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Information security capability maturity (ISCM) is a journey towards accurate alignment of 
business and security objectives, security systems, processes, and tasks integrated with business-
enabled IT systems, security enabled organizational culture and decision making, and 
measurements and continuous improvements of controls and governance comprising security 
policies, processes, operating procedures, tasks, monitoring, and reporting. Information security 
capability maturity may be achieved in five levels: performing but ad-hoc, managed, defined, 
quantitatively governed, and optimized. These five levels need to be achieved in the capability 
areas of information integrity, information systems assurance, business enablement, security 
processes, security program management, competency of security team, security consciousness 
in employees, and security leadership. These areas of capabilities lead to achievement of 
technology trustworthiness of security controls, integrated security, and security guardianship 
throughout the enterprise, which are primary capability domains for achieving maturity of 
information security capability in an organization. There are many factors influencing the areas 
of capabilities and the capability domains for achieving information security capability maturity. 
However, there is little existing study done on identifying the factors that contribute to 
achievement of the highest level of information security capability maturity (optimized) in an 
organization.  
This research was designed to contribute to this area of research gap by identifying the factors 
contributing to the areas of capabilities for achieving the highest level of information security 
capability maturity. The factors were grouped under the eight capability areas and the three 
capability domains in the form of an initial structural construct. This research was designed to 
collect data on all the factors using an online structured questionnaire and analyzing the 
reliability and validity of the initial structural construct following the methods of principal 
components analysis (PCA), Cronbach Alpha reliability analysis, confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA), and structural equation modeling. A number of multivariate statistical tests were 
conducted on the data collected regarding the factors to achieve an optimal model reflecting 
statistical significance, reliability, and validity. The research was conducted in four phases: 
expert panel and pilot study (first phase), principal component analysis (PCA) and reliability 
analysis (RA) of the factor scales (second phase), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using 
LISREL (third phase), and structural equation modeling (SEM) using LISREL (fourth phase). 
The final model subsequent to completing the four phases reflected acceptance or rejection of the 
eleven hypotheses defined in the initial structural construct of this study. 
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The final optimized model was obtained with the most significant factors loading on the 
capability areas of information integrity, information security assurance, business enablement, 
security process maturity, security program management, competency of security team, security 
conscious employees, and security leadership, including the most significant factors loading the 
three capability domains of security technology trustworthiness, security integration, and security 
guardianship. All the eleven hypotheses were accepted as part of the optimal structural construct 
of the final model. The model provides a complex integrated framework of information security 
maturity requiring multi-functional advancements and maturity in processes, people, and 
technology, and organized security program management and communications fully integrated 
with the business programs and communications. Information security maturity is concluded as a 
complex function of multiple maturity programs in an organization leading to organized 
governance structures, multiple maturity programs, leadership, security consciousness, and risk-
aware culture of employees. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Recognizing, strategizing, planning, and implementing information security management 
system as an organizational framework is now more than two decades old (Whitman & Mattord, 
2012). The British Standard for information security management, BS7799 (later, International 
Standards Organization, ISO 27001 and ISO 17799), the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, NIST 800 series special publications, IETF security architecture (Internet 
Engineering Task Force), COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations), and COBIT 
(Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies) are some of the most prominent 
initiatives in establishing, operating, and monitoring information security and risk management 
systems (Rhodes-Ousley, 2013; Whitman & Mattord, 2012; Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA), 2012; The ISO 27000 directory, 2007; Yost, 2007; Bowen et al., 
2006). Standards and technologies have been helpful to organizations in creating governance 
structures for information security and providing direct controls for the higher management 
(Bowen et al., 2006). However, given the continuous instances of security breaches demanding 
elevated levels of information security (Bahl & Wali, 2014; Kooper, Maes, & Lindgreen, 2011; 
Posthumus & Solms, 2004; Moulton & Coles, 2003), established security processes and 
governance structures still appear to be unorganized, unstructured, and unreliable. In view of 
governance being a collection of strategies and processes that formally manages problems 
Palczewska, Fu, Trundle, and Yang (2013), there appears to be drawbacks in efforts relating to 
well-defined and enhanced processes, sound standardization, and the lack of adequate security 
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awareness, analysis, support, implementation, and maintenance within organizations. Moreover, 
there is very little research on modeling information security governance maturity given that 
there is inadequate attention to what should be treated as “adequate security” and how the 
security governance controls can be considered as effective – “How does security get 
optimized?” How do organizations realize what threats exist, their likelihood, and its possible 
impact? How do organizations measure performances, ensure compliance to regulations, validate 
sufficiency in security, and identify improvements in security maturity? Given the heightened 
challenges of information security, organizations need to understand the importance of assessing 
their information security maturity levels, resulting priorities, what is important, and what is 
relevant to them, what approaches will work, the direction they need to take, and most 
importantly, “how to fix it.” Therefore, this research is focused on investigating and identifying 
the key factors that contribute towards impacting information security governance and enabling 
information security maturity in an organization. The outcome of this research is an optimal 
structural construct showing the Factors contributing towards Information Security Maturity in 
an Organization (FISMO) and their mutual relationships that will facilitate a better understanding 
of the current security status, the extent of security maturity, identify associated risks if any, 
facilitate effective decision-making and governance, and pave the way towards enhanced 
security maturity levels within the organization. 
1.2 Research Problem and Argument 
The research problem of this study identified and established the factors impacting and 
enabling information security maturity in an organization. While the essential attributes 
determining maturity of information security are defined in many research studies, there are only 
a few studies focusing on the right blend of factors that contribute to achieving a secure 
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organizational environment and designing the stepwise approach for gaining maturity especially 
in a continuously changing organizational environment. Focus is required on not only technology 
and people or the human factor, but also processes in order to achieve benefits and become 
successful. 
Information systems is defined as an organized collection of people, information, 
business processes, and information technology designed to transform inputs into outputs, in 
order to achieve a goal (Huber et al., 2007). While information systems comprise of people, 
machines, and/or methods organized to collect, process, transmit, and disseminate data that 
represent user information (American National Standards, 2007), information security pertains to 
the practice of protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction (Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA), 2002). Therefore, it is important for information security programs to consider 
approaches by which organizational people, processes and technologies can interact as well as 
consider exactly how organizational governance, culture, human factors and architectures will 
obstruct or assist the ability of the organization to manage risk and thereby protect organizational 
information (ISACA, 2009). Consequently, effective governance is required to create a 
controlled environment for desirable actions to drive the effective, efficient, and secure use of 
information technology (Robinson (2005), which in turn ensures and fulfills the alignment with 
business processes and performance goals within the organization (El-Mekawy, Rusu, and 
Perjons, 2015; Ali & Green, 2012; Chen, 2010; Khaiata & Zualkernan, 2009; De Haes and Van 
Grembergen, 2009; Luftman,  2000), the misalignment of which can lead to high costs and 
organizational failure (Kuhn, Ahuja, & Mueller, 2013; Chen, 2010). Despite such endorsements, 
4 
 
 
concerns have been raised on the effectiveness of such alignment and governance being viewed 
as an unmanageable mechanism (Kooper et al., 2011). 
Yet again, according to Khther and Othman (2013) governance is basically related to the 
management of risks associated with information technology and delivery of value via the 
strategic alignment of business and information technology, resource, and performance 
management. According to ISACA (2011) survey, considerations for security, shared services, 
resource maximization and governance concerns have contributed to a growing focus on 
enterprise-based information technology management and governance, including issues 
surrounding information technology strategic alignment with business mission, regulatory 
compliance, and adherence to generally accepted security and control practices. While there is 
some increase in recognition of governance, progress is still slow. De Haes and Van Grembergen 
(2005) maintain that, “information technology governance can be deployed using a mix of 
structures, processes and relational mechanisms,” an approach that further complicates 
governance and security initiates in organizations. Several researchers (Peterson, 2004; Patel, 
2004; Duffy, 2002; and Zmud, 1999), recommend that “a holistic approach towards IT 
governance acknowledges its complex and dynamic nature, consisting of a set of interdependent 
subsystems that deliver a powerful whole.” Organizations must take into consideration every 
organization‘s needs, requirements, and culture when defining their approach to information 
technology governance (Calder, 2016; Selig, 2015; McLeod, 2013). 
Similarly, in information security literature, there has been a lot of attention on security 
technology, security policy, and the human factor, in particular, security policy violation and 
security education, training, and awareness program (SETA) aiming at raising awareness 
(Schnittling&Munn, 2010) and reducing the security policy violations by employees. Even 
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Kuhn, Ahuja, and Mueller (2013) indicate that insufficient awareness or misunderstanding of 
operational controls could potentially lead to financial loss. However, there is no adequate 
attention paid to the organizational environment as a whole for attaining information security 
maturity. Thomson & von Solms (2006) and Barnum & McGraw (2005) described security 
maturity as the process of achieving organizational knowledge gradually through experiences, 
creating repetitive processes, procedures, and tasks, and enhancing people skills and 
competencies. It may begin with a basic level of awareness and mature to a level when all 
employees achieve significant knowledge and skills in managing security such that an 
organization wise security competency is developed. The capability maturity model integration 
(CMMI) by Software Engineering Institute is based on the philosophy that processes and process 
models hold an organization structurally and functionally. They are key enablers for aligning 
employees with the way the higher management planned to do business in the markets. However, 
merely having processes in place is not sufficient. They need to deliver what they are expected to 
for the business and build an organizational knowledge framework for reusing by the employees. 
Processes help in using people and technologies in more effective and competitive ways. 
In modern times, there may be hardly an organization not having established information 
security policies and procedures. A large number of organizations have achieved formal 
certifications for their information security policies and processes. However, these are not 
sufficient for achieving maturity. Thomson and von Solms (2006) reiterated that such 
organizations can be merely considered at which, the policies and processes are in place but the 
employees are unconsciously incompetent in managing them. Conscious competence in 
information security is an organizational skill that is achieved through the path of achieving 
maturity. The traditional myths need to be discarded to enter this path. Karokola, Kowalski, & 
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Yngstrom (2011) argued that information security has been viewed as a group of technical skills 
owned by specialists. Until recently, the concept of security governance had not even evolved 
because the models of employee participation were not implemented adequately (Karokola, 
Kowalski, & Yngstrom, 2011). In general, the people aspects of information security were not 
explored adequately in the professional world while the academics were highlighting the known 
issues through their research studies.  
On the other hand, while there are prominent standards that have been highlighting the 
risks and vulnerabilities on the technical side and recommending essential controls (like NIST 
800 series special publications, IETF security architecture, ISO 27001, and Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS)) (Bowen et al., 2006; ISACA, 2012; Rhodes-
Ousley, 2013; The ISO 27000 directory, 2007; Whitman & Mattord, 2012; Yost, 2007). Calder 
(2016) contends that “most information technology management frameworks and standards offer 
solutions and tools that can help with information technology governance, but they are typically 
very detailed, and have narrow scopes. No single framework or standard provides a full set of 
information technology governance tools and, collectively, they can provide a confusing picture 
that actually hinders the core purpose of information technology governance.” Chang et al. 
(2014), recently combined the Auditing Standard (International Standards on Auditing (ISA) and 
Sarbanes Oxley (SOX)) and Information Security organization guidelines (COSO, COBIT, 
ISO27001/BS7799) in order to aid with the best framework and complement any deficiencies. 
According to IT Governance Ltd. (2016), even though “there are many information technology 
related management frameworks, standards and methodologies in use today, none of them, on 
their own, are standalone IT governance frameworks, but they all have a useful role in the 
efficient management of IT operations.” It should be iterated that while these frameworks are all 
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linked with the concept of trustworthy computing, they cannot be overlooked. They should be 
considered along with people competence, learning, (Thomson & von Solms, 2006) and process 
maturity (BSI, 2002; SSE CMM, 1999; Philips, 2003). Therefore, we need to focus not only on 
technology and people or the human factor, but also processes in order to achieve benefits and 
become successful. Adequate attention needs to be paid to the organizational environment as a 
whole.  
Yet again, Dunkerly and Tejay (2008) focused on technology and semantics (users) to 
derive security benefits. However, process aspects were not adequately fleshed out. ISACA’s 
(Information Systems Audit and Control Association) Business Model for Information Security 
(BMIS) model focuses on organization design and strategy plus people, process, and technology 
(ISACA, 2009). Also, Doss (2012) focused on organizational insider threats and emphasized 
security guardianship as an important construct in security policy violation. While leadership, 
organizational culture and structure can have an impact (Dutta &McCrohan, 2002), proper and 
balanced attention needs to be paid to people, process, and technology aspects of information 
security to make necessary improvements and achieve security maturity in an organization. For 
security practitioners, it is imperative to know what can be done to attain success with security 
endeavors to attain the level of maturity with security and also determine which factors to focus 
on in order to achieve a secure organizational environment. 
1.3 Problem Description 
Establishing an understanding and providing key terms are crucial to communicate 
common knowledge acquired during this research (Alter, 2008). With the tremendous increase in 
information security risks, it is important for organizations to understand the underlying cause 
for security risks and failures and gain knowledge to the path of achieving security maturity 
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within their organization. Information security is defined as the protection of information and 
information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability (NIST, 2004). The 
primary reasons for information security requirement according to the Ernst & Young Global 
Information Security Survey (Ernst & Young, 2005), pertain to compliance with regulations, 
threats, and meeting business objectives. Raghupathi (2007) suggests that the drivers for business 
strategy could be external through compliance with policies and internal through strategic 
performance measures. Achieving an effective information security assists in reducing threats, 
effectively managing risks, and preventing security breaches. It is better to build defenses to 
protect and prevent any compromises (Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff, 2009; Knapp & Boulton, 2006; 
Anderson, 2003; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002).  
Organizations tend to address information security from a technology perspective (Chen, 
2008; Caralli & Wilson, 2004; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Gordon & Loeb, 2002) that causes a 
concern when managing information security (Caralli & Wilson, 2004). Also, the methodologies 
utilized for evaluating information security are profoundly influenced by methodologies of the 
past (Siponen, 2002). Further, information security is heavily event-driven and reactive (Caralli, 
2004) when it should be considered as proactive and an ongoing event (von Solms, 2001). While 
Dhillon (1995) describes information systems security as the minimization of risks that arise in 
response to inconsistent and incoherent activities, Johansson et al. (2006), view the management 
of enterprise information security assessments and detection of risks as significant factors for the 
preservation of information assets. Anderson (2003) focuses on the importance of actually 
understanding, measuring and communicating about risk. Therefore, it is imperative to take steps 
to prevent serious security breaches and not just work towards reducing their impact (Anderson, 
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2003). In fact, it should be realized that information security pertains to a structured set of 
actions to meet an organization’s business, policy, and governance requirements (White & 
Bruton, 2011). Given the numerous business drivers being handled by organizations, information 
security needs to be focused from a business perspective to determine organizational information 
security requirements (Su et al., 2007) and their components should be analyzed by senior 
decision makers (Ekstedt et al., 2004).  
In addition, organizations need to realize the risks of inadequate information security 
(Carrali & Wilson, 2004). Organizations need to understand the importance of controlling and 
governing their entire organization to eliminate potential failures given that organizations that 
reported weaknesses in internal controls had significantly larger forecasting errors compared 
with organizations with effective internal controls (Li et al., 2012). The exact factors that 
contribute to information security is still not clearly identified and defined in many organizations 
to realize the desired level of security maturity for protecting their informational assets. Further, 
organizations need to recognize the importance of aligning such factors to their strategic business 
objectives with the aim of achieving success with the initiatives of protecting information and 
enabling information systems assurance. Achieving information security maturity is not only 
complicated, but critical to the operations of an organization in contributing towards a robust 
information security environment as well as in achieving its overall goals and objectives and 
promoting the mission of the organization. It is critical therefore, to implement information 
security practices within the organizational context given that each organizational composition of 
business drivers and risk tolerances vary from each other (Carrali & Wilson, 2004). Information 
security is a risk management discipline (Johansson et al., 2006, Spears, 2005; Blakley et al., 
2002) where risk analysis can be utilized to identify vulnerabilities, threats, and business impact 
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for valuing security risks together with determining policy content analysis and information 
security planning (Locher, 2005; Farah, 2005).  
Finally, alignment of information security requires the involvement and attention of all 
entities to ensure their organizations information security is well protected. For effective 
security, users need to make a conscious decision for complying with organizational security 
policies and adopting computer security behavior (Ng et al., 2009). Written documentation in the 
form of information security policies is required to outline the structure of the organizational 
security posture and define acceptable actions (Baker & Wallace, 2007; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; 
Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Metzler, 2007). Thus, the benefits of studying and investigating this 
problem area is focused to not only reveal the contributing factors towards information security 
maturity, but to enable organizations in aligning and applying these variables to their business 
management objectives and performance measurement strategies. Other benefits include 
promoting a security awareness culture across the organizations on information security as well 
as maturity levels, requirements, and benefits. In addition, although “security benefits” is 
arguably the most important measure of success with an information system security program 
(Dunkerley and Tejay, (2011), other important outcome expected includes circumventing major 
security risks and negligence, avoidance of cost, degradation of reputation, and promoting 
organization-wide security and normal functioning of organizational operations. 
1.4 Importance of the Research Context 
With the increased reliance on information systems, organizations are prioritizing their 
information security (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Information systems security is often perceived as a 
purely technical concern (Posthumus & Solms, 2004; Moulton & Coles, 2003; Williams, 2001; 
von Solms, 2001; Wood, 1995), which in turn fails to consider all factors that constitute security 
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of information systems (Willison & Backhouse, 2006). However, it is common knowledge that 
technological controls alone are not adequate for safeguarding information security (Lee and Lee 
2002) and in recent times information security protection is considered a highly-complicated task 
requiring a blend of secured practices to include technological, behavioral, managerial, 
philosophical and organizational factors (Crossler et al., 2013). While prior and current research 
has provided a great wealth of knowledge pertaining to the factors contributing towards 
information security maturity, more importantly, recent studies have determined security as 
collective information practices of risk, trust, and morality (Dourish and Anderson 2006). These 
and other findings have inspired the holistic approach to information security within the 
organization to include relational interactions between work groups, policies and technologies. 
Despite contributions from other research studies, minimal research has been focused on 
the exact factors contributing to information systems security maturity within an organizational 
context. Hence, this study is not only geared towards organizing significant and extensive 
amount of information systems security and security maturity literature, but mainly focused on 
identifying the core factors that contribute towards information security maturity. It also focuses 
on presenting the mutual relationships of the factors identified that can better enable in 
determining “how secure are we or need to be?” as well as assisting in promoting “security 
maturity” in an organizational environment. Most importantly, this study makes an effort to 
operationalize these factors as a model to predict maturity levels given information security 
initiatives within organizations.  
Given the concept of assurance, for the purposes of this research, the definition derived 
by Anderson (2003, p310) is adopted regarding evaluating each information security function 
objectively to ascertain how it adds to a “well informed sense of assurance that information risks 
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and controls are in balance.” Organizations need to assure the security of the information and 
integrity of critical information assets in advance to protect against complex and obscured 
attacks, including the development of relevant security policies (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). 
Anderson (2003) considers that with the basis of assurance in information security, even with 
nothing unfortunate happening, information security professionals have the opportunity to get 
noticed in a good way. Thus, the return on information security investment can be further 
enhanced via improved reputation as a result of good governance (Cowan, 2011). 
While information security policy is the foundation of any information security system 
and drives the implementation of the other security measures (Hagen, Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 
2008), a control that does not function effectively to reduce risk may actually increase other 
exposures (Anderson, 2003). According to Moulton & Coles (2003), information security 
governance is “the establishment and maintenance of the control environment to manage the 
risks relating to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and its supporting 
processes and systems which is not a part of audit (ensuring that governance processes been 
properly established and are functioning), security operation (day-to-day performance of security 
administrative activities) and security development (engineering of new information technology 
or processes to meet security objectives).” Given the definition, this leads to the question: Is 
there a systemic approach to achieving information security governance? 
The ISO 27001 standard and the COBIT modeling approach recommend a systemic 
approach to implementing information security governance (Ula, Ismail, & Sidek, 2011; Barlette 
et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007; Whittman & Mattord, 2012). Several organizations strive 
to document and formalize the operational and strategic objectives creating methodologies such 
as COBIT, ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library), ISO 20000, and ISO 38500 
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(Bin-Abbas & Bakry, 2014). Similarly, organizations use such methodologies for audit and 
control purposes, and ISO 17799 for meeting security management obligations (Iden & 
Eikebrokk, 2014). According to Janssen and Schrenker (2011), ISO 20000 is the most 
acknowledged best practice in the information technology service management standard. COBIT 
was developed by the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) as a model and best practice guideline 
(Bernroider and Ivanov (2011) for information technology management that consist of internal 
controls and holistic operations controls (Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2003) which minimizes the 
management risk of information technology (Kerr and Murthy (2013). Then again, ITIL’s 
responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical 
standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national 
security-related information in Federal information systems. NIST Special Publication 800-160 
attempts to bring greater clarity to the difficult and challenging problems associated with a 
systems-oriented viewpoint on realizing trustworthy secure systems. Lastly, complex systems 
present problems that require solutions achieved through the application of the types of holistic 
processes represented by ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288, a systems engineering standard that provides the 
foundation and basis for the discipline of systems security engineering.  
Together with relevant guidelines, these standards recommend establishing the 
information security framework by defining the security requirements for the organization and 
establishing the contexts very clearly as per the management’s vision and strategy. As stated by 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010), “strategy is a firm’s contingent plan as to the business 
model it will use” (p. 204). This implies that a practice similar to requirements engineering 
approach to systems maturity (Chandra, 2001; Montgomery, 2009; Montgomery & Runger, 
2014; Tetlay & John, 2009) is in place. The information security framework needs to be 
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implemented as per the contexts and requirements established by the management and the 
organization needs to deliver as per them (Barlette et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007; 
Whittman & Mattord, 2012). 
Thus, one of the key domain areas required for achieving information security 
governance maturity is controlling the systemic design of information security framework in the 
organization. Perhaps, the control charts method of achieving maturity, as described by Tetlay & 
John (2009), SEI (1995), and SSE CMM (1999) needs to be adopted in information security 
governance maturity, as well. However, the organization will have to define what constitutes a 
defect in the framework, and what should be the upper and lower bounds of the tolerance range. 
These are strategic decisions that the management needs to make during the requirements 
definition phase, as recommended by Tetlay & John (2009), SEI (1995), and SSE CMM (1999). 
Further, information security implementation is a major change management project, given that a 
new management system is planned, piloted, implemented, operated, and monitored in the 
organization (BSI, 2005). An organization not matured in managing change may find it difficult 
to carry out all these activities and plan for a maturity path for information security governance 
maturity. After designing the management system, and defining the security policies, objectives, 
and tasks, the organization will need to identify change champions and make organization-wide 
communications for diffusing the design ensuring employee participation and managing 
resistance to change. These capabilities need to be matured in an organization for managing 
complex change projects like this successfully (Oxtoby, McGuiness, & Morgan, 2002). 
With change projects comes challenge in organizational learning and team competency 
for achieving information security governance maturity. ISO 27001 and COBIT emphasizes on 
repeatable process and learning from experiences in managing security incidents and managing 
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security controls (BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007). Repeatable processes require implementing 
searchable knowledge units linked with the processes in action (Christensen & Knudsen, 2009; 
Foss & Michailova, 2009; Heiman, Nickerson, & Zenger, 2009). Repeatable processes need to 
be designed in such a way that the outcomes and quality levels are consistent every time the 
processes are auctioned (Christensen & Knudsen, 2009; Foss & Michailova, 2009; Heiman, 
Nickerson, & Zenger, 2009). Achieving repeatable processes with sustainable outcomes and 
quality are achieved at level four of SEI CMM (SEI, 2006) and also requires level 4 knowledge 
management maturity (Kochikar, 2000). While maturity in information security risk and 
assurance management is highly essential domain for information security given that the former 
is an integral part of the latter in COBIT and ISO 27001 standards (Barlette et al., 2009; BSI, 
2005; ISACA, 2007; Whittman & Mattord, 2012), the risk management practice can be made 
organized and repeatable using knowledge management maturity at level 4. However, since 
repeatable processes tend to exist at an intermediate level, these processes need to be defined, 
managed, measured, and optimized at all stages of the information cycle.  
Additionally, research skills are needed to conduct internal studies in the organization 
such that the effectiveness of practices and controls may be studied. Maturity in research design, 
methods, tools and techniques, data analysis, and abstract conceptualization capabilities 
(Szakonyi, 1994) may help in meeting the need for making controls effectiveness assessments by 
collecting and analyzing information from the controlled assets and from the people controlling 
and using them (Barlette et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007; Whittman & Mattord, 2012). 
Further, testing the levels of effectiveness of information security controls requires feedback 
(Barlette et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007; Whittman & Mattord, 2012). While many data 
sets needed from the controlled assets can be collected from the activity monitoring logs, the 
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behavioral and compliance aspects can be assessed by collecting data from individual 
interactions or organization-wide surveys (Lacey, 2009). Hence, a good level of competency in 
organizational research is required.  
Also, maturity in the domain of strategic business management is essential for every 
organization (BS Institute, 2010; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). There is no need to argue about 
it. It is required as the fundamental maturity for implementing maturity in any other key domain 
area and information security governance is not an exception. Information security governance is 
a strategic initiative and implementing its maturity program needs maturity in strategic 
management. The desired level of strategic management maturity should be level 4 (organized, 
proactive, and structured). Information security governance requires a security-oriented 
organization structure with specific roles, responsibilities, performance targets, and 
measurements (Barlette et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007; Whittman & Mattord, 2012). An 
organization needs to be matured in strategic management to create and manage the strategic 
layer and organization structure for governing information security and achieving its highest 
maturity level. 
Information security governance also requires maturity in designing robust processes 
contributing to the integrity of information. However, will the organization require high levels of 
maturity in design practices and processes? Will the organization require engagement with 
design experts for designing the processes for each maturity level of information security 
governance? Perhaps this level of design maturity is not required. Barlette et al. (2009) and 
Whittman & Mattord (2012) have discussed about the role of information security consultant in 
interpreting the organizational information security requirements, defining the statement of 
applicability, choosing the appropriate controls from ISO 27001 and other standards, and finally 
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defining the processes. However, they did not emphasize upon the need for advanced design and 
development maturity. Most of the processes are available in NIST standard documentation and 
ISO 27002 code of best practices (BSI, 2008; NIST, 2013). Additional guides can be purchased 
from professional companies engaged in information security consultancy. Hence, it may be 
safely assumed that design and innovation maturity is not a prerequisite for maturity in 
information security governance. Having said so, it should also be kept in mind that developing 
in-house capabilities in designing, tailoring, and innovating security controls and their processes 
will benefit the organization in the longer run. The organization may not need highest levels of 
maturity but will definitely need a reasonable level of maturity in this domain. Depending on 
consultants only for designing processes, systems, and controls may not be a good idea for long-
term sustainability of maturity in information security. 
Organizational collaboration and teamwork is another very critical maturity domain 
required for achieving matured information security governance. Human factor is one of the 
most crucial factors influencing information security effectiveness in an organization (Da Veiga 
& Eloff, 2010; Koskosas & Paul, 2003; Lacey, 2009). The organization needs to have a security-
aware culture that requires extensive coordination among people within and across teams while 
making decisions for handling information assets (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Koskosas & Paul, 
2003; Lacey, 2009). Lack of coordination and teamwork can cause formation of silos that can be 
exploited easily by malicious actors (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Koskosas & Paul, 2003; Lacey, 
2009). Such a gap will also affect identification of critical information assets and operating a 
uniform level of controls for protecting and information asset that may have different sensitivity 
perceptions for different roles in the organization (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Koskosas & Paul, 
2003; Lacey, 2009). In addition, the only way to diffuse knowledge of security, threats, and risks 
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is organization-wide coordination through knowledge management (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; 
Koskosas & Paul, 2003; Lacey, 2009).  
Also, it is perceived that no organization can achieve maturity in any domain without 
having maturity in project management. This domain is perceived to be equally essential as is 
knowledge management and teamwork/collaboration management (Howes, 2001). They are 
complementary maturity domains and cannot survive in silos (Howes, 2001). For implementing 
maturity in information security governance, these three domains along with strategic 
management maturity cannot be diluted for achieving effectiveness. The lack of policies, security 
conscious employees, and adept leadership are viewed as possible factors that can influence 
actions that would cause security violations in an organization (Tejay & Doss, 2012). 
Additionally, just having the right tone set at the top, will not necessarily guarantee sound 
information security governance until non-technical issues such as awareness and compliance 
management are addressed and effectively implemented through regular compliance and risk 
reporting (Kuhn, Ahuja, and Mueller, 2013; Solms, 2006). According to Dzazali & Zolait 
(2012), awareness is the key challenge in implementing information security governance 
especially when stakeholders are reluctant to accept information security as part of the 
organizational objective due lacks of knowledge on the value added benefit it could offer. 
According to Barker (2014), when there is a gap between real and perceived security risk, it is an 
indication that the control policy of risk identification, control, monitoring action, compliance, 
etc. set at executive management level did not get translated in the expected manner by lower 
level staff. Hence, it is imperative to understand real risk exposure, in the absence of which may 
result in staff rejection (ineffective control procedure, not comfortable, not competent) of the 
control procedure decided by executive management. Ultimately, the effectiveness of 
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information security governance and the importance of maintaining information integrity still 
rest on the user’s awareness and understanding of the threat and adherence to integrity 
(Mohamed, 2013). 
Williams (2001) rightfully noted that in order to accommodate robust information 
security governance, it is essential for all negative perceptions towards information security be 
swapped beyond the traditional boundaries through inculcating the value added advantage of 
information security, which is worth to invest on. Thus, for this observation, this research 
adopted the factors such as the competency of security team, security conscious employees, and 
security leadership utilized in the research model of Tejay and Doss (2012) since employees are 
key to supporting information security efforts within an organization (Tejay & Doss, 2012). 
1.5 Outline of the Research Report 
Having provided the overall scope and definitions, this research report is divided into five 
chapters for addressing the information security maturity objective and alignment strategy. 
Chapter 1 sets the direction of this research by defining the aim, objectives and the overall 
research approach. Chapter 2 presents a detailed review of literature for providing the context 
and formulating the initial measurement model. Chapter 3 describes the initial measurement 
model, instrument development, and the sequence of methods proposed for collecting primary 
data and analyzing the model for achieving high reliability and validity. Chapter 4 presents a 
collective analysis of the findings from the data collected. And Chapter 5 delineates the final 
standing on the hypotheses and the research conclusions are presented, to include 
recommendations for future areas of research. 
20 
 
 
1.6 Summary 
This study focuses on identifying the factors that contribute towards information security 
maturity in an organization and to establish their mutual relationships. Organizations need to be 
aware of what constitutes their organizational capabilities and their current security maturity 
levels. Hence, a brief overview of information security maturity is provided in this chapter. 
Management needs to have the ability to assess and ascertain business impacts and what factors 
to focus on so management can act on attaining the desired information security maturity levels 
for the organization. Organizations need to be aware of what they are protecting against in their 
particular infrastructure and enterprise business setting before they can deploy asset protections 
wisely (Anderson, 2003, p 311). This research thus aims at providing the set of factors that 
organizations can focus on that will provide them the tools to assess their information security 
maturity levels, including the needed vision and practical assurance of where exactly they stand 
with respect to information security maturity. In addition, these identified factors will provide 
organizations with insight into the challenges of information risks and controls they can plan and 
focus on to ensure business objectives are met together with attaining the desired confidence and 
information security maturity level within the organization. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the literature review comprises of a broad spectrum of information 
security maturity contributions and significance that is geared towards providing a strong context 
and background to investigate in-depth the various concepts and their indicators being utilized in 
this study. The literature review also facilitates creating a sound fundamental theoretical 
foundation to establish the primary research instrument for conducting the field surveys. First, 
the research space and criteria for choosing literature and the review method are briefly 
discussed. The sections that follow, examines and provides a detailed description of relevant 
maturity models and its implications and concludes with a summary of the related work. 
2.2 Criteria for Choosing Literatures 
While a structured approach is needed to improve the rigor of literature search (Webster 
and Watson, 2002), literature reviews clearly define the problem using theoretical context and 
explain how other researchers have investigated similar studies (Singleton and Straits, 2010). 
The secondary research part of this study is a structured literature review that assists in 
confirming the theories and assumptions being employed to study the contributing factors 
towards information security maturity in organizations. Hence, this section provides the context 
and background of current and evolving literatures in which this study will be conducted. A 
systematic review of literatures is presented pertaining to the technical aspects, people, security 
process, and security maturity, which is an extension to the importance of research context 
established in Sections1.4 and 2.1. Further, Section 2.3 presents a review of the general concepts 
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pertaining to capability maturity. This section presents a review of the theories on what 
constitutes organizational capability and how its maturity can be assessed in an organization. 
Section 2.4 presents a review of the factors that constitute information security governance 
maturity in an organization. Section 2.5 is a review of the different models for assessing and 
measuring organizational capabilities in the context of their fields of applications. This section 
presents a review of management aspects of information security and the activities needed to 
achieve improved maturity levels in an organization. Section 2.6 presents a review of the factors 
influencing the variables related with information security maturity modeling. 
The literature have been chosen from reputed journals and databases, published academic 
theses, professional reports from reputed institutions and organizations, Internet sources from 
reputed websites, and books. The literature with relevant context that is considered addingvalue 
to this research and its investigation has been shortlisted. The literature shortlisted comprises of 
studies, models, designs, standards, processes, and practices related to information security 
management and governance, and goals aimed at achieving maturity in these areas in an 
organization. 
2.3 Introduction to Capability Maturity 
Capability maturity of an organization is related to the readiness levels achieved by the 
organization pertaining to the business needs. Primarily, the readiness levels are tested for 
capability maturity are in the areas of technologies, processes, production systems, internal 
research and development, people skills. The key determinants of capability maturity are 
effective organization-wide communications, reusable knowledge, flexible processes, 
measurements, monitoring, decision-support, fault tolerance, reduced flaws (defects), and 
business continuity (Relyea, 2011; Tetlay & John, 2009; Cuellar, 2009; Braf & Goldkuhl, 2002; 
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Ulrich & Lake, 1991).  Braf & Goldkuhl (2002) discussed that these determinants of 
organizational maturity need to coexist and complement each other within an organizational 
environment. They presented a model of interaction between organizational capabilities and its 
action. Matured capabilities with the help of these complementing capabilities ensure a number 
of action types in the organization. Some of the action types shown in their model are instructed 
action, automated action, efficient tool-supported action, coordinated and organized action, and 
competent action.  
Maturity is a reflection of how the specific capability is acting as per the expectations of 
the business (Braf & Goldkuhl, 2002). Such a reflection can be achieved by having appropriate 
monitoring and control systems in place (Braf & Goldkuhl, 2002). The overall capability index is 
estimated by combining the monitoring data of critical variables pertaining to multiple key 
domains areas (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; Irribaren et al., 2008). Each key domain area 
has its maturity level defined and the critical variables provide information on the maturity level 
achieved by the organization in a particular domain (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; 
Irribaren et al., 2008). Some examples of key domains are enterprise architecture governance, IT 
services, IT governance, business process management, compliance to regulations, technologies, 
marketing, finance management, portfolio management, risks management, security, quality 
assurance, and human capital management (Irribaren et al., 2008; Ulrich & Lake, 1991).  
The level of maturity achieved by a particular key domain area can be assessed with the 
help of a maturity grid (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; Fraser, Moultrie, & Gregory, 2002). 
Typically, there are four or five levels of maturity levels in the maturity grid (Maier, Moultrie, & 
Clarkson, 2012). Broadly, the first level is related to uncertainty in why the problems exist in the 
key domain areas (assuming that the organization has already identified its problem areas) 
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(Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; DeBruin & Rosemann, 2005). The second level is related to 
a state of awakening when the organization is exploring the solutions to the problems existing in 
the key domain areas (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012). At this level, a basic level of 
implementing the solutions is also expected (Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; DeBruin & Rosemann, 
2005). The third level is related to a level of enlightenment when the management is able to 
identify and implement the exact solutions (based on explorations and experiences at level 2) and 
is able to define and execute a continuous improvements program (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 
2012). At this stage, the corrective and preventive actions to problems evolve and diffuse 
throughout the organization (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; DeBruin & Rosemann, 2005). 
The fourth level is related to wisdom when the management is able to prevent the problems from 
reoccurring. At this stage, the root causes of most of the problems are known to the organization 
(Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; DeBruin & Rosemann, 2005). The fifth level is related to a 
level of certainty when the management knows very well how to ensure a problem-free 
environment in the organization in the key domain areas (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; 
DeBruin & Rosemann, 2005). 
Achieving maturity in the capabilities of the key domain areas should be an organized 
phase wise project accomplished over a period planned by the management (DeBruin & 
Rosemann, 2005). It needs to have a vision and strategy (Becker, Knackstedt, & Oppelbub, 
2009). In addition, the organization should be prepared to begin the maturity process (Maier, 
Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012; Van Steenbergen et al., 2010). The preparedness for beginning the 
journey to maturity depends upon four factors, as the following (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 
2012; Van Steenbergen et al., 2010): 
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(a) The organization should have structured processes and their adherence in the chosen key 
domain area. The processes should be enabled effectively by formality, transparency, 
technologies, and reporting. 
(b) The organization should have an appropriate organization structure with defined jobs, 
roles, and human capital policies for beginning the journey to maturity. For example, the 
organization may assign a process championship role in each function within the chosen 
key domain area. 
(c) The organization should have a positive attitude, mindset, and awareness towards the 
learning cycle in the journey to maturity in the chosen key domain area. 
(d) The organization should have a positive attitude, mindset, and awareness towards 
developing people skills in the journey to maturity. 
In the next section, a review of literatures on maturity models of multiple key domain 
areas is presented. This review gives an insight into how maturity models can be designed and 
the implementation phases can be planned. 
2.4 Information Security and its Maturity 
The primary objective of information security is to protect the functioning, stakeholders, 
and customers of an organization by protecting the confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
reliability, compliance, effectiveness, and efficiency of its information assets as per the business 
needs (Whitman & Mattord, 2012; Bowen et al., 2006; Tipton, 2004; ISACA, 2012) and through 
the application of policy, technology, education, and awareness (Khoo et al., 2010). At a broad 
level, information security governance is established based on external directives from legislative 
and executive laws, orders, and regulations and internal directives based on business policies, 
rules, and guidelines (Bowen et al., 2006). Top executives are expected to conduct governance in 
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areas of strategic planning, executive compensation, financial reporting, statutory/regulatory 
compliance, and risk management (Bart & Turel, 2010). Further, much attention has been 
directed towards proper management controls, especially with the requirement for organizations 
to comply with federal mandates and to know where they are at in terms of a maturity 
measurement (Bernroider and Ivanov, 2011). The information security governance structure 
comprises the strategic planning framework, an organization structure with roles and 
responsibilities, an enterprise information security architecture, security policies and procedures 
linked with the organizational structure and the enterprise architecture, and methods of 
operations at the ground levels (ISACA, 2012; Bowen et al., 2006; BSI, 2005). According to 
Norton and Pine (2013) such strategic planning should align organizational goals such that it 
creates the best value for its customers. 
ISO 27001 and ISACA’s COBIT explain the seven key attributes protected for 
information assets introduced in the previous paragraph (BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2012). These 
attributes are defined in Section 1.4 as per the concepts presented in these two standards. Von 
Solms & von Solms (2006, p. 406) presented a model for protecting these attributes that requires 
three broad levels in the organization structure: the board (or top management) level, the middle 
management level, and the lower management level. The board or top management layer is 
responsible for issuing strategic security governance directives in line with the broad-level 
business objectives. The middle management layer is responsible for translating the strategic 
directives into detailed tactical policies and communicating to the lower management layer. The 
lower management layer is responsible for defining processes and procedures for complying with 
the tactical policies and implementing them. The middle management layer is responsible for 
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reviewing and approving these processes and procedures and ensuring the integration and 
enablement of these defined practices.  
To judge the effectiveness, integrity, and adequacy of compliance, an internal audit team, 
serving as a feedback mechanism control, conducts periodic audits and reports the findings to all 
the three layers. COBIT v5 recommends four layers in the information security governance 
framework: owners and stakeholders, security-governing body, top and middle management, and 
operations and executions staff (ISACA, 2012). COBIT v5 views information security as one of 
the core dimensions of IT governance that operates in the cycle of evaluating, directing, and 
monitoring for directives, principles, and policies (ISACA, 2012). At the management layer 
(below the governance layer), the cycle of planning, building, running, and monitoring is 
executed for the individual processes and operating procedures to provide the required 
information security assurance (ISACA, 2012). 
Karyda, Kiountouzis, & Kokolakis (2005: p. 258) described the key attributes for success 
of information security governance as an appropriate organizational structure led by a CISO 
(chief information security officer), security-oriented organizational culture, top management 
support, participation of information asset owners and users in formulating processes and 
procedures, incorporating security in the goals of asset owners and users, periodic training and 
measurement of its effectiveness, and feedback control mechanism. COBIT v5 views security 
goals, security principles, organizational structure for security, processes and practices, and core 
security capabilities as key enablers of security governance (ISACA, 2012). NIST special 
publication 800-100 suggests alignment with organizational business and policies, laws, and 
regulations, senior management or leadership commitment, competency of security team via 
training and skills building, accountability of employees, enterprise-wide integration, appropriate 
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organizational structure, sound monitoring systems, and effective use of monitoring data as key 
determinants of information security governance success (Bowen et al., 2006).  
Whitman & Mattord (2012) argued that professional, ethical, and legal issues are the 
most prominent challenges in implementing effective information security governance. They 
also proposed that effective risk management is core process needed to achieve high governance 
effectiveness of information security. Many scholars view security conscious employees, 
security-oriented culture and its tacit determinants, management’s efforts in diffusing security 
culture in an organization, and security awareness program development and implementation as 
the most critical attributes for effectiveness of information security governance (Kuhn, Ahuja, 
and Mueller, 2013; Schnittling & Munn, 2010; Boss et al., 2009; Warkentin and Willison, 2009; 
Gross and Rosson, 2007; Flowerday and von Solms, 2006; Thomson and von Solms, 2005; 
Koskosas and Paul, 2003). Cole, Krutz, & Conley (2005) and Fenton & Wolfe (2004) discussed 
that the human side of information security comprises more vulnerabilities than processes and 
technologies. They described the human systems that should be in place for achieving high 
effectiveness in information security governance comprising organizational structures, roles, 
selection, and recruitment of employees, background checks, internal training and orientations, 
rewards and punishments, and reporting structures. Their reports identified certain flaws in 
designing the organizational structure for security that results in ineffective implementation. For 
example, commitment of resources for operating and monitoring the controls may not be 
estimated accurately. In addition, the boundaries of responsibilities and accountabilities may be 
defined inaccurately causing confusion on who should handle a specific incident or alert. These 
results reveal that human aspects should be at the core of effectiveness of information security 
governance maturity in an organization. If the culture of security responsibility is in place, 
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processes can be effective if designed appropriately as per the security requirements of an 
organization.  
Further, Lacey (2009) focused on the human aspects of information security examining 
the importance of staff consciousness on corporate policy and designing secure systems. 
Security-oriented culture in an organization can be instigated effectively if everyone is involved 
in making the difference. Security governance and management systems cannot be designed in 
silo in a closed boardroom. Open collaboration and transparency by security leadership are key 
attributes for commanding security-oriented team and culture in an organization. Threats and 
related incidents should not be treated as isolated events. There are many links invisible, to 
operators, managers, and the governors. These links will be visible only if employees are 
involved and they happily reveal secrets behind incidents without any fear. During disasters, 
events can spiral continuously going out of control. Employee involvement can ensure faster 
recovery from disasters and prevention from them. Employee loyalties, culture, and 
professionalism at workplace can ensure maturity of information security governance. They can 
stretch beyond the limits within which, the centralized governance and management teams 
operate. Effective consciousness and participation programs can help in enhancing 
organizational citizenship attitudes and behaviors of employees essential for gaining maturity in 
information security governance and the underlying management. While a top-down approach is 
preferred, employees’ envisioning of security is an essential input/feedback to the top. 
Precedents of security from other fields are also essential in designing the top-down approach. 
The real-world security architecture should position people, (employees, including leadership) at 
the center, and processes, and technologies at the periphery. This is shown in the conceptual 
diagram in Figure 2 later in this section. 
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Another critical aspect of maturity of information security governance is security 
requirements engineering that need to be well designed and established, aimed to promote the 
required integrity and assurance. The security requirements are better expressed through a 
qualitative expressive model, called requirements elicitation (Thomborson, 2010). Thomborson 
(2010, p. 4-8) described a model for preparations and data collections essential prior to 
establishing the direction, defining domains, and evolving the focus areas for security 
requirements. In this model, security is considered as a system comprising of actors on the 
attacking, protection, and prevention sides. In other words, the security system may be viewed as 
comprising three subsystems – attack subsystem, protection subsystem, and prevention 
subsystem. The system constitution requires defining all actors and their relationship with the 
system components. For example, a network attacker may be related with TCP/IP vulnerabilities 
in the networking interfaces and the assets may be related with judgmental actors 
(administrators) and functional actors (users). The organization structure should be in accordance 
with these subsystems. On the top of these subsystems, there should be a management or 
leadership system and the topmost layer should be the information security governance 
subsystem. This security model is presented in Figure 1. 
Thomborson (2010, p. 5-6) explained further that security threats may arise from 
functional behaviors (during functional operations) and non-functional behaviors (like, denial of 
service attacks). The penetration ability of an attack determines the security faults 
(vulnerabilities) of the system. There vulnerabilities may be determined based on known attack 
events. However, there may be attack patterns under preparations under the attack subsystem that 
are not yet known to the other two subsystems. These gaps may cause ambiguities in the model. 
These ambiguities can be reduced by thinking like an attacker and simulating many possible 
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attack patterns (like, war games). Simulation helps in understanding maneuvering of new 
possible attack patterns unknown yet to the protection and prevention subsystems. 
 
Figure 1. Multilayered Security Model 
(Drawn based on the concept presented by Thomborson, 2010) 
 
In his model, Thomborson (2010, p. 6-7) presented the concept of qualitative and 
quantitative modeling of security requirements analysis. While the qualitative modeling helps in 
determining security needs through explanatory analysis, quantitative modeling helps in defining 
measurement targets and designing specific metrics for measuring specific capabilities leading to 
a better assessment of the level of security process integration and maturity. The measurements 
should be precise (without any noise) and accurate (unbiased). The security ownership of 
information assets should be designed based on economic, moralistic, and business goals. 
In the context of security models, Bhattacharya, Malhotra, & Ghosh (2009, p. 23-27) 
suggested using attack graphs such that the controls can be optimized at the most exposed areas. 
In quantifiable terms, experts estimate attack surface with the help of attack graphs, which is a 
group of interfaces having similar degrees of exposures. For example, all web servers may be 
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grouped together and treated as a single attack surface. Mapping attack surface with attack 
graphs help in estimating the most probable attack paths. Controls and focus are optimized based 
on the exposure levels on the highly probable attack paths with an assumption that achieving a 
true onion-like design may not be economically feasible for many small to medium sized 
organizations. This above analysis reveals that security requirements are the most essential and 
most difficult part of designing a security governance framework. In its absence, identifying 
factors leading to information security maturity adequacy and effectiveness will be almost 
impossible in an organization. In 2005, Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (the 
institute that founded the capability maturity model) published a standard on achieving security 
quality requirements engineering (SQUARE) for guiding an organization about developing 
security requirements essential to protect its business assets (Mead, Hough, & Stehney II, 2005). 
The strategy should be very detailed encompassing the fundamental organizational structure for 
information security governance and management layers and a number of details. The details 
comprise of techniques, processes, controls, and people roles attached to them, checks, balances, 
reporting, and reviewing processes, organizational culture and style for handling security issues, 
incident response and prevention, defining security levels and metrics for their measurements, 
and economic estimates for implementing all of these. 
It is established that maturity of information security in an organization is highly 
dependent upon the quality of security requirements conducted in the organization. It is also 
established that employee values and their security-oriented culture needs to be governed to 
achieve enhancements in security maturity. However, this is just the few perspectives of the 
bigger picture. NIST (2013) special publication 800-53 revision 4 highlights security assurance 
and security trustworthiness as major determinants of security maturity. As described in the 
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standard, assurance and trust are attributes of service provider and service user, respectively. 
According to ITIL Service Strategy (2011), service strategy describes patterns, plans, positions, 
and perspectives needed to fulfill the overall business strategy, to include strategy management, 
service portfolio management, financial management, demand management, and business 
relationship management. Service design, in particular, assists in defining all aspects of 
information technology services and pertains to the design of each service, methodology, 
processes, policies, and facilitation of services. 
Assurance comes from the security managers and governors (to the end customers) about 
the level of security capability achieved in the organization. Trust comes from the end customers 
related to the level of satisfaction they could get by observing the performance of the controls 
and comparing them with their predicted performance. Both assurance and trustworthiness needs 
to be measured using different metrics and collecting data from different sets of people. In fact, 
security trustworthiness judged by the end customers should be treated as an input to information 
security governance for determining its maturity level. Without incorporating this input, 
information security governance may not gain the credibility it deserves. For example, the 
trustworthiness of incident response may be measured at multiple levels determined by the 
number of misses and the number of learning points they could collect from previous misses 
(Ahmad, Hadgkiss, & Ruighaver, 2012). Similarly, Da Veiga & Eloff (2010, p. 199-202) 
designed a framework for measuring the maturity of information security culture within an 
organization by dividing the variables in three groups – basic assumptions, values, and artifacts 
and creations.  
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Figure 2. A Conceptual Diagram showing Interactions among the Most Essential  
Attributes for Achieving Maturity in Information Security Governance 
(Source: Researcher’s visualization based on literature review till here) 
 
Based on the reviews, a conceptual diagram of the interactions among the most essential 
attributes for achieving maturity in information security governance is presented in Figure 2. The 
conceptual diagram shows people at the core interacting with processes and technologies at one 
end and the governance layer at the other end. People themselves reside within the management 
layer. The processes and technologies need to enable the assurance attribute whereas the people 
need to enable the trust attribute. Another attribute named integration has been introduced for 
tying processes and technologies. While people comprise of leadership and employees, the 
attributes governing people are envisioning, culture, behavior, openness, and awareness or 
consciousness. The attributes related to processes and technologies are assurance and integration. 
The attributes related to security governance layer are vision and strategy, security requirements 
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engineering, and internal and external compliance. These attributes are influenced by factors that 
may be internal or external to an organization. In the next section, the factors related to 
information security maturity are summarized. 
2.5 Maturity Models Relevant to Information Security Maturity 
 In Sub-Section 2.5.1, the SSE CMM (BSI, 2002; SSE CMM, 1999) and SEI CMM (SEI, 
2006) models have been reviewed. However, these models are concerned with process maturity 
only. As per the review in Sub-Section 2.5.2, process maturity is only one of the several 
readiness levels targeted on the path of achieving overall maturity in an organization. In addition, 
it is also learned from Sub-Section 2.5.2 that a maturity model should be specific to achieve 
higher levels of a particular capability readiness (or readiness in multiple capabilities targeted 
through a common maturity model). Overall, in this section, a review of maturity models 
concerned with various key domain areas, and their capability readiness target is presented. 
2.5.1 Information Integrity Maturity 
While “integrity” denotes that “outputs fully and fairly reflect its inputs, and its processes 
are complete, timely, authorized, and accurate” (Boritz, 2004), “Information integrity” measures 
the desired attributes of the information itself (Flowerday and von Solms, 2005) to include 
integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity. Given that at the technical level focus is on 
information systems within an organization, emphasis on “information integrity” is crucial 
during data transmission, receipt, and storage. Therefore, “Information has its integrity only 
when the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, validity, and processing methods are safeguarded” 
(Flowerday and von Solms, 2005, pp. 606). Information system maturity is targeted to derive 
operational capability readiness of a system within its operating environment (Tetlay & John, 
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2009). It also targets to achieve compliance readiness of a system with the requirements 
engineering specifications, a metric related to systems quality engineering and its sub-discipline 
of reliability engineering (Montgomery & Runger, 2014; Montgomery, 2009; Tetlay & John, 
2009; Chandra, 2001). Maturity of an information system is linked with its ability to perform 
without any problems and flaws with respect to the design specifications formulated by the 
requirements engineering function (Montgomery & Runger, 2014; Tetlay & John, 2009; 
Montgomery, 2009; Chandra, 2001). It is measured using the loss function concept of Dr. 
Taguchi’s experimentation model in which, a system is taken through a number of stress and 
functional tests and the results are verified for their confinement within the upper and lower 
bounds of tolerance (Montgomery & Runger, 2014; Tetlay & John, 2009; Montgomery, 2009; 
Chandra, 2001). The loss function is inversely proportional to system reliability (Montgomery & 
Runger, 2014; Tetlay & John, 2009; Montgomery, 2009; Chandra, 2001). This concept has been 
adopted in the systems engineering capability maturity model (by SEI, 1995) that takes process 
maturity into account (similar to SSE CMM and SEI CMM models discussed in Sub-Section 
2.5.1). Information systems maturity can be achieved in three phases – immature (defects mostly 
outside the lower and upper bounds), maturity in progress (defects mostly within upper and 
lower bounds with some spillage), and mature (no defects allowed to breach the upper and lower 
bounds) (Tetlay & John, 2009). SSE CMM defines six levels of maturity in information systems 
engineering processes, defined as not performed, informally performed, planned and tracked, 
well defined, quantitatively controlled, and improving continuously (SEI, 1995). SSE CMM also 
recognizes the need for maturity in other key domain areas (quality engineering, supplier 
management, knowledge management, human capital management, and risk management) for 
achieving information systems capability effectively (BSI, 2002; SEI, 1995, SSE CMM, 1999). 
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Maturity in integrity also deals with maturing the internal general capabilities of an 
organization pertaining to integrity of designing and developing systems and processes (Mettler 
& Rohner, 2009). It is designed as a different approach than the SEI CMM framework, which is 
meant for maturity in internal software design and development (Mettler & Rohner, 2009). It has 
four levels, as the following: 
(a) Basic internal inventions by operations and maintenance staff (without any 
specializations in design) 
(b) Occasional ad-hoc engagements with internal and external specialists for establishing and 
operating design processes and systems  
(c) Established engagements with internal and external design specialists for establishing and 
operating design processes and systems 
(d) Periodic review of core design competencies developed with the help of internal and 
external design partner’s integrity 
This maturity model emphasizes on employment of design specialists as internal 
employees or external consultants for establishing and operating design and development as core 
competencies, instead of allowing it to be done occasionally by internal operations and 
maintenance staff (Mettler & Rohner, 2009). The capability readiness targeted in integrity 
maturity is in the areas of design practices (effective use of engineering and process design 
flows), design processes, scenario modeling (modeling features, characteristics, and 
environments in which, the designed system is supposed to operate), reflective communications 
and reporting, and simulations (visualizing and understanding the possible effects of a designed 
system) (Maier et al., 2009; Cross, 2001, 2008; Austin et al., 2001; Bucciarelli, 1984; ). Integrity 
in design and innovation maturity is viewed as crucial for achieving strategic innovations 
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abilities in an organization (Hevner et al., 2004). This theory makes integrity in design and 
development competencies as fundamental needs of any organization given that each strategic 
innovation path taken by an organization needs designs, their reviews, scenario analysis and 
planning, and simulations to explore the possible design results that can lead to reliability. 
2.5.2 Information Systems Assurance Maturity 
“Information systems assurance” measures the security attributes of an information 
system. Thus, information systems assurance is critical for information integrity given that 
assurance is required on the primary attribute of availability of the information system and to 
depend on the system process to information in a timely and efficient manner. Information 
security involves a “well informed sense of assurance that information risks and controls is in 
balance” (Anderson, 2003, p. 310). Information systems risk management maturity is focused on 
capability readiness in strategies, environment, infrastructure, processes, and measurement for 
managing information risks within the organization (Rhodes-Ousley, 2013). The capability 
readiness should be developed for all the stages of an information cycle comprising of 
creating/capturing, manipulating, retrieving, displaying, storing, transmitting, and destruction of 
information units (Bernard, 2007; Rhodes-Ousley, 2013). The concept of information cycle is 
derived from the theory of information system considered as a work system in which, human 
participants interact with the information systems through processes and activities and produce 
products and services for external and internal customers (Alter, 2002, 2008). The targeted 
readiness level of each capability should incorporate customers, all human participants in the 
information cycle stages (specialists, IS staff, consultants, process owners, auditors, regulators, 
and information asset owners), and all products and services offered by the organization (Alter & 
Sherer, 2004; Rhodes-Ousley, 2013).  
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The process may comprise of the risk management stages recommended by ISO 31000 
and ISO 27005 standards comprising of context establishment, identifying the risks, analyzing 
the risks, evaluating the risks, and treating the risks (Mayer & Fagundes, 2009; Ongel, 2009; 
Ciorciari & Blattner, 2008; Goldstein, Benaroch, & Chernobal, 2008). The core risk exposures 
studied through the standards should include all forms of definitional uncertainties (lack or 
oversight of definitions of risks defined in the assessment process), technical risks, infrastructural 
risks, operational risks, competitive risks, and organizational risks (Willcocks & Margetts, 2006). 
The patterns of trust and beliefs, actions, organizational practices, and distinctive human 
practices need to be assessed while testing the information systems to the core exposures 
(Willcocks & Margetts, 2006). 
The maturity levels may be the five levels defined in CMM (SEI, 2006) or six levels 
comprising of states of nonexistent practices (level 0), initial ad-hoc practices (level 1), intuitive 
and repeatable practices (level 2), defined processes (level 3), managed and measurable 
processes (level 4), and optimized processes (level 5) (Mayer & Fagundes, 2009; Ongel, 2009; 
Ciorciari & Blattner, 2008). A mapping of controls at each level of maturity needs to be carried 
out in the maturity plan for IS risk management (Mayer & Fagundes, 2009; Ongel, 2009; 
Ciorciari & Blattner, 2008). The controls may be derived from NIST, ISO 31000, and ISO 27005 
and numbered appropriately as per the internal nomenclature developed in the organization 
(Mayer & Fagundes, 2009; Ongel, 2009; Ciorciari & Blattner, 2008).  
2.5.3 Business Enablement Maturity 
“Business enablement” is required to ensure that organizational business objectives are 
being met effectively. It denotes the value provided by information security controls in 
strategically managing business goals and objectives. Strategic business management maturity is 
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a complex key domain area requiring maturity readiness in nine dimensions. The nine 
dimensions comprise of sustainability, improvement of business processes, business 
performance, measurement of business performance, strategic alignment of the entire 
organization with business vision, strategy, objectives, and goals, strategic planning and thinking 
methods and tools, values, culture, and leadership (BS Institute, 2010; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997). There can be five levels in measuring strategic management maturity, named as static and 
ad-hoc, reactive, proactive and structured, focused and manageable, and continuous 
improvements (BS Institute, 2010). These levels are similar to the five-level SEI CMM model. 
The maturity definitions of all the nine dimensions need to be defined at the five maturity levels 
in the model (BS Institute, 2010).  
In addition, business change management maturity requires readiness enhancements in 
multiple capabilities. As described by Oxtoby, McGuiness, & Morgan (2002, p. 314-318), 
organizational change management maturity requires capability enhancements in defining, 
establishing, and enabling change drivers, defining change goals, change-related 
communications, strategic change leadership, strategic change championship, managing change 
resources, and measurements against change goals. Each requires different capability readiness 
levels. An organization can test them in one change project as a pilot and then gradually extend 
and enable the best practices to other projects thus making them organization wide capabilities at 
the highest level of maturity (Oxtoby, McGuiness, & Morgan, 2002). These capability readiness 
levels can be measured at five levels of maturity, namely, initial, repeatable, defined, managed, 
and optimized, as proposed by the Change Management Institute (CMI, 2012). These levels have 
been adopted from the SEI CMM model (SEI, 2006) reviewed in Sub-Section 2.5.1. 
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2.5.4 Security Process Maturity 
While information system is key to facilitating process management, it took until the 
beginning of this century before an integrated business and information system approach to 
process management was envisioned (Fremantle, Weerawarana, & Khalaf, 2002; van der Aalst, 
ter Hofstede, & Weske, 2003). Processes play a lead role in the coordination, communication, 
functional alignment, and overall management of project activities. CMM mainly focuses on the 
need to have processes or process areas associated with projects and the ability to measure the 
application and/or capability levels of those processes. While the presence of processes is not 
indicative of project success, their mere existence provides visibility into the organizations 
ability to adhere, measure, and predict success, determination on the opportunities for 
optimization, and capability for continuous improvement. Security process maturity relates to 
organizations whose security processes are well defined and managed indicating higher 
capability level among organizations. The Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 
defines five levels for progression of maturity of processes (SEI, 2006). The maturity of a 
process or activity can be defined to be at one of five levels, from Level 1 (the least mature) to 
level 5 (the most mature). 
Level 1: Performing processes – there are defined processes that are in action for 
accomplishing the process goals satisfactorily. This level is similar to the “initial” level of 
the traditional CMM (capability maturity model) by SEI that defines existence and 
general operations of processes as the first level of maturity achieved. 
Level 2: Managed processes – these are performing processes planned, implemented, 
controlled, and monitored as per organizational business policies and procedures. While 
planning for the managed processes, the measurement criteria and metrics for measuring 
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the performance of the processes are also planned. This level is similar to the 
“repeatable” level of the traditional CMM by SEI that defines this level for organizations 
capable of managing the processes for achieving repetitive tasks. 
Level 3: Defined processes – these are managed processes that can be tailored as per 
organizational tailoring guidelines for achieving improvements in the process goals and 
performance, and raising the level of measurement criteria and metrics for measuring 
process performance. Simply stated, a mechanism of process improvements for achieving 
better business performance should be in place. This level is similar to the “defined” level 
of the traditional CMM by SEI. 
Level 4: Quantitatively managed processes – these are defined processes monitored and 
controlled through quantitative techniques, like statistical and mathematical model. At 
this level, the management is able to achieve deep insight into process actions and 
performance. This level is similar to the “managed” level of the traditional CMM by SEI. 
In traditional CMM, managed processes are the ones being examined through 
quantitative modeling. 
Level 5: Optimized processes – these are quantitatively managed processes that can be 
changed for optimizing them as per changing business environment, objectives and goals 
using the deep insight achieved in the process actions and performance. This level is 
similar to the “optimized” level of the traditional CMM by SEI. 
Such five levels can be defined in information security governance maturity modeling, as 
well (Karokola, Kowalski, & Yngstrom, 2011; Thomson & von Solms, 2006; Philips, 2003; SSE 
CMM, 1999). The first attempt for defining the CMM for systems security engineering was 
made by SSE CMM project (1999) that was adopted later by ISO as the ISO 21827 standard 
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(BSI, 2002). The five levels of CMM were mapped with security maturity processes defined as 
the following (BSI, 2002; SSE CMM, 1999; Philips, 2003): 
(a) Specifying security needs of systems (security requirements engineering) 
(b) Security controls owned by the systems administrators 
(c) Threat assessment pertaining to known/emerging threats to business information systems 
(d) Impact assessment based on possible losses to the business 
(e) Vulnerability assessment of the internal security controls 
(f) Security risk assessment using a suitable quantitative model 
(g) Framework for security assurances to the business 
(h) Organization-wide coordination processes related to security 
(i) Monitoring security postures of systems and their operators 
(j) Providing inputs pertaining to security to all systems operators 
(k) Verification and validation of effectiveness of security controls 
The five capability levels defined in information systems security are the following (BSI, 
2002; SSE CMM, 1999; Philips, 2003): 
Level 1: Security processes are existing, and are performing informally 
Level 2: Security processes are planned, implemented formally, and tracked through a 
monitoring mechanism. 
Level 3: Security processes are well defined and their performances are measured using 
metrics. 
Level 4: Security processes are analyzed and controlled through quantitative modeling 
such that deeper insight in their action and performance can be achieved. 
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Level 5: Security processes are improved continuously using the deep insight achieved 
from their quantitative analysis. 
A five-level security implementation model is proposed by NIST (Bowen & Kissel, 
2007) called NISTIR 7358.The five levels proposed by NISTIR 7358 are the following: 
Level 1: Policies from the top management are in place. 
Level 2: Processes and operating procedures as per the policies are in place. 
Level 3: Processes and operating procedures are implemented (rollout and training 
programs) 
Level 4: A number of tests are conducted. 
Level 5: The processes and operation procedures are integrated organization-wide. 
These five levels help an organization to gain up to Level 2 of maturity as per the SSE 
CMM model. In modern times, there may be hardly an organization not having established and 
measured security policies and procedures. A large number of organizations have achieved 
formal certifications for their information security policies and processes. However, these are not 
sufficient for achieving maturity. 
2.5.5 Security Program Management Maturity 
Program/project management maturity model is developed by Project Management 
Institute (PMI, 2003). It begins with developing capabilities to manage individual projects in an 
organization, achieving intermediate capabilities for managing programs by grouping multiple 
projects, and finally achieving the capability to manage an entire portfolio of multiple programs 
having grouped projects within the organization (PMI, 2003). The core capabilities to be 
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achieved through the model are matching customer requirements, process maturity, technology 
maturity, quality maturity, alpha/beta testing maturity, leadership maturity, and many other 
capability maturities documented in a centralized directory named as capabilities directory. 
There can be four maturity levels, named standardizing, measuring, controlling, and improving 
continuously (PMI, 2003).  
Grant & Pennypacker (2006) further added that project management maturity requires 
measuring each ground-level practice at four of five levels on a scale (similar to the Likert scale). 
A centralized role should be assigned for capturing data from the project management databases 
and through surveys for applying them in measurement models (Grant & Pennypacker, 2006). A 
mechanism of continuous rating of the maturity variables chosen by the organization in the 
project maturity framework should be in place such that the maturity metrics associated with 
them can be visualized continuously and reported to the project managers. In this way, the 
project managers will know (on a regular basis) about the persisting gaps and work on bridging 
them regularly. There is no point measuring the gaps at planned checkpoints because there will 
be significant workload of correcting defects in the deliveries completed between the 
checkpoints. The variables associated with project management maturity needs a continuous 
improvement plan once they have been defined (typically, the level 3). 
2.5.6 Competency of Security Team Maturity 
Competency of security team is a maturity journey that is required in maturity projects of 
all the other key domain areas reviewed in this section. It is important to consider user roles and 
their competencies or expertise with respect of information security maturity within the 
organization. User knowledge of the organizational environment, both technical as it pertains to 
an understanding of technical assets and institutional knowledge pertaining to awareness of 
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security policies is critical in an organizational environment (Stanton et al., 2005). The key 
capability readiness levels targeted in competency maturity are process, cultural, structural, 
technical, teamwork, and above all, shared vision, strategy, mission, and business drivers for 
achieving organizational knowledge maturity (Shoid, Kassim, & Salleh, 2011; Pee & 
Kankanhalli, 2009; Gold, Malhotra, & Segars, 2001). Competency in knowledge accumulation 
and sharing begins with an individual sharing his or her knowledge and experiences and matures 
to organization-wide sharing of reusable knowledge through organized knowledge constructs and 
integrated information systems (Pee & Kankanhalli, 2009; Gold, Malhotra, & Segars, 2001). The 
maturity level of competency can be assessed by testing how effectively the employees can use 
the knowledge management system for retrieving and applying knowledge in their daily tasks 
and in strategic decision-support applications (Kulkarni & St Louis, 2003). The approach of 
measurement of maturity may be based on the CMM-like Grid (Kochikar, 2000) or quantitative 
surveys using Likert-type scales (Chinowsky, Molenaar, & Realph, 2007), which can be used to 
determine the  frequency of certain characteristics among groups or populations (Singleton and 
Straits, 2010). 
Given the responsibility of selecting, implementing, and sustaining the security measures 
within an organization, it is critical especially that the security team is competent in their abilities 
with their primary role of implementing security measures. Competency in the form of research 
and development maturity among project members is focused on developing mature security 
practices and processes in research design, data collection, data analysis, drawing abstract and 
conceptualization, and applying the results in the appropriate contexts of the business (Szakonyi, 
1994). Strategic innovations in an organization require internal and external participation, 
collaboration, and competency in teamwork. A few scholars have recognized this as a key 
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domain area requiring maturity in how well an organization can manage internal and external 
collaborations and functioning of teams for managing strategic innovations (Fraser, Farrukh, & 
Gregory, 2003; Hammer, 2007). They defined four levels of maturity that an organization can 
achieve in their journey towards collaboration and competency in teamwork maturity (Fraser, 
Farrukh, & Gregory, 2003; Hammer, 2007): 
(a) Level 1 – Individual actions with occasional team working (hardly any teamwork): At 
this level, the organization is more or less individual-oriented and is concerned mostly 
with individual performances. There is lack of trust and security leading to power 
struggles forcing the individuals to work for themselves than their teams. They give 
priorities to their respective tasks and ignore the overall concerns of the team in which, 
they work. Team works are evident occasionally in the scenarios where the individuals 
cannot deliver without taking help of teammates. 
(b) Level 2 – Individual actions to team actions (transition): at this level, individuals 
gradually realize the value of team working and begin discarding selfish motives and 
power struggles. The senior management motivates the employees to work more in teams 
by defining team-specific objectives and goals and team rewards. 
(c) Level 3 – Teamwork attitude and culture: The organization witnesses increased attitude 
towards teamwork, which gradually becomes a culture. Individuals like to work more as 
teams than in silos. The concerns and goals of team become more important than self-
concerns. 
(d) Level 4 – Continuous improvements in teamwork and collaboration approaches: The 
organization is able to sustain the culture of team working, and the practices of 
collaborations and team working improves by virtue of mutual trust, familiarity, full 
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participation, honesty, and harnessing the collective expertise and outcomes of the team. 
Collaboration becomes constructive and natural in the organization for almost all the 
works to be done for the business. 
2.5.7 Security Conscious Employees Maturity 
Despite the many advances in information technology, there is still a requirement for 
humans to interact with information systems and thus there is the human element to consider 
when planning an information security management program (Shultz, 2005). Organizations with 
strong senior management support, excellent controls, and quality security teams still have policy 
violations (Doss, 2012). As indicated by Schultz (2005), security breaches in information 
security is attributed to people problems and not technical issues. Further, the integrity of 
organizational members is crucial to an organization’s future given the dependency of trust and 
integrity as a form of security control (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Leach, 2003). Apart from 
displaying integrity, employees must be knowledgeable not only of their roles, but that of other 
members within the organization and display security consciousness within the team (Karokola, 
Kowalski, & Yngstrom, 2011; Kenney et al., 2005; Randazzo et al., 2004; Dhillon & Backhouse, 
2000). Demonstration of security consciousness among the team, can lead to improvements in 
the detection capabilities within the organization (Karokola, Kowalski, & Yngstrom, 2011; 
Randazzo et al., 2004; Kenney et al., 2005). The information security measures of policies, 
procedures and controls, tools and methods, and awareness creation are interdependent in 
contributing towards an effective information security program (Hagen, Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 
2008). While the security team promotes security awareness, the team is also responsible to 
assess the effectiveness of the security policies and controls in place (Karyda, Kiountouzis, & 
Kokolakis, 2005). Poor implementation of security policies can lead to negative impact or 
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improvements in security for which a security measure was designed (Willison & Backhouse, 
2006). According to Mitropoulos et al. (2006) humans are considered the best at recognizing 
atypical activities within the organization. Therefore, well-trained and security conscious 
employees play an important role in deterring information security violations. In equipping 
employees with adequate training, organizations tend to transfer to a state of “conscious 
competence” in their security practices as well as create a de facto security behavior and culture 
(Thomson & von Solms, 2006).  
2.5.8 Security Leadership Maturity 
Research has shown that only 60% of organization members believe that the senior 
managers are engaged in the information security work of their organization (Hagen, 
Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 2008). However, organizations need strong leadership involvement 
together with a good understanding of the mission of the agency and information systems 
security requirements. According to Dutta and McCrohan (2002), senior management role is 
critical to achieving a successful information security program throughout the organization. 
Further, in addition to assuming higher responsibilities and active role, senior management has 
the opportunity to utilize a holistic approach and establish a comprehensive enterprise-wide 
information security management programs within organizations (Holzinger, 2000). Apart from 
being involved, it is imperative for senior management to leverage, influence, and ensure full 
support from other senior management within the organization on integrating crucial information 
security initiatives (Dutta & McCrohan, (2002); Eloff & Eloff, (2003). Further, it is leadership’s 
responsibility for managing and motivating information security at the enterprise level to take 
responsibility for information security (von Solms, 2006). This consideration results in a top-
down approach where other components and employees within the organization value, promote, 
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and protect information security. Aside from implementing a security process or program, it is 
equally and critically important for all components of an organization to work together and 
ensure all underlying processes are accomplishing the objectives of the security program 
(Siponen, 2006).  
2.6 Factors Influencing Information Security Maturity 
For achieving maturity in information security, an organization should have an 
information security program strategy reflecting the business needs, which is constantly updated 
to reflect the changes occurring in the business strategy and environment (US Department of 
Energy, 2014; US Department of Homeland Security, 2014). The security processes and the 
workforce planning for executing them should comprise of defense operations, attack operations, 
and maintenance operations, and need to be aligned closely with the business processes 
(Acohido, 2015; Ernst & Young, 2015; US Department of Homeland Security, 2014). Business 
enablement of security processes is essential to ensure that the security workforce is focused on 
the right areas requiring maximum attention, resources, and funds (US Department of Homeland 
Security, 2014).The security program management should establish the program strategy with 
adequate sponsorship and representations from the top business management, should establish, 
maintain, and operate an integrated security infrastructure, systems, processes, and workforce, 
should manage and review all security operations, should ensure compliance to standards and 
regulations, and should publish regular reports for the top management, and for the external 
interested agencies (Acohido, 2015; Carbone, 2016; Ernst & Young, 2015; US Department of 
Energy, 2014). Information security should be implemented with joint responsibility of IT teams 
and business teams through effective collaboration, coordination, and communications (Xiao-
yan, Yu-quing, & Li-Leia, 2011). The emphasis should be on prioritization of attention towards 
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the critical business systems and processes and achieving the acceptable level of controls for 
protecting them against known and emerging threats (Acohido, 2015; Ernst & Young, 2015; 
Randeree, Mahal, & Narwani, 2012).  
The security processes and controls should be defined, implemented, and operated in 
every business service, business operation, activity, and task, business control, and business 
report (Mellado et al., 2010). The steps to be taken involve internal and external verification and 
validation of the security requirements, generation of documentation for supporting the entire 
security program, defining and integrating all standards and procedures essential to fulfill the 
requirements specifications, guidelines for continuous reuse of the standards and procedures, 
analyzing and eliminating all barriers, continuous reviews, and continuous improvements 
(Mellado et al., 2010). The highest maturity level can be achieved by operations excellence when 
information security assurance is ensured through continuous process improvement, technology 
excellence and trustworthiness, ability to quickly track and adapt to technology and business 
changes, excellent integrity of business information, and institutionalization and maturity of 
processes (Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zolait, 2009; Dzazali & Zoliat, 2012; Ernst & Young, 2015; 
Proctor, 2014).The information risk assessment and mitigation policies and processes should be 
fully integrated with the strategic business-level risk analysis and management (in the enterprise 
risk management framework of the organization) (Ernst & Young, 2015; Proctor, 2014). In this 
context, the IT leadership and governance structures should be part of the business leadership 
and governance structures for seamless horizontal communications about high priority 
information risks, information risks mitigation actions and budgets, and information risk reviews, 
controls, and monitoring into the enterprise risk management (ERM), and active defense systems 
with proactive and reactive strategies by preemptively knowing the existing and emerging 
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threats(Ernst & Young, 2015; ISACA, 2014; ISACA, 2009; Proctor, 2014). The strategies, 
tactical approaches, and policies need to be communicated vertically through middle and lower 
managers for applying in all the business processes and their underlying tasks (ISACA, 2014; 
ISACA, 2009; Proctor, 2014). The security program management should collect security-related 
data based on metrics and measurements from the individual process and tasks, applied in the 
metrics formulations, measured, and published through the organizational security analytics 
systems (ISACA, 2014; ISACA, 2009; Proctor, 2014). The key organizational capabilities 
required for integrating information security risk management with business risk management 
are the following: 
(a) The organization should be capable of integrating all risk databases and providing a 
common risks’ view to all stakeholders in the form of a portfolio of risks (Dzazali, 
Sulaiman, & Zoliat, 2009; Dzazali & Zoliat, 2012; Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association, 2014; IT Governance Institute, 2009; IT Governance Institute, 
2012; Proctor, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2015). 
(b) The organization should implement, operate, and maintain an ERM having 
information risks integrated into the framework (Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zoliat, 2009; 
Dzazali & Zoliat, 2012; Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2014; 
IT Governance Institute, 2009; IT Governance Institute, 2012; Proctor, 2014; Ernst & 
Young, 2015). 
(c) The organization should be capable to make information risks-aware business 
decisions for all the business processes and tasks depending upon IT systems(Dzazali, 
Sulaiman, & Zoliat, 2009; Dzazali & Zoliat, 2012; Information Systems Audit and 
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Control Association, 2014; IT Governance Institute, 2009; IT Governance Institute, 
2012; Proctor, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2015). 
(d) The organization should be capable of collecting and analyzing risks-based data from 
all the business processes and tasks of the organization, and formulate risks metrics 
and measurements strategy for monitoring the risks and the proactive controls 
effectively (Canal, 2008; Carcary, 2013; IT Governance Institute, 2009; IT 
Governance Institute, 2012; Proctor, 2014).  
(e) The organization should be capable of publishing integrated risks profile and risks 
acceptance statements, including information risks as a part of the risks view 
(Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zoliat, 2009; Dzazali & Zoliat, 2012; Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association, 2014; IT Governance Institute, 2009; IT Governance 
Institute, 2012; Proctor, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2015). 
(f) The organization should have reactive and proactive methods and actions against the 
known and emerging risks events (which should be updated periodically). As found 
in the Ernst & Young (2015) global information security survey, an organizational 
defense system should be capable to detect small and subtle signs of attacks and build 
preemptive offensive and defensive strategies for protecting the IT-enabled business 
assets. The organization should have an optimum mix of reactive and proactive 
response strategies catering to incidents by known (existing and emerging threats, as 
analyzed by the risks assessment team) and unknown (threats not visualized by the 
risks assessment team) threats (Baskerville, Spagnoletti, & Kim, 2014). Both IT and 
business teams should work through collaboration, coordination, and communications 
for identifying the risks and devising strategies for mitigating them (Xiao-yan, Yu-
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quing, & Li-Leia, 2011). There should be a culture of continuous monitoring and 
continuous improvements of controls (Xiao-yan, Yu-quing, & Li-Leia,2011) 
The model of integrating information risks should be as per Figure 3. It may be noted that 
information risks are not considered as merely a branch of risks albeit are considered as base-
lining all the business-related risks of the organization (ISACA, 2014; IT Governance Institute, 
2009; IT Governance Institute, 2012). This model applies in IT-enabled businesses having high 
dependence on IT systems. The bottom layer of Figure 3 is added based on a recent survey 
conducted by Ernst & Young (Ernst & Young, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 3. Information Risks Forming the Baseline of all Business-related 
Risks of an Organization  
(Ernst & Young, 2015; ISACA, 2014; IT Governance Institute, 2009: p. 11) 
 
The reviews till this point indicate that there are two facets of information security 
maturity in an organization: trustworthiness of security technologies and security integration. 
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Following is a short summary as learnt from the review of factors influencing these two facets of 
information security maturity in an organization: 
(a) Trustworthiness of all the security technologies employed through both technology and 
process integration for ensuring seamless organization-wide information integrity in all 
the business processes and tasks planned and executed in the organization. The business 
teams will need security assurance as per the business requirements, which need to be 
delivered through operations excellence, continuous process improvement, technology 
excellence and trustworthiness, ability to quickly track and adapt to technology and 
business changes, excellent integrity of business information, and institutionalization and 
maturity of processes. The organization should be capable of tracking even small and 
subtle signs of risks to the business information assets and formulating response 
strategies through controls, metrics formulation, measurements, and monitoring. In the 
event of incidents by unknown threats, the organization should be prepared to respond to 
them effectively. 
(b) Integration of security with business through an organization-wide information security 
program strategy reflecting the business needs, process and technology maturity (as 
defined in the trustworthiness dimension), and IT enablement of business risks 
management and security controls. The organization-wide information security program 
strategy should be integrated with business strategy at all levels. Both IT and business 
teams should share joint responsibilities and effectively coordinate, collaborate, and 
communicate the risks and mitigation strategies. The information security program 
management should be a joint venture between business and IT. The business leadership 
and IT leadership should jointly formulate the governance structures for seamless 
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horizontal information flow and communications about high priority information risks, 
the possible information risks mitigation actions and budgets, and the information risk 
reviews, security controls, metrics and measurements, and monitoring. The information 
risks should be integrated into the enterprise risk management (ERM) framework and 
active defense systems with proactive and reactive strategies by preemptively knowing 
the existing and emerging threats. All strategies and policies should be communicated 
vertically through managers at middle and lower operating levels for applying in all the 
business process elements and tasks. Security-related data should be collected from the 
individual process and tasks, applied in the metrics formulations, measured, and 
published through the organizational security analytics systems. The process of security 
monitoring and measurements, and security enhancements should be continuous at the 
highest maturity level of information security. 
Beyond security technology trustworthiness and security integration, what else is 
essential for achieving information security maturity in an organization? The third essential facet 
of information security maturity is people maturity. Every organization needs guardianship of 
their security technologies and processes in the form of a dedicated and highly skilled security 
workforce. The security workforce should be skilled security practitioners at the forefront of 
enabling the security technologies, security processes, and security controls essential to achieve 
the strategic and policy objectives of information security management defined through 
collaboration of business and IT security leadership (US Department of Energy, 2014; US 
Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
The key deliverables of the security workforce are implementation and management of 
security controls, managing processes and tasks, managing security operations, integrated 
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security governance of business and IT, collecting data as per the metrics defined, measurements, 
analytics, continuous monitoring, and continuous improvements (Alaboodi, 2007; Canal, 2008; 
US Department of Energy, 2014; US Department of Homeland Security, 2014). The workforce 
should be provided adequate redundancy and coverage such that every critical role has a 
competent backup (Alaboodi, 2007; US Department of Energy, 2014). The workforce should be 
screened and recruited effectively for ensuring reliability and trust on their services for the 
organization (like performing background checks and past career analysis) (US Department of 
Energy, 2014). Access to critical assets and competence for access should be reviewed 
periodically (US Department of Energy, 2014).  
The most critical among the security workforce are the system administrators who should 
be monitored continuously for any type of malicious behavior or change in behavioral patterns 
(US Department of Energy, 2014). The organization should have clearly documented job 
responsibilities of the security workforce roles (clearly highlighting the overlapping 
responsibility areas) and clearly defined criteria for assessing job performance (US Department 
of Energy, 2014). 
Apart from reliability, competence, and trust of the security workforce, the organization 
should practice a security-aware and risk-aware culture of making decisions even in the smallest 
and insignificant tasks executed on a daily basis (Acohido, 2015; Proctor, 2014).The leadership 
skills in information security management and governance are very critical for success of 
information security programs in organizations (Carbone, 2016). The leadership team manages 
cost, schedule, quality, return on investments, and stakeholder satisfaction of the information 
security management system (ISMS) (Acohido, 2015).  
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The ISMS implementation begins with information risk management that is integrated 
effectively with the enterprise risk management framework (Acohido, 2015). The results of risk 
management help in defining the management system and in establishing the organizational 
structure for information security program comprising of multiple processes and tasks as 
required by the security requirements engineering. Some of the key processes are information 
asset configurations and change management, identity management, access control, threats and 
vulnerabilities management, incident response, and business continuity (Acohido, 2015). The 
competencies of workforce operating these processes are managed and enhanced by the 
leadership team through training, orientation, workshops, and certifications (Acohido, 2015; US 
Department of Energy, 2014). At the highest level of maturity, the workforce knowledge and 
skills and the processes are optimized, repetitive, and continuously improved (Acohido, 2015; 
US Department of Energy, 2014). 
2.7 Summary 
Chapter 2 presented an organized review of literature relevant to the research problem, 
enquiry, and context for establishing a theoretical background for preparing the initial structural 
construct of this research. The review in Section 2.3 established a theoretical understanding of 
capability maturity and its significance in an organization’s progress towards meeting the 
maturity goals. This section presented an understanding about how maturity goals pertaining to a 
specific area are formulated, aligned with the business goals, strategized and planned in steps of 
improvements, and implemented.  
The theories on information security maturity modeling are reviewed in Section 2.4. The 
subsequent Section 2.5 presented a review of the most relevant maturity models to information 
security maturity for defining the initial structural construct of this study. The maturity models 
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reviewed in Section 2.5 are related with information integrity maturity, information systems 
assurance maturity, business enablement maturity, security process maturity, security program 
management maturity, competency of security team maturity, security conscious employees’ 
maturity, and security leadership maturity. The review of these models helped in deciding on the 
most crucial variables needed in defining the information security maturity modeling.  
Finally, Section 2.6 presents the various factors that affect the variables related with 
information security maturity. These factors form the scales of respective variables related with 
information security maturity, and also are essential for defining the questionnaire for primary 
data collection.  
The next step in this research defines the initial structural construct and its hypothetical 
relationships. It also defines the factors related with each of the variables in the initial structural 
construct, and the design of the structured questionnaire for primary data collection. The next 
chapter presents these aspects and also presents a detailed review of the methods utilized for 
primary data collection and analysis. The review of methods in particular helped in choosing the 
most appropriate combination of research methods for this study. The initial structural construct, 
its expanded form showing all the factors, and the research methods collectively formed the 
research design for this study. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides pertinent information on the initial structural construct (theoretical 
model), hypotheses, research approach, and assumptions of the research study relating to security 
controls and mechanisms to effectively govern information security. The model has been 
constructed with the help of literature reviews in Sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. The review 
conducted in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 helped in defining the levels of information security maturity 
in an organization, and the maturity aspects needed to achieve these levels. Based on this review, 
the variables of highest maturity level have been included in the initial structural construct. The 
review in Section 2.6 helped in exploring the factors associated with each maturity variable such 
that the scales for each of the variable can be constructed in the model.  
Additionally, this chapter discusses the data definition, sampling, data collection and 
analysis strategies of the research study. The variables are defined by their respective scales 
comprising the factors closely associated with them. The questionnaire presented in Appendix A 
is associated with each of the factors. The data definition is based on the five-level Likert scale 
as explained later in this chapter. The population and sampling strategies are explained with 
respect to probabilistic sampling methods from the population accessible through professional 
contacts of the researcher. The data analysis method comprises testing of reliability of all the 
scales, formation of path diagram, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation 
modeling. The reliability analysis of all the scales is proposed in the Statistical Package for 
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Social Science (SPSS) and other data analysis methods are proposed in Linear Structural 
Relations (LISREL). 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
In this study, the factors influencing information security maturity in an organization is 
examined. An organization should target the Level 5 maturity of SSE CMM model (why should 
they settle for anything less?). This research focuses on the key factors contributing to achieve 
level-5 maturity of security governance (optimization of security governance). However, merely 
a CMM model of process maturity will not be sufficient. A model is a statistical statement or a 
pattern of relationships between two or more variables (Reinard 2006; Hoyle 1995). To begin 
with, the most basic model may be viewed as given in Figure 4. This model states simply that in 
order to achieve Level 5 maturity of information security governance, an organization should 
achieve Level-5 technology trustworthiness, Level-5 security integration maturity (optimized 
processes based on in-depth insight into them through quantitative modeling), and Level-5 
security guardianship. By using the theoretical model, researchers are able to prove or disprove 
the hypothesized relationships among constructs of the model (Reinard 2006; Hoyle 1995). 
Hence, this model needs to be expanded to define the variables contributing to these three 
determinants. The three fundamental variables for achieving information security maturity were 
decided in Section 2.6 after an analysis of information security maturity review of Section 2.4. 
Referring to Figure 3, it may be interpreted that information security maturity requires 
integration of security risk management and their tasks related with all the organizational 
functions using IT-enabled business systems to operate the business processes. The view has 
emerged recently (Ernst & Young, 2015; Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 
2014; IT Governance Institute, 2009) suggesting that information security should no longer be 
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treated as a separate vertical department but should be integrated horizontally with all the 
departments of an organization.  
 
Figure 4. The Basic Form of Initial Information Security Governance Maturity Model 
 
 
As per the literature review provided in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, Level-5 technology 
trustworthiness (integrity of information and information systems assurance) comes from 
security requirements engineering, security design, risk management, and compliance with 
regulations. Level-5 security integration (strategic business, process, and program management) 
maturity comes from quantitative modeling, defined practices, and continuous improvements. 
Level-5 security guardianship (people competence, consciousness, and leadership) maturity 
comes from envisioning, culture, behavior, openness, and awareness. As a result, the following 
essential key domain areas for achieving information security maturity have been identified: 
(a) Information Integrity  
(b) Information Systems Assurance 
(c) Strategic Business Enablement 
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(d) Security Culture/Conscious Employees 
(e) Security Leadership 
(f) Organizational Competency and Teamwork Maturity 
(g) Program/Project Management Maturity 
(h) Process Maturity 
These maturity domains require a number of added prerequisites that an organization will 
need to achieve maturity in information security governance. These prerequisites can make the 
project quite sophisticated. However, they cannot be avoided because the effectiveness of the 
system is driven by the threats and business exposures. In order to protect the business from the 
prevailing threats, an organization will have to invest in maturity of the identified key domain 
areas.  
A number of models for planning the maturity levels have been proposed in the 
literatures reviewed in Section 2.4. The fundamental models for planning maturity are the ones 
not specific to a key domain area. For example, the six-level model by SEI CMM (SEL, 2006) 
comprising nonexistent practices (level 0), initial ad-hoc practices (level 1), intuitive and 
repeatable practices (level 2), defined processes (level 3), managed and measurable processes 
(level 4), and optimized processes (level 5) can be used by replacing processes by practices 
(including processes that will make them specific to process maturity only). Thus, the approach 
for information security governance maturity can be defined in six levels: 
(i) Level 0: nonexistent practices – the organization has no practices concerned with 
information security governance. 
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(j) Level 1: initial and ad hoc practices – the organization has information security 
practices followed by people by virtue of their choices. The practices may be tacit or 
documented, but are not organized. 
(k) Level 2: intuitive and repeatable practices – the organization has documented and 
organized practices that can help in deciding and taking repetitive actions. However, 
they are not defined for standardizing across the organization. 
(l) Level 3: defined practices – the organization has defined practices as standards for the 
entire organization. 
(m) Level 4: managed and measurable practices: the organization has managed practices 
and has measurement methods to monitor and assess the performances of the 
practices. 
(n) Level 5: optimized practices – the organization has optimized practices with their 
performance levels in control of the business. 
The interactions among people, processes, and technologies are matured through three 
core attributes of: trustworthiness, guardianship, and integration. Combining all these attributes, 
the initial information security maturity model is presented in Figure 5. This research suggests 
that the factors of information security maturity model have three core areas for achieving 
information security governance maturity – security technology trustworthiness, security 
integration, and security guardianship. These three areas are defined by the variables enabling 
them in an organization. The variables associated with technology trustworthiness are 
information integrity and information systems assurance. The variables associated with security 
integration are business enablement, security process maturity, and security program 
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management. The last area is related to people, which includes characteristics such as 
competency, consciousness, and leadership. These considerations are proposed by a number of 
literatures in the context of information security (Hurst, Merabti, & Fergus, 2013; Islam & Dong, 
2012; Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Lacey, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009; Stanton et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Initial Information Security Maturity Model 
 
 
In the context of strategic leadership management maturity, envisioning and alignment to 
strategic business goals are essential people competencies (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Lacey, 
2009; BSI, 2005). The people need to work in teams and collaborate effectively to diffuse a 
security-aware mindset and managing checks and balances while making decisions for managing 
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and operating the information assets (Ifinedo, 2012; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Lacey, 2009). This 
is linked with teamwork and collaboration in an organization where people need to be competent 
and practice continuous learning and skills enhancements through internal and external 
collaborations, and through available training programs (Albrechsten & Hovden, 2010; Vroom & 
von Solms, 2004). Hence, the variables competency of security team, security conscious 
employees, and security leadership are added in the measurement model. The information 
security maturity model depicting the hypothesized relationships among the variables is 
presented in Figure 6: 
 
 
Figure 6. The Information Security Maturity Model for Directing this Research 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review, a set of hypotheses were developed for each construct. 11 
hypotheses relationships were tested through path modeling technique involving Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) (reviewed in Section 3.1).  
The hypotheses are summarized as the following: 
H1: Information integrity is related significantly with security technology trustworthiness in the 
context of information security 
H2: Information system assurance is related significantly with security technology 
trustworthiness in the context of information security 
H3: Business enablement is related significantly with security integration in the context of 
information security 
H4: Security process maturity is related significantly with security integration in the context of 
information security 
H5: Security program management is related significantly with security integration in the context 
of information security 
H6: Competency of security team is related significantly with security guardianship in the 
context of information security 
H7: Security conscious employees is related significantly with security guardianship in the 
context of information security 
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H8: Security leadership is related significantly with security guardianship in the context of 
information security 
H9: Security technology trustworthiness is related significantly with information security 
maturity 
H10: Security integration is related significantly with information security maturity 
H11: Security guardianship is related significantly with information security maturity 
3.4 Research Approach 
This research follows the positivistic philosophical approach and quantitative 
methodological approach for testing the initial structural construct. Positivistic philosophy helps 
in breaking down the worldview into specific concepts describing the relationships and laws 
concerned with the concepts studied (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Crook & Garratt, 2005). In a 
research design, positivism has a significant value because it helps in empirically formalizing the 
concepts, like patterns, definitions, variables, interrelationships, language, and interpretations 
(Crook & Garratt, 2005). Before formalization, the concepts are hypothesized with the help of 
past explorations and theory suggestions (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Crook & Garratt, 2005). In the 
process of formalization, positivism uses quantitative methods employing mathematics, statistics, 
and computerized simulations extensively (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Crook & Garratt, 2005; 
Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
Based on an expanded literature review in Section 2.1 pertaining to the hypotheses 
relationships, there are 11 relationships (paths) in this model that was tested in LISREL (Linear 
Structural Relations). However, a description of the research approach utilized to experimentally 
examine the given hypothesis is presented below. This research was organized in four phases: 
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expert panel and pilot study, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Reliability Analysis (RA) 
of the factor scales, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using LISREL, and Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) using LISREL.  
In the reliability analysis (RA), certain alternate path connections between the factors and 
the variables were tested through the principal component analysis (PCA) research method. 
From the review in Section 2.6, it is revealed that the same factors may be related with more than 
one variable. For example, operations excellence, continuous process improvement, technology 
excellence and trustworthiness, ability to quickly track and adapt to technology and business 
changes, excellent integrity of business information, and institutionalization and maturity of 
processes are the factors that related with technology trustworthiness, information integrity, and 
security assurance. This process helped to ascertain the significant loading of factors on the 
variables of the initial structural construct. It may be possible that one factor may be discovered 
as loading two variables. However, this discovery was a confirmatory inclusion of the factor in 
the scales of the two variables instead of being extended hypotheses in the model. This process 
simplified the model before CFA because the insignificant factors were eliminated and each 
variable was armed with its highest reliable configuration of scale before entering the CFA tests. 
In the subsequent Sub-Sections, the four phases of this research are described in detail. 
These phases were executed sequentially although multiple attempts were conducted in the event 
the results returned errors. These errors facilitated in a later phase and used as a feedback for the 
previous phases to investigate what might have gone wrong. 
3.4.1 First Phase: Expert Panel and Pilot Study 
In the first phase, the research instrument prepared in Sub-Section 3.5.2 was vetted by an 
expert panel of information security experts, practitioners, and consultants. The panel members 
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were selected from the researcher’s professional contacts and requested to study the 
questionnaire developed and presented in Appendix A. As explained by Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill (2009), a questionnaire should be tested for possibilities of ambiguity, dual meaning, 
loaded terms, bias, lengthiness, irrelevance, and technical inaccuracy. These problems, if 
detected, should be eliminated from the instrument by rephrasing the questions and flow of the 
inquiry (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Accordingly, a panel of information security 
experts was recruited for reviewing the construct validity and adequacy of the survey instrument, 
specifically for refining the questionnaire, identifying and eliminating defects, and for 
conducting a pilot study to test how and in how much time the questionnaire is interpreted and 
can be responded to. 
3.4.2 Second Phase: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Reliability Analysis (RA) of 
the Factor Scales 
As presented in Figure 6, the initial structural construct has 12 variables and 11 paths. For 
11 variables, there are underlying factors as presented in Sub-Section 3.5.2. Since these factors 
may be related to more than one variable, the method of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
for factor loading analysis was proposed (Hair et al., 2009). This process was followed for three 
sets of variables:  
(a) Information integrity, information security assurance, and security technology 
trustworthiness 
(b) Variables business enablement, security program management, security process 
maturity, and security integration 
(c) Competency of security team, security conscious employees, security leadership, and 
security guardianship 
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This was a preliminary test to explore the loading of factors in the respective variables 
using PCA comprising of rotated factor loading analysis using VARIMAX rotation. This rotation 
approach was proposed because it is a more commonly used method (Hair et al., 2009). As a 
result of this step, the factors attached to their respective variables were determined forming the 
respective scales of each variable. At this stage, the number of factors attached per variable was 
reduced after individual scale reliability tests were conducted using Cronbach Alpha. This entire 
process was carried out in SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science). 
3.4.3 Third Phase: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using LISREL 
This phase focused on the validity of elements integrated from phase two. The outcome 
of the second phase was a path diagram showing the high loading factors attached to their 
respective variables. This path diagram was subjected to the confirmatory factor analysis test in 
LISREL. CFA was chosen because it has been proven to be ideal for testing the validity of 
proposed constructs (Gillaspy, 1996; Segars & Grover, 1993) as well as model fit (Ulrich, 2009). 
A number of metrics are reported, as reviewed later in this chapter. 
3.4.4 Fourth Phase: Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) using LISREL 
In this phase, the focus was on deciding the validity of the model.  The path diagram was 
subjected to SEM tests in LISREL for model fitment analysis. SEM attempts to analyze the 
relationships between latent variables and the corresponding fit of the data to a theoretically 
derived model (Dow, Wong, Jackson, & Leitch, 2008). A number of additional metrics were 
reported in LISREL, as reviewed later in this chapter. At this stage, alternate configurations of 
the path diagram were tested to explore the optimum model that can be treated as the outcome of 
this research. 
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3.5 Data Collection 
Survey research is designed to learn more about a large population using a sample of that 
population (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The research method that was utilized is the survey 
research given the key strength of minimal cost of implementation (Babbie, 2001), facilitation of 
theory validation, and frequently used and accepted method for conducting research in the field 
of information systems (Newsted, Chin, Ngwenyama, and Lee,1996). Further, given that using 
an internet based survey provides the benefits of anonymity and access to large population 
(Babbie, 2001), data was collected through an internet site using a computerized survey. Only 
the group to be studied was provided access to the survey and data was obtained from a sample 
of the population in an approach that will allow the results to reflect the greater population 
(Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). Particularly, the research included a target population of senior 
security executives who are responsible for governing information security functions and who 
are responsible for securing organizational information assets to offer true representation of a 
balanced approach to assess and determine information security maturity within organizations.  
To facilitate the survey, information security maturity literature was thoroughly reviewed 
for the development of the survey instrument. A total of 5 items was created per latent variable 
since empirical studies have shown 5-point scales to provide an ideal balance of validity and 
reliability (Dawes, 2008). Also, the number of items was kept relatively low given that research 
has shown little improvement on internal consistency by using more than 5 items per construct as 
well as the potential for response bias caused by participant fatigue (Hinkin, 1998). Items were 
designed for measurement using a 5-point Likert scale consisting of “Strongly Disagree”, 
“Disagree”, “Neither Agree, Nor Disagree”, “Agree”, and “Strongly Agree” while still allowing 
respondents to express ambivalence as necessary (Converse & Presser, 1986). 
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As discussed, the data collection method chosen is survey given that survey helps in 
collecting quantifiable data for investigating the variables and their relationships in a theoretical 
framework (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Variables are of four types: independent, dependent, 
moderating, and mediating (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Independent variables are causes in a 
theoretical framework that affect some changes in the dependent variables based on underlying 
theories. Dependent variables are changed as per the independent variables, which reflect the 
concepts being studied through the theoretical framework. Moderating variables influence the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables through their contingent effects. 
Mediating variables intervene between the independent and dependent variables during the 
measurement period and help in shaping the relationships under different scenarios. In fact, 
mediating variables are essential to model a process that lets independent variables influence the 
dependent variables. 
The independent and dependent variables and their interrelationships in the form of an 
initial structural construct have been presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The hypothetical 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables are the ones formed with the help 
of literature review. These relationships were tested through the methods presented in Sections 
3.6 and 3.7. There are no mediating and moderating variables in the initial construct. However, 
they may appear in the process of structural equation modeling if alternate indirect paths are 
found to ensure better model fitment and elimination of certain variables may cause significant 
impact on the model fitment. These tests were conducted under model validity testing, as 
discussed in Section 3.7. 
To solve complex research problems, complex multi-level modeling is essential, which 
provides information on many embedded simple models nested within it and also the bigger 
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picture on how these simple models act and interact when viewed from a high level (Jones, 
2005). Complex and multi-level modeling is needed when the variables are complex (secondary 
variables) and are defined by many contributing factors such that it becomes impossible to 
measure the variables without measuring the contributing factors (Jones, 2005). Such models are 
tested for validity of their entire constructs and not only the embedded individual relationships 
(this is the concept of construct validity presented in Section 3.7) (Jones, 2005). The factors are 
measurable that indirectly consolidate to form the measures of the complex variable (Rubin & 
Babbie, 2011). However, the contribution of factors in influencing a complex variable may vary 
by a measure called loading coefficient (Rencher, 2002; Rubin & Babbie, 2011). Hence, only the 
factors with significant loading coefficients are retained in the list that influences the complex 
variable (Rencher, 2002; Rubin & Babbie, 2011). This list forms the scale of factors related with 
the complex variable (Rencher, 2002; Rubin & Babbie, 2011). The reliability associated with the 
scale of factors is called internal scale reliability measured through Cronbach Alpha discussed in 
Section 3.7 (Cozby & Bates, 2012). 
The variables in the initial structural construct (Figure 6) are complex (secondary) 
variables, which need to be measured through their factors. The factors influencing these 
complex variables have been reviewed in Chapter 2. The data collection is about the factors 
obtained through a structured questionnaire instrument. The Sub-Section 3.5.2 presents the 
factors and development of this instrument. The final instrument is presented in Appendix A. 
3.5.1 Sampling and Population 
Population refers to the universal group of subjects relevant to a research (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). It is very tedious and expensive to conduct research studies on entire 
populations. Hence, samples are drawn from the population through sampling windows in such a 
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way that the results of study on the sample are inferable to the entire population (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Primarily, the sampling can be done through probabilistic and non-
probabilistic methods (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). The nature and size of population determines 
the type of sampling (Rubin & Babbie, 2011). In large samples with repeated patterns, where the 
researcher has no restriction of available subjects only, the probabilistic sampling methods are 
more suitable (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; Rubin & Babbie, 2011). However, if availability of 
subjects is limited the non-probabilistic sampling methods may be preferred (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2009; Rubin & Babbie, 2011). The non-probabilistic sampling methods require gathering of pre-
sampling intelligence and occasionally hiring informers from the population such that relevant 
data about the possible sample members can be collected (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; Rubin & 
Babbie, 2011). 
In this research, the population comprises managerial and operations staff working in 
information security teams of organizations. The population is specialized and limited. Hence, 
the non-probabilistic sampling methods are considered. The key non-probabilistic sampling 
methods are convenience, snowballing, purposive, and quota sampling (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2011; Rubin & Babbie, 2011). In convenience sampling, the reliance is on the subjects 
available to the researcher (Rubin & Babbie, 2011). It is also called accidental sampling because 
the researcher may not have any pre-sampling information about the subject sampled (Rubin & 
Babbie, 2011). Hence, this sampling may be good for gaining a quick insight about a concept, 
but is not suitable for deeply rooted studies like the one researched in this thesis (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). Snowballing also begins with limited pre-sampling information, but 
as the research is progressed the information about sample members are increased such that the 
sample size is further increased accordingly (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). In many 
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studies, the recruited sample members help in further identification and recruitment (Rubin & 
Babbie, 2011). This method is good for longitudinal studies, but not for one-time surveys 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). 
For this research, purposive sampling is an appropriate choice. Purposive sampling 
requires deeper engagement with the population such that the sample members can be recruited 
by analyzing one member at a time based on a recruitment qualification checklist (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). This method suits this research because the population members were 
recruited by analyzing their existing and past roles in the field of information security 
management through their published professional profiles. This method was lengthy for this 
study given that the target sample size was between 200 and 300. However, this method helped 
in achieving a valid and highly relevant sample for the study thus ensuring better reliability and 
validity. The recruitment qualification checklist for analyzing and recruiting the sample members 
is the following: 
(a) The respondent should have worked in information security management or 
operations for at least one year. 
(b) The respondent should be working in the field of information security management or 
operations in his/her current assignment in a role that is suitable for this research. 
(c) The respondent should have knowledge about maturity models. 
(d) The respondent should be ready to participate in the research. 
(e) The respondent should have good English language skills. 
These aspects were discovered through Part A of the structured questionnaire (Appendix 
A). The respondent was not allowed to proceed to Part B in the event any of the answers in Part 
A was in the negative. The next section presents the factors affecting the variables under study in 
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the initial structural construct and the instrument development.  
3.5.2 Instrument Development 
A number of factors related to the variables security technology trustworthiness, security 
integration, and security guardianship were reviewed in Section 2.6. These factors do not appear 
to have definitive loading relationships with the other eight variables. It is quite difficult to 
define definitive loading relationships based on theoretical knowledge only. Hence, as presented 
in Figure 7, the factors have been grouped into three parts and shown as loading the three 
variable sets defined in Section 2.3 (replicated below): 
(a) Information integrity (II), information security assurance ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
(b) Business enablement (BE), security program management (SPM), security process 
maturity (SPRM), and security integration (SI) 
(c) Competency of security team (CST), security conscious employees (SCE), security 
leadership (SL), and security guardianship (SG) 
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Figure 7. The Design of Instrument Based on Expanded Initial Structural Construct of this Research 
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The instrument was designed with one question attached with each of the factors. The 
questions were simple inquiries on the satisfaction level at which, the practice exists in the 
organization. The satisfaction level of each respondent was expressed in five possible levels: 
(a) Level 1: Strongly disagree – the respondent is strongly dissatisfied with the practice 
in his/her organization. 
(b) Level 2: Disagree – the respondent is dissatisfied with the practice in his/her 
organization. 
(c) Level 3: Neither Agree, Nor Disagree – the respondent is neutral between agreement 
and disagreement with the practice in his/her organization. 
(d) Level 4: Agree – the respondent is satisfied with the practice in his/her organization.  
(e) Level 5: Strongly agree – the respondent is strongly satisfied with the practice in 
his/her organization. 
There were 43 questions in the instrument, corresponding to the 43 factors identified for 
the initial structural construct. The factors are encoded for easy identification as presented in 
Table 1 below: 
Table 1. Factor Encoding and Loading Table 
Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
1 
Continuous process 
improvement 
CPI 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
2 Technology excellence TE 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
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Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
technology trustworthiness (STT), 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
3 Process excellence PE 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT), 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
4 Operations excellence OE 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT), 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
5 Technology trustworthiness TT 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
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Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
6 Adapt to technology changes ATC 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
7 Adapt to business changes ABC 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
8 
Integrity of business 
information 
IBI 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
9 
Institutionalization of 
processes 
IOP 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
10 Tracking signs of risks TSR 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
11 
Formulating risk response 
strategies 
FRRS 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
12 Risk metrics formulation RMF 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
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Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
13 Risk measurements RM 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
14 Risk monitoring  RMON 
Information integrity (II), information 
security assurance (ISA), and security 
technology trustworthiness (STT) 
15 Security program strategy SPS 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
16 
Security program integration 
with business needs 
SPI 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
17 
IT enablement  of security 
program 
ITES 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
18 Security governance structures SGS 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
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Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
19 
IT Security and business 
coordination 
ITSBC 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
20 Horizontal information flow HIC 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
21 Vertical information flow VIC 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
22 
Information risks integrated 
into ERM 
IRIERM 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
23 Organization-wide risk view OWRW 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
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Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
integration (SI) 
24 Risks communications RC 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
25 
Prioritization of risks 
mitigation 
PORM 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
26 
Risk management budget 
allocation 
RMBA 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
27 
Pre-emptive knowledge of 
threats 
PKOT 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
28 
Security data collection and 
analysis 
SDCA 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
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Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
29 
Continuous security 
enhancements  
CSE 
Business enablement (BE), security 
program management (SPM), security 
process maturity (SPRM), and security 
integration (SI) 
30 
Joint teams of business and IT 
security 
JTBITS 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
31 
Security-aware decision-
making 
SADM 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
32 Risk-aware work culture RAWC 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
33 
Stakeholder satisfaction 
surveys 
SSS 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
34 Continuous improvements in CISS Competency of security team (CST), 
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Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
security skills security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
35 Skilled security practitioners SSP 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
36 Security workforce screening SWC 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
37 Security leadership skills SLS 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
38 
Security knowledge 
management 
SKM 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
39 Continuous access review CAR 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
87 
 
 
Sl. No. Factor Description Factor Code Loading on Variables 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
40 IT security training ITST 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
41 Defined security roles DSR 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
42 Security certifications SC 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
43 
Security teams working in 
shifts  
STWS 
Competency of security team (CST), 
security conscious employees (SCE), 
security leadership (SL), and security 
guardianship (SG) 
 
Although there are 43 factors loading 11 variables in the initial structural construct, a 
number of non-significantly loading factors is expected to be eliminated at the PCA stage. A few 
more may be eliminated when the scale reliability testing is carried out using Cronbach Alpha. 
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Thus, a considerably smaller number of factors and their loading relationships are expected to be 
finalized in the path diagram entering the CFA and SEM stages. This level of simplification may 
not be achievable through theoretical interpretations only. Hence, PCA and scale reliability 
analysis have been chosen as the prerequisite for CFA and SEM. These methods are reviewed in 
detail in Section 3.6. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
Upon completion of data collection activities, data is analyzed utilizing the Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), Cronbach Alpha testing, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) techniques. As presented in Figure 7, there are three sets of 
factors discovered through review of literature, each set loading on the complex (latent) 
variables. In summary, there are 14 factors loading information integrity, information security 
assurance, and security technology worthiness, 18 factors loading business enablement, security 
process maturity, security program management, and security integration, and 14 factors loading 
competency of security team, security conscious employees, security leadership, and security 
guardianship. The total number of factors is 43. Thus, there are 43 questions in part B of the 
structured questionnaire presented in Appendix A. Each question has five quantitative levels 
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) that are reported by the respondents. The levels 
constitute the quantitative values of the factors. 
3.6.1 Principal Component Analysis 
This model can be taken through CFA directly from here after collecting data for each of 
the factors. However, it is a better idea to reduce this model before entering the CFA stage. This 
is the reason the PCA and Cronbach Alpha testing steps are introduced. They are completed 
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using SPSS software. PCA is one of the prominent methods under exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA). PCA conducts a factor loading analysis by rotating the factors using orthogonal rotation 
(Varimax), non-orthogonal rotation (direct oblimin), Quartimax rotation, Equamax rotation, and 
Promax rotation (Hair et al., 2009). The most used rotation method is orthogonal (Varimax) 
(Hair et al., 2009). The number of loaded variables can be defined prior to the rotation using 
either theoretical framework (in this research, three for the first set of factors, and four each for 
the second and third sets of factors) or the Eigen values plotted in the Scree plot (Foster & 
Barkus, 2006). Eigen value of a loaded variable is calculated as the sum of the squares of the 
loadings of factors on the loaded variable (Foster & Barkus, 2006). As a thumb rule, the number 
of loaded variables should be less than or equal to the number of components plotted on left side 
of the elbow of the Scree plot curve (Foster & Barkus, 2006). The result of CFA after orthogonal 
rotation reflects the loading relationships between the factors and the loaded variables, and the 
loading coefficients. The outcome is represented by Equation (1) (Rencher, 2002): 
│y│ – │µ│ = │λ││F│ – │ℰ│  Equation (1) 
In Equation (1), │y│ represents the matrix of loaded variables, │µ│ represents the 
matrix of mean values of the factors, │λ│ represents the matrix of loading coefficients, │F│ 
represents the matrix of factors, and │ℰ│ represents the matrix of error components resulting 
after the orthogonal rotation. The loading coefficient values reported after the rotation vary from 
0.00 to 0.99 (Rencher, 2002). However, for retaining significantly loading factors only, the 
loadings with loading coefficients values of 0.6 and above may be retained (Hair et al., 2009). 
Each loaded variable will have a set of such high loading factors, which will represent the scale 
of the loaded variable (Anderson, 2003; Sekaran, 2003). At this stage, the reliability testing is 
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conducted for each scale using Cronbach Alpha method to ensure that each loaded variable gets 
a scale of Cronbach reliability value between 0.70 and 0.99 (as discussed in Sub-Section 3.7.1).  
3.6.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
After reducing the model with each loaded variable restricted to its highly reliable scale 
of factors, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted for the model. CFA helps in 
assessing the validity of factor loadings on the variables and the relationships between the 
variables (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). In this research, CFA helps in establishing 
validity of the construct in Figure 7 after it is reduced as a result of PCA and Cronbach Alpha 
reliability analysis. CFA runs complex validity tests and reports a set of validity statistics in 
LISREL, AMOS, or equivalent multivariate statistical software (Foster & Barkus, 2006). It is 
much more sophisticated than EFA using PCA or any other technique. CFA tests the latent 
processes that establish the validity of factors loading on the complex (latent) variables, and the 
loading of latent variables on each other following through causal relationships between the 
latent variables (a structural construct called path diagram)(Foster & Barkus, 2006). The CFA 
test is run along with SEM using a common set of PRELIS commands in LISREL (Foster & 
Barkus, 2006). The key validity statistics reported in CFA are presented in Sub-Section 3.7.2. 
3.6.3 Structural Equation Modeling 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is also a confirmatory technique like CFA. It 
confirms the loading relationships between the factors and the latent variables, and the causal 
relationships between the latent variables through model fitment statistics (testing the model 
fitment of the path diagram) (Foster & Barkus, 2006). SEM involves testing of different 
configurations of the path diagram, and selects the optimum one given the data set (Foster & 
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Barkus, 2006). It involves a graphical analysis of the path diagram and comparing it with the 
model fitment statistics generated through the PRELIS command in LISREL (Foster & Barkus, 
2006). For a model to converge successfully in LISREL, the number of parameters should be 
less than or equal to the sum of number of paths, number of variances, number of covariances, 
and number of errors (collectively called observations of SEM) (Saris, 1999).  
For SEM, the path diagram determined after EFA (PCA and reliability testing of the 
factor scales using Cronbach Alpha or other tests) should be drawn graphically in LISREL using 
a graphics user interface(Foster & Barkus, 2006). When the PRELIS command is executed in 
LISREL, it computes the CFA and SEM statistics collectively (Foster & Barkus, 2006; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The PRELIS command first creates an observed covariance 
matrix of the path diagram entered by the researcher, and then also creates an internal minimum 
fitment covariance matrix (null model) (Foster & Barkus, 2006; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). 
The model fitment statistics reported in SEM presents an overview of how the observed 
covariance matrix differs from the best fitment covariance matrix (Foster & Barkus, 2006; Hair 
et al., 2009; Schreiber et al., 2006; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The statistics reported in SEM 
are the following (Foster & Barkus, 2006; Hair et al., 2009; Schreiber et al., 2006; Schumacker 
& Lomax, 2010): 
(a) Goodness of Fitment (GFI): This is the most basic statistic reported in SEM. It simply 
reflects the difference between the observed model’s covariance matrix and the 
minimum fitment (null) model’s covariance matrix. For acceptable model fitment, its 
value should be at least 0.90. However, it may not be reliable for sample sizes less 
than 250. The formula for GFI is presented in Equation (2): 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 1 −  𝜉𝜉12
𝜉𝜉0
2  Equation (2) 
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Here, 𝜉𝜉02 = chi squared of the minimum fitment independence (null) model having the 
variables uncorrelated) 
𝜉𝜉1
2 = chi squared of the observed model 
(b) Adjusted Goodness of Fitment (AGFI): AGFI is like GFI, but is adjusted for small 
sample sizes; typically between 50 and 250. SEM should not be conducted below 
sample size of 50. AGFI value should also be at least 0.90 for goodness of fitment. 
(c) Normed Fitment Index (NFI): NFI is calculated as the difference between the Chi-
squared of an independence model (a model having no correlations among the 
variables; also called Null model) and the Chi-squared of the observed model, and 
subtracting the result by the Chi-squared of the independence model. If, 𝜉𝜉02 is the Chi-
squared of the independence model and 𝜉𝜉12 is the Chi-squared of the observed model, 
then NFI is estimated as shown in Equation (3): 
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  𝜉𝜉02−𝜉𝜉12
𝜉𝜉0
2   Equation (3) 
The minimum value of NFI should be 0.90 for good model fitment. 
(d) Non-Normed Fitment Index (NNFI): NNFI is also based on Chi-squaredof an 
independence model and the observed model. However, it also takes into account the 
degrees of freedom df0 and df1 of the independence and the observed models, 
respectively. NNFI is also called Tucker-Lewis index. NNFI or Tucker-Lewis index 
can be used for comparing fitment of two models or of a model with the null model. It 
can be estimated from the following formula [Equation (4)]: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 =  { 𝜉𝜉02𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑0 −  𝜉𝜉12𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1 } { 𝜉𝜉02
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑0
− 1}�  Equation (4) 
The minimum value of NNFI should be 0.90 for good model fitment. 
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(e) Comparative Fitment Index (CFI): CFI also takes into account Chi-squared of an 
independence model and the observed model, and the degrees of freedom of both the 
models. CFI helps in estimating the improvement in non-centrality when going from 
observed to null model, or an alternate model. The minimum value of CFI should be 
0.90 for good model fitment. CFI can be estimated by the following formula 
[Equation (5)]: 
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  �𝜉𝜉02− 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑0�− �𝜉𝜉12− 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1�
𝜉𝜉0
2− 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑0   Equation (5) 
(f) Incremental Fitment Index (IFI): IFI takes into account the difference of Chi-squared 
of an independence model (𝜉𝜉02)and the Chi-squared of the observed model (𝜉𝜉12), and 
the Chi-squared of an independence model subtracted by the degrees of freedom of 
both the observed model. The minimum value of IFI should be 0.90 for good model 
fitment. IFI can be estimated by the following formula [Equation (6)]: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  𝜉𝜉02− 𝜉𝜉12
𝜉𝜉0
2− 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1  Equation (6) 
(g) Relative Fitment Index (RFI) takes into account Chi-squared of both independence 
and observed models, and the degrees of freedoms of both the models. It is a simple 
evaluation of effect of ratios of chi-squared to degrees of freedom of both the 
independence and observed models on the overall model fitment score of the 
observed model relative to the independence model. The minimum value of RFI 
should be 0.90 for good model fitment. RFI can be estimated by the following 
formula [Equation (7)]: 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  1 −  𝜉𝜉12 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1�
𝜉𝜉0
2
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑0
�
 Equation (7) 
94 
 
 
The above model fitment indices should reflect the goodness of the model irrespective of 
the sample size (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). However, the fitment may be penalized by 
adding parameters to the model (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Ideally, all these indices should 
report values of 0.90 and above (Byrne, 2010). However, in certain models some of the indices 
may return lower values, which need to be explained to justify fitment (Byrne, 2010). 
3.7 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability is related with the precision and accuracy of the measurement model and 
method used for measuring variables under a study (Cozby & Bates, 2012). Validity is related 
with the extent to which, the measurement model and method used can be trusted for measuring 
the variables under a study(Cozby & Bates, 2012).Hence, a measurement model and method 
with high reliability should provide consistency in results when the measurements are repeated 
for different samples with similar sampling characteristics (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). The 
results of the measurement model with high validity should be applicable in different practical 
scenarios with similar characteristics and similar limitations defined by the researcher (Cooper 
&Schindler, 2014). In Sub-Sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2, the common reliability testing methods are 
reviewed. After this review, the Sub-Section 3.7.3 presents the reliability and validity testing 
methods utilized for this research. 
3.7.1 Review of Reliability Testing Methods 
The reliability of a measurement model and method can be tested using test-retest 
method, internal consistency method, and inter-rater method (Cooper & Schindler, 2014; Cozby 
& Bates, 2012; Sekaran, 2003). The objective of reliability testing is to find out the possible 
measurement error in a measurement model and method (Cooper & Schindler, 2014; Cozby & 
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Bates, 2012; Sekaran, 2003). A reliable scale of a variable should return minimum variability of 
the scores collected for each of the measure in the scale (Cozby & Bates, 2012). High variability 
indicates some reliability problem in either the model design, or the instrument design, or the 
experiment design or the measurement method (Cozby & Bates, 2012). For example, the 
instrument may have ambiguity or the observer is not trained adequately. There may also be 
errors in choosing the variables or the measures included in the scale (Sauro & Lewis, 2012). 
Test-retest is the simplest reliability testing method. The same sample can be tested with 
the same instrument at two different times, preferably at least a week apart (Cozby & Bates, 
2012). This is done with an assumption that the respondents will need to make decisions on the 
questions again as they won’t remember their earlier answers given earlier in the same test 
(Sekaran, 2003). The design of the instrument and the experiment are not altered because they 
are the ones tested for reliability at the first place. There should be consistency in the results 
reflected by high correlation between the findings of the two tests (Cozby & Bates, 2012). There 
may be some exceptions, like change in moods or perceptions of respondents because of a 
significantly impacting event. Hence, this method may not work always. 
Internal reliability testing is used in complex instruments in which, a number of factors or 
items constitute the construct of a variable (Cozby & Bates, 2012; Howitt & Cramer, 2011; 
Sauro & Lewis, 2012). Such variables not measurable directly through a simple test are called 
complex, secondary, or latent variables. Internal reliability testing helps verifying if the variables 
are reliably constructed of their items or factors in the form of their respective scales (Hair et al. 
2009; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Hence, this method is also called construct reliability 
testing. There are two methods of construct reliability testing: Spearman Brown split-half 
reliability coefficient and Cronbach Alpha reliability. Split-half test is simpler between the two, 
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which compares the correlation of half of the items with that of the other half assuming that there 
should be consistency in both of them as they collectively are constructing the same complex 
variable (Cozby & Bates, 2012; Howitt & Cramer, 2011; Sauro & Lewis, 2012).Cronbach Alpha 
test makes use of split-half test whereby, the alpha reliability indicator is the average of all the 
split-half reliability coefficients possible internally in a scale (Cozby & Bates, 2012; Howitt & 
Cramer, 2011; Sauro & Lewis, 2012).  
The inter-rater reliability testing is used in observational research studies (Cozby & 
Bates, 2012). In this method, multiple observers make their observations about the same subjects 
and then correlate their findings (Cozby & Bates, 2012). A popular indicator for inter-rater 
reliability testing is Cohen’s Kappa, which assesses the agreements on observations on the same 
subjects’ dong the same events (Cozby & Bates, 2012). 
This research has chosen the internal reliability method with Cronbach Alpha reliability 
indicator. More details are presented in Sub-Section 3.7.3. 
3.7.2 Review of Validity Testing Methods 
Validity testing helps in establishing the correctness of a construct comprising variables, 
their scales, and interrelationships between the variables (Cozby & Bates, 2012; Sekaran, 2003). 
Construct validity may be established by testing face validity, content validity, predictive 
validity, concurrent validity, convergent validity, or discriminant validity (Cozby & Bates, 2012; 
Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011, Sekaran, 2003). They are explained as the following 
(Cozby & Bates, 2012; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011, Sekaran, 2003): 
(a) Face validity: In this method, the apparent fitment of the scale to a variable is judged 
by interpreting the possible fitment of the items with a variable. 
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(b) Content validity: In this method, the fitment of the scale to a variable is judged by 
reviewing existing theories and studying the items in the universe of contents fitting a 
variable. 
(c) Predictive validity: In this method, the items included in a scale predict the validity of 
a variable in future. 
(d) Concurrent validity: In this method, the items included in a scale reflect the validity 
of a variable at the current time when the measurements are taken. 
(e) Convergent validity: In this method, the items included in a scale reflect the validity 
of other variables in the same construct at the current time when the measurements 
are taken. 
(f) Discriminant validity: In this method, the items included in a scale do not reflect the 
validity of other variables in the same construct at the current time when the 
measurements are taken. 
In the next Sub-Section 3.7.3, the validity testing of this research is presented. The testing 
is of the entire construct and hence shall be either convergent or discriminant validity (whichever 
reported). 
3.7.3 Reliability and Validity Testing Methods Utilized in this Research 
This research explores an optimum model fit starting from an initial construct comprising 
complex variables constructed by multiple factors (items) for each. Hence, construct validity or 
internal validity testing is the appropriate method for this research. Further, the chosen method is 
Cronbach Alpha. This method was chosen because it is easy to estimate Alpha in SPSS and also, 
a report of individual item-total correlations are reported in tabulated form. This report helps in 
finding how including or excluding an item affects the overall reliability of the scale of the 
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complex variable. As explained in Sub-Section 3.6.1, the factors loading on a variable was 
explored through PCA and only the ones having significant loading on the variables was retained 
within the scale of items. However, this method merely helps in reducing the initial measurement 
construct and does not include reliability and validity testing. For reliability, the scales of the 
complex variables were tested using Cronbach Alpha separately. Cronbach Alpha values range 
from 0.0 to 1.0 (Beins & McCarthy, 2012; Hair et al., 2009). The acceptable range of Cronbach 
Alpha for finalizing a scale is greater than 0.70 (Beins & McCarthy, 2012; Hair et al., 2009). In 
psychological studies, lower values of 0.60 and above may be accepted if the research is on 
complex and unpredictable scenarios (Howitt & Cramer, 2011). In this research, the range is 0.70 
to 0.99 unless something unexpected results in the research outcomes, after the initial 
measurement model is reduced and the scales of factors for each variable are determined. 
This research investigates the validity of the reduced measurement construct after PCA 
and reliability analysis. The objective is to study the convergent or discriminant validity 
whichever is reported) of the variables in the construct. The model fitment tests of SEM reported 
in Sub-Section 3.6.2 are for validity testing of the entire construct. In addition, the following 
validity tests are proposed under CFA (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010; Hair et al., 2009; Schreiber 
et al., 2006): 
(a) Chi-squared to degrees of freedom ratio: Chi-squared is a relative statistic between 
the expected and observed value of a model. It is presented by the following formula: 
Chi-squared = [expected value – observed value] 2 / expected value Equation (8) 
The variability of factors within a scale bound by their interrelationships is the 
degrees of freedom. For acceptable validity, the Chi-squared to degrees of freedom 
ratio should be less than 3. 
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(b) Root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA): RMSEA is also calculated 
using Chi-squared and degrees of freedom. It is a statistic incorporating validity for a 
specific sample size. It is presented by the following formula: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =  � 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑−𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 
𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆−1) Equation (9) 
The value of RMSEA varies from 0 to 1. For acceptable validity, RMSEA should be 
less than or equal to 0.3. 
(c) Root mean squared residual (RMR): RMR is a statistic based on the covariance 
matrix. It is calculated as the squared root of the residual of differences between 
observed and best fit covariance matrix. Its value should be between 0 and 10 for 
acceptable validity. 
(d) Standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR): SRMR is estimated as the Normed 
value of RMR taking into account the sample size. The value of SRMR is estimated 
by dividing RMR by the sample size before square rooting. Its value should be 
between 0 and 1 for acceptable validity. 
3.8 Relevance and Significance 
Organizations invest significantly in information security processes, controls, and the 
overall management system. However, there is always one question that appears to remain 
unanswered for every organization. How much effective and efficient the information security 
controls are in an organization given the known and emerging threats, and also the threats that 
are not yet visible at the horizon? Can an organization guarantee that enough has been done to 
achieve information security and protection of all the information assets with varying levels of 
criticality? Perhaps, an organization can never guarantee this. In that case, there should be 
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something the organization should be working upon to ensure that there is a reasonable level of 
security in the organization and it is being enhanced continuously. The answer is in defining and 
achieving information security maturity. This research defines the levels of information security 
maturity possible within an organization and investigates the key factors associated with the 
variables and their relationships in achieving the highest level of information security maturity 
possible within an organization. This research is expected to be a useful value addition to the 
existing studies on information security maturity modeling and their applications. 
A study by Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zoliat (2009) explored the information security 
landscapes in Malaysian public sector organizations to analyze the thought process behind 
information security maturity analysis and achieving the levels. Their study discovered more 
reactivity by security professionals instead of proactive approach. Their research found that 
respondents are comfortable in managing information security when they see evidences of 
known types of attacks and known solutions for curbing or preventing such attacks. This is 
because the respondents reported maximum attention on the technical controls involving 
firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, antivirus software and access control 
systems. However, the respondents faced difficulties when the attacks and security incidents are 
beyond the domain of known or emerging attacks. Baskerville, Spagnoletti, & Kim (2014) also 
raised the concern of incident centric approach in information security management with more of 
reactivity and inadequate proactive approach. There is a complacency when everything is alright 
and too much of firefighting when things go wrong in any of the critical assets. As highlighted 
by Baskerville, Spagnoletti, & Kim (2014), there needs to be a balance between incident 
management and incident prevention in a matured information security management framework. 
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This research is a value addition to the existing studies like Baskerville, Spagnoletti, & 
Kim (2014) and Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zoliat (2009) that have focused on both the proactive and 
reactive sides of information security. A perfect maturity can be achieved by creating an 
organization wide framework for information security, which is much larger than mere security 
controls managed by the security administrators and staff. As reflected in the initial measurement 
model, such a framework should encompass technology trustworthiness, integration of security 
in everything the organization does for running the business, and security guardianship by not 
only the security administrators but all the employees of the organization at all the levels in the 
hierarchy. The initial measurement model presents the variables and their significant influencing 
factors. The solution of the model will indicate which of these variables and their influential 
factors are primary for achieving information security maturity in an organization balancing the 
acts of reactivity and proactive approach. 
3.9 Barriers and Issues 
This research used the survey-based approach in which, a structured questionnaire was 
utilized to collect quantitative data from respondents working in information security teams. The 
survey was web-based and the respondents accessed a web link to launch the questionnaire for 
marking their answers. Apparently, there are two key barriers in this approach: achieving the 
target sample size and willingness of the target respondents to participate in the study. However, 
the possible respondents were identified through professional contacts and professional 
networking sites (Like, the information security community groups on LinkedIn). Also, the 
participation was voluntary based on an e-mail request sent to the professionals. Initially, there 
was an uncertainty on how many respondents may participate and how many will fill the 
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complete instrument. The target was to achieve between 200 and 300 respondents, and even 
more if possible. 
The survey designed in this study is not intrusive into the privacy of any role in an 
organization. The responses requested were based on experience-linked perceptions about 
general facts that no organization may object in disclosing. However, the respondents needed to 
be convinced about this fact. To meet this challenge, a commentary was defined explaining the 
generic and non-intrusive nature of this survey. This commentary was shared with each targeted 
respondent inviting them to ask any questions as they want before participating in this research. 
3.10 Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
Multivariate statistical method was the primary approach for exploring the results and 
their generalization through reliability and validity testing in this research. The approach 
involved PCA, Cronbach Alpha, CFA, and SEM in this study. Hence, the assumptions and 
limitations of these methods apply to this research, as well. In general, this research depended 
upon the reliability and validity scores of the optimal model and the evidences in literature in 
favor of the relationships discovered through the statistical approach. Hence, all original 
contributions of this study will need to be vetted in future by further studies. As discussed in the 
previous section, the sample size may be a limitation given that this is a specialized study 
requiring experienced information security experts to respond to the queries. The attempt was to 
achieve between 200 and 300 respondents answering the full instrument, which is acceptable for 
structural equation modeling (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). 
This research followed the positivistic philosophical approach with deductive approach of 
learning. Hence, the learning process does not induct anything revealed by the respondents from 
their experiences albeit reflects the theories studied in this study. Simply stated, the enquiry to 
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the respondents was against a preconceived model instead of requesting the respondents to create 
a model for this research. This approach was chosen such that the researcher controls the 
analytical thinking and analysis process of the primary data. However, given that the researcher 
is not a subject matter expert in information security management, the entire trust about accuracy 
of the measurement model is on existing theories. This research proceeded with an assumption 
that the existing theories studied in this research are sufficient to formulate the measurement 
model. While the model was modified based on the data collected per the statistical process 
revealed, it will need future studies. 
In this research, in-depth technical studies of information security controls have been 
avoided. Technology trustworthiness is treated as a generalized variable (supported by some 
generalized factors). For example, this research does not treat firewall trustworthiness as 
different from intrusion detection trustworthiness even if they have different significance in real 
world information security environments. By generalizing technology trustworthiness, this 
research may have missed on these differentiations that may be prevalent in the real world 
environments. However, this delimitation is accepted keeping in mind that this research is 
targeted to arrive at a general model of highest level of information security maturity without 
getting into details that some experts might be interested in. 
3.11 Summary 
This Chapter presented a detailed account of the initial measurement model, its variables, 
and the factors influencing the variables. The instrument development followed the model 
description and analysis, which is presented in Appendix A. Further, this chapter presented a 
review of the proposed sequence of methods for reducing the model, and arriving at the optimum 
model with acceptable reliability and validity scores. The methods utilized are principal 
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components analysis (PCA), Cronbach Alpha testing, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and 
structural equation modeling (SEM). The target statistics and scores for reliability and validity 
are also defined in this chapter. Finally, this chapter presented an overview of the general issues 
pertaining to relevance, significance, barriers, issues, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. 
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Chapter 4 
Data Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents analysis of the data collected from survey respondents with the help 
of the instrument designed to collect quantitative data for all the factors presented in Figure 7 
provided under Sub-Section 3.5.2. The data has been collected uniformly as per a five-level scale 
defined for each factor (presented following Figure 7 provided under Sub-Section 3.5.2). The 
factors, their encoding, and their loading on the model variables of the initial structural construct 
were presented in Table 1. In this chapter, a report on the four phases defined in Sub-Sections 
3.4.1 to 3.4.4, and analysis of the outcomes of methods followed in the four phases are presented. 
In the end, a collective analysis of the findings is presented. 
4.2 Data collection 
Prior to data collection, the instrument presented in Appendix A was vetted by eight 
industry professionals in information security for correctness of variables chosen and the 
relationships shown in the initial structural construct. No changes were suggested by the experts. 
Data was collected from an online survey conducted through the Survey Monkey website. The 
link of the survey was sent to 413 prospective respondents identified through LinkedIn (a 
professional networking website that allows communications to millions of professionals) and 
professional contacts working in information security teams in the public sector and from the 
North Eastern and Mid-Atlantic area of the United States. Invitations were sent to participants 
based on their published professional profiles.  Relevance with the research scope and objectives 
were analyzed closely prior to sending the invitations. The link to the survey questionnaire was 
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sent to each participant after getting an informed consent of his/her participation. As a result, a 
total of 301 responses were obtained. Some of the responses were incomplete. However, the 
missing responses were very few and hence, the SMEAN feature of SPSS was used to populate 
the missing data fields. This method is feasible when the number of missing responses in a 
variable is very small compared to the overall series of responses for the variable (Gupta, 2000; 
SPSS Inc., 2007). The SMEAN feature in SPSS is a way to populate the missing fields by the 
mean of the entire series of responses of a particular question (Gupta, 2000; Landau & Everitt, 
2004; SPSS Inc., 2007). The SMEAN report for treating the missing responses is presented in 
Appendix B. There are many other methods for treating the missing values in SPSS. SMEAN 
method was chosen with an assumption that populating a small number of missing fields (say, 1 
to 3%) with series mean will not vary the model outcomes as the standard deviations reflected in 
the descriptive statistics report (Appendix E) are non-significant. 
4.3 Principal Component Analysis and Reliability Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Reliability Analysis (RA) are the two tests 
proposed in the second phase of this research. Referring Figure 7, a number of factors in three 
groups were shown as loading the model variables. These variables were found from the review 
of literature and were also vetted by the eight information security industry experts consulted. 
The objective of PCA was to reduce the number of factors by retaining only the ones loading the 
variables significantly. The threshold for loading coefficients was decided at 0.6. The rotation 
method used was VARIMAX with Kaiser Normalization as discussed in Sub-Section 3.6.1.  
Table 2 presents the loading of first group of factors on three model variables: 
Information Integrity (II), Information Security Assurance (ISA), and Security Technology 
Trustworthiness (STT). The loading coefficients of 0.6 and greater are highlighted in green color. 
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The components are latent variables in the output table in SPSS. However, they can be decided 
easily by studying the group of factors loading on a component significantly. For example, the 
highlighted factors in the second column comprise of all the factors that should suitably 
influence STT significantly. Similarly, the highlighted factors in the first column suitably 
influence ISA, and the ones in the third column suitably influence II. 
 
Table 2. Factor Loading Analysis on Information Integrity (II), Information Security Assurance 
(ISA), and Security Technology Trustworthiness (STT) 
 Component 
 Information 
Security 
Assurance (ISA) 
Security 
Technology 
Trustworthiness 
(STT) 
Information 
Integrity (II) 
Continuous Process Improvements (CPI) .318 .280 .781 
Technology Excellence (TE) .332 .323 .825 
Process Excellence (PE) .314 .358 .809 
Operations Excellence (OE) .352 .418 .725 
Technology Trustworthiness (TT) .369 .626 .473 
Adapt to Technology Changes (ATC) .299 .727 .387 
Adapt to Business Changes (ABC) .278 .821 .308 
Integrity of Business Information (IBI) .324 .794 .276 
Institutionalization of Processes (IOP) .465 .632 .345 
Tracking Signs of Risks (TSR) .695 .463 .209 
Formulating Risk Response Strategies 
(FRRS) .778 .307 .308 
Risk Metrics Formulation (RMF) .779 .193 .393 
Risk Measurements (RM) .750 .304 .386 
Risk Monitoring (RMON) .766 .341 .240 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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The decision is not about all influencing variables but the most significantly influencing 
variables only (the threshold of factor loading coefficient chosen is 0.6 or higher). The literatures 
may indicate certain factors as influencing other variables, as well. In fact, all these influencing 
factors have been included in the initial structural construct with the help of literature review in 
Chapter 2. However, at this stage of the research, the results are about what the primary data set 
collected in this research reflects about the significant factors influencing a variable. In order to 
test whether the groups of significantly loading variables on the model variables are reliable 
scales or not, a further testing of scale reliability is essential. The scale reliability process using 
Cronbach Alpha method has been explained in Sub-Sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.3. As indicated, 
Cronbach Alpha value should be between 0.70 and 0.99. The Cronbach Alpha test results of 
loadings on all the eleven model variables are presented in Appendix C. 
From Tables 8, 9, and 10 in Appendix C, the Cronbach Alpha scale reliability values of 
ISA, STT, and II are 0.924, 0.925, and 0.940. These values indicate high reliabilities of the ISA, 
STT, and II scales. Further, the values under the column named as "Cronbach Alpha if Item 
deleted" indicate that the Cronbach Alpha values of any of the scales will not increase further if a 
variable is eliminated from them. Hence, the scale configurations may be deemed as finalized for 
further analysis. Table 3 presents the significant factors loading on the four model variables: 
Security Integration (SI), Business Enablement (BE), Security Program Management (SPM), and 
Security Process Maturity (SPRM). The significant loadings are highlighted in green color. 
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Table 3. Factor Loading Analysis on Security Integration (SI), Business Enablement (BE), 
Security Program Management (SPM), and Security Process Maturity (SPRM) 
 Component 
 
Security 
Integration 
(SI) 
Business 
Enablement 
(BE) 
Security 
Program 
Management 
(SPM) 
Security 
Process 
Maturity 
(SPRM) 
Security Program Strategy (SPS) .219 .364 .742 .230 
Security Program Integration (SPI) .296 .243 .770 .269 
IT Enablement of Security (ITES) .351 .283 .715 .308 
Security Governance Structures 
(SGS) .291 .567 .561 .222 
IT Security and Business 
Coordination (ITSBC) .374 .640 .405 .232 
Horizontal Information Flow (HIF) .280 .773 .310 .268 
Vertical Information Flow (HIF) .353 .723 .285 .306 
Information Risks Integrated into 
ERM (IRERM) .610 .571 .287 .147 
Organization-Wide Risk View 
(OWRW) .721 .417 .210 .238 
Risks Communications (RC) .768 .251 .307 .206 
Prioritization of Risks Mitigation 
(PORM) .710 .363 .233 .329 
Risk Management Budget 
Allocation (RMBA) .685 .172 .339 .340 
Pre-emptive Knowledge of Threats 
(PKOT) .513 .232 .201 .679 
Security Data Collection and 
Analysis  (SDCA) .231 .300 .414 .746 
Continuous Security Enhancements 
(CSE) .368 .339 .400 .624 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
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In this group, there are some critical decisions to be made as some of the variables have 
loading coefficients close to 0.60. The significant one is security governance structures (SGS) as 
the factor loads two variables with almost the same loading coefficient close to 0.60 (0.567 and 
0.561): BE and SPM. The decision to be made was to either include it or discard it in the two 
scales. It is an important factor, as reported by Bart & Turel (2010), Bernroider & Ivanov (2011), 
Bowen et al. (2006), BSI (2005), and ISACA (2012). In addition, the factor “Information Risks 
Integrated into ERM” has a loading of 0.571 on business enablement, which is again close to 
0.60. Information Risks Integrated into ERM is a critical requirement of COBIT design (ISACA, 
2009, 2012), and is also recommended by Ernst & Young (2015), Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association (2014), and Proctor (2014).  
The tool used for making a decision on these variables was Cronbach Alpha comparison 
of the scales with and without these variables. The clue lies in the column “Item scale if deleted”. 
If this column shows reduction in reliability if the variables IRERM and SGS are deleted, then 
they need not be included in the scales. This test has been shown in Tables 12 and 13 (Appendix 
C). In Table 12, the Cronbach reliability value of the scale of BE with SGS included is 0.926 and 
the scale without SGS has the reliability value of 0.896. The last column indicates that if SGS is 
deleted, the new Cronbach Alpha value will be 0.914, which is lower than the reliability of the 
overall scale with SGS (0.926). Hence, inclusion of SGS in the scale of BE is justified. Similar 
observations could be made in Table 13. The Cronbach Alpha reliability scale of SPM is 0.902 
including SGS and 0.882 excluding it. This observation confirms justification of including SGS 
in the scale of SPM. Finally, the case of SPRM is straight forward (Table 14) as Cronbach 
reliability value of SPRM is 0.876 with all factors included have loading coefficients above 0.6. 
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Table 4. Factor Loading Analysis on Competency of Security Team (CST), Security Conscious 
Employees (SCE), Security Guardianship (SG), and Security Leadership (SL) 
 Component 
 
Competency 
of Security 
Team (CST) 
Security 
Conscious 
Employees 
(SCE) 
Security 
Guardianship 
(SG) 
Security 
Leadership 
(SL) 
Joint Teams of Business and IT 
Security (JTBITS) .215 .766 .372 .161 
Security-Aware Decision-Making 
(SADM) .368 .782 .271 .171 
Risk-Aware Work Culture 
(RAWC) .283 .771 .275 .261 
Stakeholder Satisfaction Surveys 
(SSS) .262 .626 .171 .522 
Continuous Improvements in 
Security Skills (CISS) .649 .433 .155 .415 
Skilled Security Practitioners (SSP) .734 .374 .289 .171 
Security Workforce Screening 
(SWC) .778 .268 .270 .183 
Security Leadership Skills (SLS) .730 .194 .362 .319 
Security Knowledge Management 
(SKM) .406 .271 .238 .740 
Continuous Access Review (CAR) .495 .216 .529 .439 
IT Security Training (ITST) .317 .306 .666 .229 
Defined Security Roles (DSR) .402 .301 .695 .242 
Security Certifications (SC) .207 .264 .471 .676 
Security Teams Working In Shifts 
(STWS) .195 .283 .811 .189 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Table 4 presents the significantly loading factors on Competency of Security Team 
(CST), Security Conscious Employees (SCE), Security Guardianship (SG), and Security 
Leadership (SL). The scales of CST, SCE, and SG could be formed by the variables loading with 
loading coefficients above 0.6. However, a decision was taken to include SSS in SL because 
there were only two variables with loading coefficients above 0.6. A scale needs at least three 
factors to avoid negative average covariance among items, which violates the reliability model 
assumptions (De Sa, 2007). The Cronbach Alpha reliability testing confirmed reliability values 
of 0.904, 0.902, 0.853, and 0.832 of CST, SCE, SG, and SL, respectively (Tables 15 to18). 
Elimination of any factor did not reflect improvements in reliability scales. Hence, their scales 
have been accepted. The next step is path diagram formation using only the reduced scales of the 
variables, as presented in Section 4.4. 
4.4 Path Diagram 
The path diagram based on the reduced version of the initial measurement construct after 
PCA and reliability analysis is presented in Figure 8. As expected, the number of factors and the 
number of relationships had reduced significantly after completing PCA and reliability analysis. 
In the reduced construct, each variable is loaded by the most significant factors numbering three 
to five per variable, and the rest of the factors loading them non-significantly have been 
eliminated. 
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Figure 8. The Reduced Design of Initial Structural Construct after Principal Component 
Analysis and Reliability Analysis 
 
114 
 
 
Each of the scales has been tested to be having reliability values between 0.70 and 0.99 
using Cronbach Alpha method. Further, it has been ascertained that the reliability values are 
optimized as no further improvements are possible by adding or deleting factors. In three scales 
(BE, SPM, and SL), factors with loading coefficients slightly less than 0.6 have been included to 
achieve optimum reliability scales. The reduced model presented in Figure 8 was tested further 
for validity and model fitment using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation 
modeling (SEM). As presented in Sub-Section 3.7.2, validity testing reflects the accuracy or the 
construct and its relationships for representing the concepts studied in the research (Cozby 
&Bates, 2012; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011, Sekaran, 2003). As further proposed in Sub-
Section 3.7.2, the construct validity will be tested to find out convergent and discriminant 
validities of the scales when fitted into the construct. The results are presented in Sections 4.5 
and 4.6. 
4.5 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
As discussed in Sub-Section 3.7.3, CFA is a method for testing the validity of 
relationships between the model variables and the factors that load over them using validity 
metrics proposed by a number of researchers (Hair et al., 2009; Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 
2008). Significance of loading coefficients of factors is only one of the indicators of validity of 
relationship between the factor and the loaded variable. As observed in the results of Section 4.3, 
a scale formed by grouping only the highest loading factors need not have optimum Cronbach 
Alpha reliability scale. Similar observation can be found in validity analysis, as well. The 
validity analysis in this research was conducted by programming the path diagram after reducing 
the initial construct in LISREL software tool and running the PRELIS command. The output 
presented a number of validity metrics analyzed in this section. 
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In the outcome of the SIMPLIS command, the model based on the path diagram 
presented in Figure 8 converged successfully after 17 iterations in the first attempt itself. This 
was made possible after reducing the model from the initial structural construct presented in 
Figure 7 to the reduced construct presented in Figure 8 after PCA and reliability analysis.  
The validity metrics to be analyzed in CFA were discussed in Sub-Section 3.6.3. CFA is 
not an isolated method albeit is integrated with SEM (Hair et al., 2009). CFA and SEM 
collectively involves detailed validity analysis of the path diagram and also analysis of alternate 
constructs having better validity statistics such that the optimum construct can be chosen as the 
outcome. As discussed in Sub-Section 3.6.3, the PRELIS command in LISREL has the ability to 
estimate the observed covariance matrix of the construct (path diagram formed in LISREL and 
corresponding PRELIS commands generated), and create an internal covariance matrix to be 
used as the null model to facilitate testing of hypothetical relationships in the path diagram 
(Foster & Barkus, 2006; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The model fitment validity statistical 
metrics reported in CFA and SEM are reflections of the difference between the observed 
covariance matrix and the null covariance matrix (Foster & Barkus, 2006; Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2010).The raw report of the path diagram model in Figure 8 is presented in Appendix D 
output D1. The results observed in this research are discussed in the following paragraphs. First, 
the CFA results are discussed, thereafter the SEM results are discussed, and finally the alternate 
path diagram models are analyzed and compared with the model in Figure 8. In this research, 
two alternate models were tested by comparing their output validity metrics with those of the 
path diagram presented in Figure 8. The outputs of the alternate models are presented in 
Appendix D under outputs D2 and D3. The details of modifications are discussed in Section 4.6 
under structural equation modeling (SEM). 
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In CFA, the validity statistics analyzed are the following (as introduced in Sub-Section 
3.7.3 and as per the reported values presented in Table 5 below) (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010; 
Hair et al., 2009; Schreiber et al., 2006): 
Table 5. CFA Validity Statistics 
Metric S. No. Metric Name Acceptable Value 
Reported 
Value Reflection 
1 Chi-Squared to degrees of freedom < or = 3 2.455 Good Validity 
2 
Root Mean Squared Error 
of Approximation 
(RMSEA) 
< or = 0.3 0.07 Good Validity 
3 Root Mean Squared Residual (RMR) < or = 1 0.014 Good Validity 
4 
Standardized Root Mean 
Squared Residual 
(SRMR) 
< or = 1 0.034 Good Validity 
 
(a) The first metric, as presented in Sub-Section 3.7.3, as the ratio of Chi-Squared to 
degrees of freedom. This ratio should be less than 3 for good validity in a model. In 
the PRELIS output of the path diagram shown in Figure 8, this ratio is 1868.33/761 = 
2.455. This ratio is below 3 indicating good validity. 
(b) The second metric is RMSEA. Its value should be less than or equal to 0.3. In this 
mode, RMSEA is reported as 0.07 indicating good validity. 
(c) The third metric is RMR. Its value should be less than 1. In this mode, RMR is 
reported as 0.014 indicating good validity. 
(d) The fourth metric is SRMR. Its value should also be less than 1. In this mode, SRMR 
is reported as 0.034 indicating good validity. 
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The four statistics indicates good validity of covariance of the observed model (path 
diagram of Figure 8) with respect to the null covariance model (internally estimated within 
LISREL) with and without normalization for the given sample size. However, these validity 
statistical metrics do not reflect model fitment for hypotheses testing. Further tests need to be 
conducted under the scope of SEM. These tests are presented in Section 4.6. 
4.6 Structural Equation Modeling 
SEM reports the model fitment statistical metrics that reflect the fitment of the observed 
covariance matrix with respect to the internally estimated (by LISREL) optimum covariance 
matrix (Foster & Barkus, 2006; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The differences between the two 
matrices reflect the extent of model fitment of the observed model (that is, the path diagram 
entered by researcher in LISREL; it is the Figure 8 in this study) with respect to the internally 
computed optimal model (Foster & Barkus, 2006; Hair et al., 2009; Schreiber et al., 2006; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The structural (pictorial) computation of the path diagram 
conducted by LISREL is presented in Appendix D (although it is not very clear; hence, Figure 8 
may be used as reference).  
The SEM statistical metrics described by Foster & Barkus (2006), Hair et al. (2009), 
Schreiber et al. (2006), and Schumacker & Lomax (2010), and computed in LISREL through the 
PRELIS command lines are analyzed as the following (as introduced in Sub-Section 3.6.3 and as 
per the reported values presented in Table 6 below). The equations of these metrics are not 
repeated here as they are already presented in Sub-Section 3.6.3: 
  
118 
 
 
Table 6. SEM Validity Statistics 
Metric S. No. Metric Name Acceptable Value 
Reported 
Value Reflection 
1 Goodness of fitment (GFI) < or = 0.90 0.77 Poor model fitment 
2 Adjusted Goodness of fitment (AGFI) < or = 0.90 0.73 Poor model fitment 
3 Normed-Fitment Index (NFI) < or = 0.90 0.98 Good model fitment 
4 Non-Normed Fitment Index (NNFI) < or = 0.90 0.98 Good model fitment 
5 Comparative Fitment Index (CFI): < or = 0.90 0.99 Good model fitment 
6 Incremental Fitment Index (IFI) < or = 0.90 0.99 Good model fitment 
7 Relative Fitment Index (RFI) < or = 0.90 0.98 Good model fitment 
 
(a) Goodness of fitment (GFI): GFI is the most basic and simply presents the difference 
between observed and null covariance matrices. It is not suitable for small sample 
sizes that are less than 250 (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Its value should be at least 
0.90; but the SEM analysis results of the model in Figure 8 reflects GFI at 0.77 
indicating poor model fitment. However, this research has a sample size of 301, 
which is not larger enough than 250. Hence, this may not be trusted as the only 
suitable metric of model fitment for this research. Hence, more metrics need to be 
assessed before taking a decision. 
(b) Adjusted Goodness of fitment (AGFI): AGFI is adjusted to somehow fit into smaller 
sample sizes between 50 and 250. Normally, it varies only slightly from GFI and 
hence, the result of model in Figure 8 is not expected to be much different than GFI. 
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AGFI is only 0.73 for this model. Further metrics need to be analyzed before 
considering the model as lacking fitment. 
(c) Normed-Fitment Index (NFI): NFI is different than GFI and AGFI as it estimates 
comparing the covariance matrix of the observed model with that of an independence 
model (a model having no correlations among the variables). It should be at least 
0.90. The observed model of this research returns very good NFI of 0.98 indicating 
excellent model fitment. Again, this should not be viewed as sufficient to judge the 
model. More indices reported under SEM should be analyzed to gain visibility into 
the bigger picture.  
(d) Non-Normed Fitment Index (NNFI): NNFI is the NFI taking into account degrees of 
freedom. As discussed in Sub-Section 3.6.3, this metric is also called Tucker-Lewis 
metric. Its minimum value should be 0.90, and the observed model in this study 
returned the NNFI metric at 0.98. This value again indicates excellent model fitment.  
(e) Comparative Fitment Index (CFI): CFI reflects the change in non-centrality when 
approaching an independence model from the observed model. Its minimum value 
should be 0.90, and the observed model in this study returned the CFI metric at 0.99 
indicating excellent model fitment. 
(f) Incremental Fitment Index (IFI): IFI reflects the incremental change in chi-squared 
when approaching an independence model from the observed model taking into 
account degrees of freedom of the observed model. Its minimum value should be 
0.90, and the observed model in this study returned the IFI metric at 0.99 indicating 
excellent model fitment. 
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(g) Relative Fitment Index (RFI): RFI is the last metric taken into account. It reflects 
relative change in chi-squared when approaching an independence model from the 
observed model taking into account degrees of freedom of both the models. Its 
minimum value should be 0.90, and the observed model in this study returned the RFI 
metric at 0.98. This value again indicates excellent model fitment. 
The results reflect that except GFI and AGFI, all metrics reflected excellent model 
fitment. Hence, one may be encouraged to conclude good model fitment of Figure 8 (provided 
under Section 4.4) and conclude the study. However, LISREL offers information on change in 
relationships to improve the model. As a part of SEM, alternate models should be evaluated to 
explore if an optimal one exists other than the modeled path diagram (Schumacker & Lomax, 
2010). Hence, two modified models were explored in addition to Figure 8.  
The first modified model had the changes in relationships as recommended by LISREL, 
as presented in Appendix F, Table 20. All the relationships suggested by LISREL were added in 
small steps of three relationships at a time and running the PRELIS command to observe the 
changes in validity and model fitment statistics. After entering all the relationships as presented 
in Appendix F, Table 20, the chi-squared to degrees of freedom ratio was improved to 2.15, the 
GFI improved to 0.80, the AGFI improved to 0.75, and the RMSEA improved to 0.01. All the 
remaining metrics were quite close to their previous levels (RMR = 0.028, NFI = 0.98, NNFI = 
0.99, CFI = 0.99, IFI = 0.99, and RFI = 0.98). Overall, the model performance reflected in 
reliability and validity statistics remained the same in spite of adding 30 relationships. 
The second modified model was a further modification of the first modified model. The 
change in relationships is as presented in Table 21 in Appendix F. In this model as well, all the 
relationships suggested by LISREL were added in small steps of three relationships at a time and 
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running the PRELIS command to observe the changes in validity and model fitment statistics. 
After entering all the relationships as per Table 21, the chi-squared to degrees of freedom ratio 
was improved to 1.9965, the GFI improved to 0.81, and the AGFI improved to 0.77. The other 
metrics were quite close to their previous levels (RMSEA = 0.001, RMR = 0.026, NFI = 0.99, 
NNFI = 0.99, CFI = 0.99, IFI = 0.99, and RFI = 0.98). 
From these results, it appears that the model in Figure 8 is an optimal one. The 
improvements in GFI and AGFI are very small and still well below the model fitment threshold. 
The sample size is not suitable for GFI and hence, only AGFI appears to be the problem. All 
other metrics reflect excellent model fitment and do not improve significantly after the two 
modifications. In addition, the Cronbach Alpha levels were compromised as tested randomly on 
some of the scales. Hence, the model in Figure 8 is concluded to be optimal. A detailed 
discussion on the model follows in Section 4.7. 
4.7 Discussion 
Taking the model presented in Figure 8 as the optimal outcome of this research, it is now 
analyzed with respect to the concepts reviewed in Chapter 2. There are three enablers of ISM in 
the optimum model of this study. The first enabler is STT, which in turn is enabled by II and 
ISA. Information integrity is found to be directly influenced by excellence in information 
security technology, processes, and operations, and a system of continuous improvements in 
processes. The standards in information security (like ISO 27001 and ISO 27002) are directly 
affected by standards for excellence in technology, processes, and operations (like COBIT, ITIL 
and ISO 20000) (BSI, 2005, 2008; ISACA, 2007; Kerr & Murthy, 2013). The role of integrated 
security operations, their controlling processes, and technology excellence in assuring 
information integrity is projected by BSI (2008) and NIST (2013). 
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Contribution by continuous process improvements can be attributed to sustained and 
improving operation excellence and keeping the pressure on technology innovations to curb 
complacency with a view in mind that malicious actors also keep upgrading their methods for 
causing harm. The factors of security process excellence and continuous improvements have 
been elaborated in the middle part of the model in the form of security process maturity (SPM), 
which is directly influenced by preemptive knowledge of threats, security data collection and 
analysis, and continuous security enhancements. SPM directly affects security integration in the 
organization, which as per NIST 800-100 is essential for information security assurance (Bowen 
et al., 2006). 
As shown in the model, information security assurance (ISA) is directly influenced by 
risk management factors: TSR, FRRS, RMF, RM, and RMON. This means that an organization 
can provide ISA to its stakeholders, customers, and employees by ensuring effective 
management of risks to information in the organization.  In a recent report by CSO online 
(Armerding, 2017), a list of 16 recent data security breaches is presented. The recent high impact 
data breach cases, like Yahoo, eBay, Equifax, JP Morgan Chase, Sony, and Adobe, reminds the 
information security experts about the criticality of proactive risk management by tracking the 
signs of risks and taking response and preventive actions before the attackers strike. All of these 
organizations may be already having information security systems and standards. However, they 
seem to have lacked in achieving excellence in processes, technology, operations, risk 
management, and continuous improvements making their security technologies untrustworthy. 
This is a reflection gained from the direct influence of ISA on STT and of SPRM on SI.  
The other two influencers of SI are business enablement (BE) and security program 
management (SPM). BE is most loaded by SGS, ITSBS, HIF, VIF, and IRERM. Security 
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governance structures (SGS) are very challenging to be formed in an organization as they require 
professional, legal, controlling, and cultural frameworks for supporting them amidst a 
challenging environment of threats and risks and their players (Whitman & Mattord, 
2012).Security-orientation and risk-aware cultures are key determinants of cultural framework 
enabling SGS. In the optimal model of this research, security-orientation and risk-aware cultures 
are enabling factors of security conscious employees, which in turn is a key enabler of the 
overall security guardianship in the organization. ITSBS is another crucial area as it integrates IT 
and security professionals with business professionals for joint accountability of security in the 
organization.  
A good number of research studies have proposed ITSBS as critical for security program 
management (Kuhn, Ahuja, and Mueller, 2013; Schnittling & Munn, 2010; Boss et al., 2009; 
Warkentin and Willison, 2009; Gross and Rosson, 2007; Flowerday and von Solms, 2006; 
Thomson and von Solms, 2005; Koskosas and Paul, 2003), which in the optimal model of this 
study is another key variable enabling security integration. ITSBS and horizontal/vertical 
information flows enables business enablement (BE). Many scholars have recommended that 
ITSBS, IT enablement of security, and efficient information sharing are critical for success of 
security program strategy and integration with business strategy (Kuhn, Ahuja, and Mueller, 
2013; Schnittling & Munn, 2010; Boss et al., 2009; Warkentin and Willison, 2009; Gross and 
Rosson, 2007; Flowerday and von Solms, 2006; Thomson and von Solms, 2005; Koskosas and 
Paul, 2003), which are enablers of security program management in the optimal model. Hence, it 
is valid that security program management and business enablement are key enablers of security 
integration. 
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However, in the optimal model a third variable called security process maturity also 
enables security integration. The factors PKOT, SDCA, and CSE are influencers of security 
process maturity, which is the output of process excellence and continuous process 
improvements as stated by BS Institute (2010), Karokola, Kowalski, & Yngstrom (2011), 
Thomson & von Solms (2006), Philips (2003), and SSE CMM (1999). In the optimal model, 
process excellence and continuous process improvements is grouped with technology excellence 
and operations excellence for forming the scale of information integrity, which in turn influences 
security technology trustworthiness. In a way, the model treats information integrity and security 
integration as two different areas although they both are enablers of ISM. Security integrity is 
linked with process maturity, program management, and business enablement in the optimal 
model whereby technology may be having only small role to play. This model somehow dispels 
the myth that security technology is the primary enabler of security integration.Theyare related 
but with lesser statistical significance. 
The third enabling variable of ISM is security guardianship. One of its enablers, security 
conscious employees, is discussed above. The other two enablers are competency of security 
team and security leadership. As per the optimal model, security leadership can be determined 
significantly by knowledge management system in security, security certifications obtained, and 
stakeholder’s satisfaction. The COBIT and COSO standards are specifically based on security 
knowledge management and scientific analysis of security risks that finally lead to formation of 
the controls and their objectives (Rhodes-Ousley, 2013; Whitman & Mattord, 2012; ISACA, 
2012; Yost, 2007; Bowen et al., 2006).  
Knowledge of recurring security threats and their analysis helps in forming proactive 
protective strategies and controls, which is a higher maturity level than mere day-to-day fighting 
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against the threats (Bahl & Wali, 2014; Kooper, Maes, & Lindgreen, 2011; Posthumus & Solms, 
2004; Moulton & Coles, 2003). The security processes and governance structures are organized 
in accordance with such knowledge and the standards supporting them (ISACA, 2012). The 
security certifications are obtained in accordance with the processes and structures as per the 
knowledge and supporting standards (Christensen & Knudsen, 2009; Foss & Michailova, 2009; 
Heiman, Nickerson, & Zenger, 2009). 
Competency of security team is another variable influencing security guardianship. The 
optimal model suggests that competency of security team is influenced by continuous 
improvement in skills, hiring skilled practitioners in the security field, screening of security 
workforce, and developing security leadership skills. While security processes and governance 
structures influence leadership and knowledge as per COBIT (ISACA, 2012), they in turn 
influence competency of security team. The processes and governance structures should 
comprise of organized and integrated security programs running skill enhancement programs 
among many others (like, controls effectiveness testing) (Kuhn, Ahuja, & Mueller, 2013; 
Schnittling & Munn, 2010; Boss et al., 2009; Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Gross & Rosson, 
2007; Flowerday & von Solms, 2006; Thomson & von Solms, 2005; Koskosas & Paul, 2003).  
Other direct variables influencing security guardianship are defining roles, training, and 
round-the-clock availability of security personnel. These factors have been found as significantly 
influencing security guardianship. These factors reflect security team management for security 
guardianship. Training, clear definition of roles and round-the-clock availability reflects 
formation of a shield of dedicated and committed human actors around the technology, systems, 
and processes for effective security guardianship. 
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Security maturity is quite complex.  The model in Figure 8 is complex yet optimal. Other 
research studies reviewed in this research also have reflected various complexities in security 
maturity. The model presents an overall idea of influencing variables on the core enablers of 
information security maturity. It may not be unique as it is formed by significance levels of 
relationships reflected from the responses in this research. However, the relationships may be 
reported again in future studies with varying statistical levels of significance. The actual levels of 
significance may vary by industry, country of location, cultures, and laws/regulations. Hence, 
model-driven studies should be continued in future with similar designs for more empirical 
depth. This research has provided insight into a possible optimal model and can be used as an 
input reference for future model-based studies in the information security field. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter presents a view of the primary data collected from the survey, and its 
analysis following a multi-step statistical process. The data and its analysis provide a view into 
the significance of the relationships in the initial structural construct and reducing it to a reliable 
model with only the significant relationships retained. The scale reliabilities of all the influencing 
factors associated with each of the variables were tested using Cronbach Alpha method. The 
PCA and Cronbach Alpha method helped in evolving the reduced and reliable version of the 
initial structural construct. The reduced construct (presented in Figure 8) was later tested to be 
optimally valid after completing the tests in CFA and SEM, and after analyzing alternate models 
suggested by LISREL subsequent to completing the tests. 
The finalized optimal model, after concluding the statistical analysis was reviewed and 
discussed theoretically with the help of the literature studied in Chapter 2. The model appears 
logical and practically applicable in designing an information security framework for achieving 
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maturity. However, it is argued that the model may not be unique as different significances in 
relationships may appear in other research studies conducted in other industries and countries. 
Hence, model-driven studies of information security maturity should be continued in future. It is 
expected that different levels of significances of the relationships reported may be revealed, but 
the relationships may be retained as empirical. In the next chapter, this study is concluded by 
confirming the hypotheses and presenting the closing points and recommendations. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the final standing on the hypotheses and the research conclusions are 
presented. While going through the analysis and conclusions of this research, the reader may 
perceive that many more relationships between factors and variables could have been possible in 
the final optimum model. This fact is acknowledged with a response that only the statistically 
significant relationships (significant factor loadings) are concluded in the model shown in Figure 
8 as it was derived as optimum after reliability and validity tests presented in the previous 
chapter. Other relationships are also possible and may emerge as optimum (statistically 
significant) when tested in other research settings in future studies. The models of different 
studies may vary slightly. An analogy may be made with the hurricane forecasting models that 
tend to show different paths and strengths but collectively provide a bigger picture facilitating 
near accurate early warnings. The forecasts of those models change as the hurricane progresses 
and the threat profiles change with time. In the same way, multiple research studies like this may 
provide an accurate picture of the ISM such that organizations can be more proactive in 
managing their risks and information security. With time, the models in such research studies 
may change as the new forms of threats and risks emerge in the information systems and 
services. ISM can be achieved only when organizations develop proactive and repetitive 
practices in information security, and develop change capabilities as and when new models 
emerge through research studies. A bigger picture of ISM can only be possible from multiple 
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studies (both academic and professional). A single study cannot provide all the knowledge 
elements needed for ISM. It serves merely as one of the references in the current time. 
Section 5.2 presents the final report on the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3. 
Thereafter in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, the conclusions and generalizations derived from this study 
are presented. Finally, recommendations for further studies are provided in Section 5.5 for the 
benefit of current and future researchers interested in ISM. 
5.2 Reporting on the Hypotheses 
In this research, the initial structural construct was formed based on eleven hypotheses 
presented in Section 3.3. A brief report on confirmation (or rejection, if any) of the hypotheses is 
presented in this section. Given that the core structure of the initial measurement construct was 
retained in the end, all the hypotheses have been confirmed. However, the factors influencing the 
variables and their relationships reduced significantly, as presented in Figure 8. The first 
hypothesis was the following: 
H1: Information integrity is related significantly with security technology trustworthiness in the 
context of information security 
Hypothesis H1 was confirmed in the final optimal construct. Information integrity is 
found as influenced significantly by CPI, TE, PE, and OE forming a reliable scale and security 
technology trustworthiness is found as influenced by TT, ATC, ABC, IBI, and IOP forming a 
reliable scale. With this partial construct (of the full model), both the variables (information 
integrity and security technology trustworthiness) are confirmed as significantly related. The 
second hypothesis was the following: 
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H2: Information system assurance is related significantly with security technology 
trustworthiness in the context of information security 
Hypothesis H2 was confirmed in the final construct, with Information system assurance 
having an optimally reliable scale comprising of TSR, FRRS, RMF, RM, and RMON as 
individual elements and security technology trustworthiness having an optimally reliable scale as 
described above. The third hypothesis was the following: 
H3: Business enablement is related significantly with security integration in the context of 
information security 
Hypothesis H3 was confirmed in the final optimal construct. Business enablement is 
found as influenced significantly by SGS, ITSBC, HIF, VIF, and IRERM forming a reliable 
scale and security integration is found as influenced by IRERM, OWRW, RC, PORM, and 
RMBA forming a reliable scale. With this partial construct (of the full model), both the variables 
(business enablement and security integration) are confirmed as significantly related. A special 
observation to be noted is that IRERM is influencing both the variables. The fourth hypothesis 
was the following: 
H4: Security process maturity is related significantly with security integration in the context of 
information security 
Hypothesis H4 was confirmed in the final construct, with security process maturity 
having an optimally reliable scale comprising of PKOT, SDCA, and CSE as individual elements 
and security integration having an optimally reliable scale as described above. The fifth 
hypothesis was the following: 
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H5: Security program management is related significantly with security integration in the context 
of information security 
Hypothesis H5 was confirmed in the final construct, with security program management 
having an optimally reliable scale comprising of SPS, SPI, ITES, and SGS as individual 
elements and security integration having an optimally reliable scale as described above. The 
sixth hypothesis was the following: 
H6: Competency of security team is related significantly with security guardianship in the 
context of information security 
Hypothesis H6 was confirmed in the final optimal construct. Competency of security 
team is found as influenced significantly by CISS, SSP, SWC, and SLS forming a reliable scale 
and security guardianship is found as influenced by ITST, DSR, and STWS forming a reliable 
scale. With this partial construct (of the full model), both the variables (competency of security 
team and security guardianship) are confirmed as significantly related. The seventh hypothesis 
was the following: 
H7: Security conscious employees is related significantly with security guardianship in the 
context of information security 
Hypothesis H7 was confirmed in the final construct, with security conscious employees 
having an optimally reliable scale comprising of JTBITS, SADM, RAWC, and SSS as individual 
elements and security guardianship having an optimally reliable scale as described above. The 
eighth hypothesis was the following: 
H8: Security leadership is related significantly with security guardianship in the context of 
information security 
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Hypothesis H8 was confirmed in the final construct, with security leadership having an 
optimally reliable scale comprising of SKM, SC, and SSS as individual elements and security 
guardianship having an optimally reliable scale as described above. A special observation to be 
noted is that SSS is influencing the variables security conscious employees as well as security 
leadership. The ninth hypothesis was the following: 
H9: Security technology trustworthiness is related significantly with information security 
maturity 
Hypothesis H9 was confirmed in the final construct. With information integrity and 
information security assurance as enablers and having its own reliable scale comprising of TT, 
ATC, ABC, IBI, and IOP as individual elements, security technology trustworthiness is found to 
be significantly related with information security maturity in the final construct. The tenth 
hypothesis was the following: 
H10: Security integration is related significantly with information security maturity 
Hypothesis H10 was confirmed in the final construct. With business enablement, security 
process maturity, and security program management as enablers and having its own reliable scale 
comprising of IRERM, OWRW, RC, PORM, and RMBA as individual elements, security 
integration is found to be significantly related with information security maturity in the final 
construct. The eleventh hypothesis was the following: 
H11: Security guardianship is related significantly with information security maturity 
Hypothesis H11 was confirmed in the final construct. With competency of security team, 
security conscious employees, and security leadership as enablers and having its own reliable 
scale comprising of ITST, DSR, and STWS as individual elements, security guardianship is 
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found to be significantly related with information security maturity in the final construct. The 
next section presents a summary of conclusions of the findings. 
5.3 Concluding the Findings 
The model presented in Figure 8 is the final optimal construct of this research. This 
model shows that information security maturity as a function of security technology 
trustworthiness, security integration, and security guardianship. Each of these variables 
comprises of their own reliable scales as revealed in Figure 8 and presented in the previous 
section. These are secondary variables enabled by primary variables as per the model in Figure 8. 
As stated in Section 3.2, the factors influencing the variables revealed in the model are to achieve 
the highest level of their maturity. 
The primary variables enabling security technology trustworthiness are information 
integrity and information security assurance. As the model reveals, security technology 
trustworthiness requires excellence in technology, processes, and operations, and continuous 
process improvements that affects all the three factors. Excellence is a subjective term requiring 
maturity in many aspects, like ability to rapidly track and adapt to technology and business 
changes, excellent integrity of business information, institutionalization and repeatability of 
processes, knowledge management, enterprise wide risk management, and enterprise wide 
cultural orientation to excellence (Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zolait, 2009; Dzazali & Zoliat, 2012; 
Ernst & Young, 2015; Proctor, 2014). 
Information security assurance is enabled by ability to manage enterprise wide risks 
through tracking mechanisms for signs of risks, strategically responding to risks, and risks 
measurement and monitoring. These can be made possible through an enterprise-wide risk 
management (ERM) system and integration of information risks into them (Ernst & Young, 
134 
 
 
2015; Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2014; ISACA, 2009; Proctor, 2014). 
Figure 2 presents a view of ERM design and the role of information risks as a baseline for all 
other enterprise risks (E & Y, 2015; ITGI, 2009). 
The model further reveals that security integration is enabled by business enablement of 
security, security process maturity, and security program management. Business enablement can 
be achieved through forming governance structures for information security, integrating IT and 
business teams, integrating information and business risks, and managing all channels of 
communications effectively (BS Institute, 2010).  Values, culture, leadership, and critical 
thinking have significant role play in business enablement of information security (BS Institute, 
2010).  
Further, security process maturity is enabled by preemptive knowledge management 
about threats, collecting and analyzing vast data from all areas related to security, and related 
continuous enhancements of security controls. The security process maturity can be achieved in 
five levels: performing, managed, defined, quantitative, and optimized (BSI, 2002; Karokola, 
Kowalski, & Yngstrom, 2011; Thomson & von Solms, 2006; Philips, 2003; SSE CMM, 1999). 
The capabilities of preemptive knowledge management, data collection and analysis, and 
continuous process enhancements are achieved at the highest level of process maturity (Barlette 
et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007; Whittman & Mattord, 2012). Further, testing the levels of 
effectiveness of information security controls requires feedback from stakeholders that can be 
obtained from satisfaction surveys (Barlette et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 2007; Whittman & 
Mattord, 2012). In this study, stakeholder satisfaction survey has appeared as a crucial factor in 
security guardianship maturity. 
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Security program management is influenced by security program strategy and integration, 
IT-enablement of security program and security governance structures. It is revealed here that 
security governance structures is the fundamental variable needed for business enablement as 
well as running security programs in the organization. 
Finally, the security guardianship is enabled by competency of security teams, security 
consciousness in employees, and security leadership. These variables are influenced by the 
cultural orientation of employees towards security, and constitution, management, and leadership 
of special teams for security. Competency of security teams are influenced by continuous 
enhancements in skills, hiring skilled security practitioners (experts), and screening of workforce 
engaged in security and special leadership skills for security. Security consciousness in 
employees can be invoked through joint teams and operations between business and IT security, 
cultural orientation towards risk awareness and security-aware decision making, and conducting 
regular surveys of stakeholder satisfaction to explore if they are satisfied with the security 
objectives met by the security teams and leadership (Barlette et al., 2009; BSI, 2005; ISACA, 
2007; Lacey, 2009; Whittman & Mattord, 2012). Stakeholder satisfaction survey is also revealed 
as a significant influencer of security leadership. Security leadership is further influenced by 
knowledge management in security and security certifications. 
The complexity of the final optimal model with high reliability and validity reflects that 
information security maturity needs a high top management commitment, enterprise wide 
implementation, and security objectives defined for every employee in the organization. 
Processes, technologies, people, various management systems, security teams, security 
leadership and organizational leadership all need to mature to the highest level to achieve true 
maturity in information security. It requires collective organization-wide efforts and is influenced 
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by many areas and their functions. This research has been able to finalize and present one 
possible view of the overall construct needed to achieve information security maturity. 
5.4 Generalizations 
Given that the model is formed with the help of a reasonably sized and high quality 
sample, and the reliability and validity tests conducted through widely accepted statistical 
methods, it is fit to be generalized. However, this model may be one of the possible optimal 
models reflecting a construct of information security maturity. Security technology 
trustworthiness, security integration, and security guardianship appear to be related with 
technology, processes, and people at the broader level. Hence, information security maturity is 
enabled by broad variables related to people, processes, and technology maturity as reviewed in 
theories in Chapter 2. However, all these three variables are enabled by independent variables 
largely linked with people, processes, and technology, as well. For example, as presented in 
Figure 8, security technology trustworthiness is influenced by technology trustworthiness 
(technological aspect), institutionalization of processes (process aspect), and adaptation to 
business and technology changes (people aspect). Hence, people, process, and technological 
aspects cannot be separately dealt and related when discussing about the maturity variables in 
this model.  
The model presented by this study is unique but not exclusive. It has been judged as 
optimal based on the data collected from sample studied in this study and the standard and 
relevant statistical methods used for their analysis. New studies may reveal different constructs 
of a model comprising of the variables chosen in this research. The levels of significance of 
relationships between the variables may vary but the relationships will exist in future studies as 
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well. The levels of significance may vary by industry and country of location. These are 
proposed as basis of future studies as suggested in the next section. 
5.5 Recommendations for Further Studies 
The model presented in Figure 8 may be generalized as an empirical model based on the 
merits and supporting references discussed in previous sections. However, the levels of 
significance of relationships may vary by industry. Given that the model itself is built retaining 
the most significant inter-variable relationships based on scale reliabilities and construct validity, 
the structure of the model may vary in future studies when studied on samples drawn from 
different industries and countries. For example, the sample drawn in Africa and Europe may 
have different significance in certain relationships. Such details can only be drawn from future 
studies and subsequent empirical knowledge building and generalizations. For the future 
aspirants, it is recommended that the initial measurement construct may be tested on different 
samples from other countries. In this research, the respondents were chosen from the public 
sector and from the North Eastern and Mid-Atlantic area of the United States. Hence, the model 
is a representation of information security maturity in the US. Future studies may reveal the 
model constructs for information security maturity in other parts of the world that may be having 
different cultural, people, technology, and process aspects than the US. 
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Appendix A: Research Instrument 
 
This survey is designed to explore how information security maturity can be achieved in an 
organization. Please select the MOST APPROPRIATE response from your perspective to each 
question. Your responses are voluntary and shall be kept confidential. Your individual and 
organizational details will not be disclosed in the report. 
 
There are five levels out of which, you need to choose ONLY ONE: 
Level 1 - Strongly disagree: It is a level at which, the respondent strongly disagrees with the 
parameter mentioned in the question without any doubts in mind. 
 
Level 2 - Disagree: It is a level at which, the respondent disagrees to the parameter mentioned in 
the question, but there is an element of doubt in the respondent’s mind. 
 
Level 3 - Neither agree nor disagree (level 3): It is a level at which, the respondent takes a 
neutral stand between agreement and disagreement against the parameter mentioned in the 
question. 
 
Level 4 - Agree: It is a level at which, the respondent agrees to the parameter mentioned in the 
question, but there is an element of doubt in the respondent’s mind. 
 
Level 5 - Strongly agree: It is a level at which, the respondent strongly agrees with the parameter 
mentioned in the question without any doubts in mind. 
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All the respondents will be provided a link to access the published research document. 
Part A: About yourself 
Q A1: Do you have a minimum of one year experience in either information security 
management or information security operations, or both? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Q A2: How many years of experience you have in either information security management or 
information security operations, or both? 
1) One to three years 
2) More than three years to five years 
3) More than five years to eight years 
4) More than eight years to ten years 
5) Above ten years 
Q A3: Are you currently working in the field of either information security management or 
information security operations, or both? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Q A4: Do you have some theoretical or practical knowledge about achieving information 
security maturity in an organization? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Q A5: Do you agree to participate in this research? 
1) Yes 
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2) No 
Q A6: Do you possess good English language skills? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
Please proceed to Part B if all your answers in Part A are in “Yes”. 
Part B: about factors influencing variables associated with Information Security Maturity 
Q B1: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has an effective system for 
continuous improvements in information security processes? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B2: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has achieved technology 
excellence in information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B3: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has achieved process excellence 
in information security? 
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1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B4: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has achieved operations 
excellence in information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B5: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has achieved technology 
trustworthiness in information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B6: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively adapted to 
technology changes in information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
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3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B7: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively adapted to 
business changes in information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B8: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively ensured integrity 
of business information for information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B9: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively institutionalized 
processes for information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
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5) Strongly Agree 
Q B10: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively tracked the signs 
of risks in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B11: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively formulated risk 
response strategy in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B12: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively formulated risk 
metrics in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
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Q B13: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively implemented risk 
measurements in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B14: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively implemented risk 
monitoring in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B15: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively formulated 
security program strategy in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B16: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively achieved security 
program integration with business needs in the area of information security? 
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1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B17: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively achieved IT 
enablement of security program in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B18: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively implemented 
security governance structures in the area of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B19: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively implemented IT 
security and business coordination for information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
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3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B20: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively implemented 
systems for horizontal information flow (among peers in various departments) for information 
security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B21: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively implemented 
systems for vertical information flow (across organizational levels in various departments) for 
information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B22: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effectively integrated 
information risks into the organization-wide enterprise risk management (ERM)? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
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3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B23: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has an organization-wide risks 
view related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B24: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective risks 
communication related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B25: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective prioritization of 
risks mitigation related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
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5) Strongly Agree 
Q B26: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has sufficient budget allocated 
for information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B27: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective preemptive 
knowledge of threats related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B28: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective system for 
information security-related data collection and analysis? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
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Q B29: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective system for 
continuous security enhancements for information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B30: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has joint teams of business and 
IT security for information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B31: In your experience, do you agree that your organization effectively ensures security-
aware decision-making related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B32: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has risk-aware work culture 
related to information security? 
150 
 
 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B33: In your experience, do you agree that your organization effectively conducts stakeholder 
satisfaction surveys related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B34: In your experience, do you agree that your organization effectively ensures continuous 
improvements in security skills of employees related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B35: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has hired skilled security 
practitioners related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
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3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B36: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective ways for security 
workforce screening related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B37: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective security leadership 
skills related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B38: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective security knowledge 
management related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
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5) Strongly Agree 
Q B39: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective ways for reviewing 
of systems access related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B40: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has effective IT security training 
related to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B41: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has defined security roles related 
to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
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Q B42: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has security certifications related 
to information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
Q B43: In your experience, do you agree that your organization has security teams working in 
shifts for full coverage of information security? 
1) Strongly Disagree 
2) Disagree 
3) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4) Agree 
5) Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
154 
 
 
Appendix B: Missing Values Treatment 
 
Table 7. Missing Values Treatment in SPSS 
 Result 
Variable 
No. of 
Replaced 
Missing 
Values 
Case Number of Non-
Missing Values No. of Valid 
Cases Creating Function 
First Last 
1 MINEXP_1 1 1 301 301 SMEAN(MINEXP) 
2 ISEXP_1 2 1 301 301 SMEAN(ISEXP) 
3 ISCURR_1 8 1 301 301 SMEAN(ISCURR) 
4 ISKNOW_1 5 1 301 301 SMEAN(ISKNOW) 
5 AGREE_1 1 1 301 301 SMEAN(AGREE) 
6 ENGLISH_1  1 301 301 SMEAN(ENGLISH) 
7 CPI_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(CPI) 
8 TE_1 2 1 301 301 SMEAN(TE) 
9 PE_1 2 1 301 301 SMEAN(PE) 
10 OE_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(OE) 
11 TT_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(TT) 
12 ATC_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(ATC) 
13 ABC_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(ABC) 
14 IBI_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(IBI) 
15 IOP_1 2 1 301 301 SMEAN(IOP) 
16 TSR_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(TSR) 
17 FRRS_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(FRRS) 
18 RMF_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(RMF) 
19 RM_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(RM) 
20 RMON_1 2 1 301 301 SMEAN(RMON) 
21 SPS_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(SPS) 
22 SPI_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(SPI) 
23 ITES_1 5 1 301 301 SMEAN(ITES) 
24 SGS_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(SGS) 
25 ITSBC_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(ITSBC) 
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 Result 
Variable 
No. of 
Replaced 
Missing 
Values 
Case Number of Non-
Missing Values No. of Valid 
Cases Creating Function 
First Last 
26 HIC_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(HIC) 
27 VIC_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(VIC) 
28 IRIERM_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(IRIERM) 
29 OWRW_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(OWRW) 
30 RC_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(RC) 
31 PORM_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(PORM) 
32 RMBA_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(RMBA) 
33 PKOT_1 6 1 301 301 SMEAN(PKOT) 
34 SDCA_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(SDCA) 
35 CSE_1 7 1 301 301 SMEAN(CSE) 
36 JTBITS_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(JTBITS) 
37 SADM_1 6 1 301 301 SMEAN(SADM) 
38 RAWC_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(RAWC) 
39 SSS_1 5 1 301 301 SMEAN(SSS) 
40 CISS_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(CISS) 
41 SSP_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(SSP) 
42 SWC_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(SWC) 
43 SLS_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(SLS) 
44 SKM_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(SKM) 
45 CAR_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(CAR) 
46 ITST_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(ITST) 
47 DSR_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(DSR) 
48 SC_1 3 1 301 301 SMEAN(SC) 
49 STWS_1 4 1 301 301 SMEAN(STWS) 
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Appendix C: Scale Reliability Analysis 
 
Table 8. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Information Security Assurance (ISA) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.924 5 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Tracking Signs of Risks 17.1030 5.026 .765 .914 
Formulating Risk Response 
Strategies 17.0831 4.956 .819 .904 
Risk Metrics Formulation 17.1130 4.954 .801 .907 
Risk Measurements 17.0897 4.909 .834 .900 
Risk Monitoring 17.1395 5.100 .792 .909 
 
 
Table 9. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Security Technology Trustworthiness (STT) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.925 5 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Technology Trustworthiness 17.0731 5.028 .785 .913 
Adapt to Technology Changes 17.0698 5.038 .803 .909 
Adapt to Business Changes 17.0399 5.098 .839 .902 
Integrity of Business Information 17.0432 5.141 .822 .905 
Institutionalization of Processes 17.0233 5.236 .778 .913 
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Table 10. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Information Integrity (II) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.940 4 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Continuous Process Improvements 12.7907 3.439 .804 .937 
Technology Excellence 12.8040 3.191 .903 .906 
Process Excellence 12.7973 3.162 .885 .911 
Operations Excellence 12.7973 3.289 .834 .928 
 
 
Table 11. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Security Integration (SI) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.919 5 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Information Risks Integrated into 
ERM 16.6611 5.385 .793 .900 
Organization-Wide Risk View 16.7043 5.382 .818 .895 
Risks Communications 16.6645 5.584 .791 .901 
Prioritization of Risks Mitigation 16.6977 5.445 .830 .893 
Risk Management Budget 
Allocation 16.8073 5.443 .730 .914 
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Table 12. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Business Enablement (BE) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.896 3 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
IT Security and Business 
Coordination 8.5183 1.410 .764 .877 
Horizontal Information Flow 8.5050 1.344 .817 .832 
Vertical Information Flow 8.4983 1.411 .803 .844 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.926 5 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Security Governance Structures 16.9834 5.250 .790 .913 
IT Security and Business 
Coordination 16.9502 5.174 .815 .908 
Horizontal Information Flow 16.9369 5.139 .821 .907 
Vertical Information Flow 16.9302 5.225 .826 .906 
Information Risks Integrated into 
ERM 16.9701 5.076 .785 .914 
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Table 13. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Security Program Management (SPM) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.882 3 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Security Program Strategy 8.4319 1.200 .759 .845 
Security Program 
Integration 8.4518 1.195 .783 .823 
IT Enablement of Security 8.4718 1.190 .773 .832 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.902 4 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Security Governance 
Structures 12.6777 2.539 .759 .882 
IT Enablement of Security 12.6811 2.585 .804 .865 
Security Program 
Integration 12.6611 2.638 .783 .873 
Security Program Strategy 12.6412 2.617 .779 .874 
 
 
Table 14. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Security Process Maturity (SPRM) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.876 3 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Pre-emptive Knowledge of 
Threats 8.4884 1.257 .730 .870 
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Security Data Collection 
and Analysis 8.3754 1.462 .788 .804 
Continuous Security 
Enhancements 8.3854 1.484 .788 .807 
 
 
Table 15. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Competency of Security Team (CST) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.904 4 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Continuous Improvements 
in Security Skills 12.8040 2.438 .789 .875 
Skilled Security 
Practitioners 12.7973 2.369 .798 .871 
Security Workforce 
Screening 12.7841 2.350 .769 .883 
Security Leadership Skills 12.8239 2.452 .784 .876 
 
 
Table 16. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Security Conscious Employees (SCE) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.902 4 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Joint Teams of Business 
and IT Security 12.7143 2.978 .771 .877 
Security-Aware Decision-
Making 12.7641 2.981 .835 .856 
Risk-Aware Work Culture 12.7674 2.886 .812 .862 
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Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.902 4 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Stakeholder Satisfaction 
Surveys 12.8140 2.865 .718 .900 
 
 
Table 17. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Security Guardianship (SG) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.853 3 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
IT Security Training 8.3488 1.308 .680 .835 
Defined Security Roles 8.3953 1.293 .776 .749 
Security Teams Working In 
Shifts 8.4252 1.212 .721 .798 
 
 
Table 18. Reliability Analysis of the Scale of Security Leadership (SL) 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.805 2 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Security Knowledge 
Management 4.1761 .412 .674 .
a 
Security Certifications 4.1794 .374 .674 .a 
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates 
reliability model assumptions. You may want to check item codings. 
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Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.832 3 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Security Knowledge 
Management 8.3821 1.424 .723 .741 
Security Certifications 8.3854 1.384 .700 .760 
Stakeholder Satisfaction 
Surveys 8.3555 1.317 .660 .805 
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Appendix D: Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation 
Modeling 
 
D.1 Output of Model Reduced after Principal Component and Reliability Analysis 
Latent Variables ISA STT II SI BE SPM SPRM CST SCE 
 SG SL ISM 
 Relationships 
 IRIERM = SI BE 
 OWRW = SI 
 RC = SI 
 PORM = SI 
 RMBA = SI 
 SGS = BE SPM 
 ITSBC = BE 
 HIC = BE 
 VIC = BE 
 SPS = SPM 
 SPI = SPM 
 ITES = SPM 
 PKOT = SPRM 
 SDCA = SPRM 
 CSE = SPRM 
 JTBITS = SCE 
 SADM = SCE 
 RAWC = SCE 
 SSS = SCE SL 
 CISS = CST 
 SSP = CST 
 SWC = CST 
 SLS = CST 
 ITST = SG 
 DSR = SG 
 STWS = SG 
 SKM = SL 
 SC = SL 
 CPI = II 
 TE = II 
 PE = II 
 OE = II 
 TT = STT 
 ATC = STT 
 ABC = STT 
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 IBI = STT 
 IOP = STT 
 TSR = ISA 
 FRRS = ISA 
 RMF = ISA 
 RM = ISA 
 RMON = ISA 
 Path Diagram 
 Admissibility Check = 100 
 Iterations = 999 
 End of Problem 
 
 Sample Size =   301 
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         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 CPI         TE         PE         OE         TT        ATC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      CPI       0.39 
       TE       0.33       0.42 
       PE       0.31       0.37       0.44 
       OE       0.29       0.34       0.36       0.43 
       TT       0.25       0.29       0.33       0.34       0.45 
      ATC       0.24       0.27       0.29       0.29       0.32       0.43 
      ABC       0.22       0.26       0.26       0.26       0.28       0.31 
      IBI       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.29       0.28 
      IOP       0.23       0.25       0.28       0.27       0.28       0.27 
      TSR       0.21       0.24       0.25       0.25       0.28       0.27 
     FRRS       0.23       0.25       0.24       0.26       0.26       0.23 
      RMF       0.24       0.26       0.26       0.26       0.25       0.24 
       RM       0.24       0.27       0.28       0.28       0.27       0.25 
     RMON       0.20       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.26       0.23 
      SPS       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.24 
      SPI       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.26 
     ITES       0.21       0.25       0.26       0.27       0.26       0.25 
      SGS       0.23       0.25       0.27       0.25       0.24       0.25 
    ITSBC       0.21       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.24 
      HIC       0.22       0.24       0.27       0.25       0.25       0.21 
      VIC       0.22       0.24       0.25       0.24       0.25       0.23 
   IRIERM       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.24 
     OWRW       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.23 
       RC       0.19       0.21       0.22       0.20       0.23       0.23 
     PORM       0.19       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.21 
     RMBA       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.23       0.26       0.26 
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     PKOT       0.23       0.25       0.26       0.22       0.26       0.26 
     SDCA       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.23       0.25       0.22 
      CSE       0.21       0.22       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.23 
   JTBITS       0.21       0.24       0.23       0.21       0.23       0.23 
     SADM       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.24 
     RAWC       0.21       0.24       0.23       0.21       0.24       0.24 
      SSS       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.25       0.28       0.26 
     CISS       0.20       0.21       0.21       0.20       0.21       0.20 
      SSP       0.19       0.22       0.19       0.20       0.22       0.21 
      SWC       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.22       0.20       0.21 
      SLS       0.18       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.20 
      SKM       0.18       0.20       0.19       0.18       0.23       0.22 
     ITST       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.18 
      DSR       0.18       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.22 
       SC       0.18       0.20       0.20       0.19       0.23       0.19 
     STWS       0.19       0.23       0.22       0.21       0.20       0.21 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 ABC        IBI        IOP        TSR       FRRS        RMF    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      ABC       0.39 
      IBI       0.31       0.38 
      IOP       0.28       0.28       0.39 
      TSR       0.24       0.24       0.27       0.42 
     FRRS       0.22       0.23       0.26       0.29       0.40 
      RMF       0.20       0.22       0.25       0.27       0.30       0.41 
       RM       0.24       0.23       0.26       0.28       0.30       0.30 
     RMON       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.27       0.26       0.27 
      SPS       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.22       0.23 
      SPI       0.23       0.23       0.23       0.24       0.20       0.23 
     ITES       0.21       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25 
      SGS       0.20       0.22       0.25       0.23       0.26       0.25 
    ITSBC       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24 
      HIC       0.20       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.25       0.23 
      VIC       0.22       0.21       0.24       0.22       0.25       0.23 
   IRIERM       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.26       0.29       0.28 
     OWRW       0.21       0.21       0.23       0.25       0.27       0.26 
       RC       0.20       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.23       0.22 
     PORM       0.21       0.20       0.23       0.26       0.26       0.24 
     RMBA       0.23       0.24       0.23       0.25       0.25       0.25 
     PKOT       0.24       0.24       0.21       0.29       0.25       0.25 
     SDCA       0.19       0.18       0.20       0.23       0.21       0.21 
      CSE       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.21 
   JTBITS       0.23       0.23       0.22       0.25       0.21       0.22 
     SADM       0.24       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.23       0.24 
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     RAWC       0.24       0.25       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.24 
      SSS       0.25       0.27       0.22       0.25       0.24       0.22 
     CISS       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.22       0.20 
      SSP       0.21       0.18       0.20       0.20       0.21       0.19 
      SWC       0.18       0.17       0.20       0.18       0.23       0.21 
      SLS       0.18       0.17       0.18       0.18       0.20       0.19 
      SKM       0.21       0.20       0.16       0.22       0.21       0.19 
     ITST       0.19       0.19       0.17       0.18       0.18       0.17 
      DSR       0.19       0.16       0.19       0.18       0.18       0.19 
       SC       0.21       0.19       0.18       0.19       0.20       0.21 
     STWS       0.19       0.16       0.19       0.17       0.16       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                  RM       RMON        SPS        SPI       ITES        SGS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       RM       0.40 
     RMON       0.29       0.37 
      SPS       0.26       0.24       0.35 
      SPI       0.23       0.22       0.25       0.34 
     ITES       0.25       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.35 
      SGS       0.26       0.20       0.26       0.24       0.27       0.40 
    ITSBC       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.30 
      HIC       0.24       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.24       0.29 
      VIC       0.26       0.20       0.23       0.22       0.23       0.27 
   IRIERM       0.28       0.25       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.29 
     OWRW       0.29       0.27       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.25 
       RC       0.25       0.25       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.24 
     PORM       0.26       0.24       0.21       0.21       0.24       0.24 
     RMBA       0.23       0.25       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.27 
     PKOT       0.27       0.25       0.23       0.25       0.25       0.26 
     SDCA       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.23       0.24       0.24 
      CSE       0.24       0.22       0.22       0.21       0.25       0.25 
   JTBITS       0.21       0.18       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.26 
     SADM       0.24       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.25 
     RAWC       0.25       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.25 
      SSS       0.24       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.25       0.26 
     CISS       0.22       0.20       0.20       0.19       0.22       0.22 
      SSP       0.22       0.20       0.23       0.19       0.21       0.23 
      SWC       0.24       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.23       0.24 
      SLS       0.20       0.19       0.19       0.17       0.19       0.21 
      SKM       0.21       0.21       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.21 
     ITST       0.17       0.16       0.21       0.18       0.19       0.22 
      DSR       0.18       0.19       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.23 
       SC       0.19       0.22       0.17       0.17       0.20       0.20 
     STWS       0.16       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.20 
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         Covariance Matrix        
 
               ITSBC        HIC        VIC     IRIERM       OWRW         RC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
    ITSBC       0.40 
      HIC       0.30       0.41 
      VIC       0.28       0.31       0.38 
   IRIERM       0.31       0.30       0.31       0.46 
     OWRW       0.28       0.27       0.27       0.34       0.44 
       RC       0.24       0.23       0.24       0.29       0.30       0.40 
     PORM       0.27       0.27       0.26       0.31       0.32       0.30 
     RMBA       0.28       0.25       0.25       0.31       0.30       0.28 
     PKOT       0.27       0.27       0.28       0.29       0.32       0.29 
     SDCA       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.23       0.23       0.22 
      CSE       0.26       0.23       0.23       0.26       0.26       0.23 
   JTBITS       0.27       0.27       0.25       0.26       0.22       0.22 
     SADM       0.27       0.24       0.25       0.27       0.26       0.23 
     RAWC       0.27       0.25       0.25       0.29       0.26       0.24 
      SSS       0.27       0.24       0.26       0.31       0.27       0.24 
     CISS       0.22       0.19       0.20       0.24       0.24       0.21 
      SSP       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.21       0.18 
      SWC       0.19       0.19       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.20 
      SLS       0.18       0.19       0.20       0.21       0.20       0.17 
      SKM       0.20       0.18       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.21 
     ITST       0.20       0.22       0.20       0.21       0.19       0.17 
      DSR       0.21       0.21       0.20       0.21       0.21       0.21 
       SC       0.24       0.19       0.20       0.26       0.27       0.22 
     STWS       0.22       0.20       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                PORM       RMBA       PKOT       SDCA        CSE     JTBITS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     PORM       0.41 
     RMBA       0.32       0.50 
     PKOT       0.31       0.35       0.52 
     SDCA       0.25       0.24       0.30       0.36 
      CSE       0.25       0.26       0.29       0.27       0.35 
   JTBITS       0.23       0.27       0.26       0.21       0.25       0.39 
     SADM       0.23       0.24       0.25       0.23       0.26       0.28 
     RAWC       0.24       0.27       0.28       0.22       0.25       0.28 
      SSS       0.24       0.30       0.29       0.22       0.25       0.27 
     CISS       0.21       0.23       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.20 
      SSP       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.23       0.22       0.21 
      SWC       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.21       0.22       0.20 
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      SLS       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.21       0.17 
      SKM       0.20       0.26       0.29       0.20       0.22       0.20 
     ITST       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.18       0.19       0.24 
      DSR       0.18       0.22       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.21 
       SC       0.23       0.27       0.28       0.18       0.22       0.22 
     STWS       0.21       0.22       0.20       0.17       0.18       0.21 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                SADM       RAWC        SSS       CISS        SSP        SWC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     SADM       0.35 
     RAWC       0.30       0.40 
      SSS       0.28       0.29       0.48 
     CISS       0.22       0.24       0.27       0.32 
      SSP       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.34 
      SWC       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.23       0.25       0.36 
      SLS       0.20       0.20       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.23 
      SKM       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.23       0.21       0.22 
     ITST       0.18       0.23       0.23       0.19       0.21       0.21 
      DSR       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.21       0.21       0.21 
       SC       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.21       0.21       0.21 
     STWS       0.22       0.23       0.22       0.18       0.20       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 SLS        SKM       ITST        DSR         SC       STWS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      SLS       0.31 
      SKM       0.23       0.37 
     ITST       0.21       0.21       0.39 
      DSR       0.21       0.21       0.24       0.34 
       SC       0.20       0.26       0.23       0.23       0.41 
     STWS       0.20       0.19       0.24       0.27       0.26       0.42 
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 Number of Iterations = 17 
 
 LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood)                            
 
         Measurement Equations 
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      CPI = 0.52*II, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.030)             (0.011)            
            17.74               10.85             
 
       TE = 0.60*II, Errorvar.= 0.058  , R² = 0.86 
           (0.029)             (0.0069)            
            21.09               8.42               
 
       PE = 0.61*II, Errorvar.= 0.066  , R² = 0.85 
           (0.029)             (0.0075)            
            20.86               8.74               
 
       OE = 0.58*II, Errorvar.= 0.092  , R² = 0.79 
           (0.030)             (0.0092)            
            19.49               10.01              
 
       TT = 0.56*STT, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.032)              (0.013)            
            17.82                10.47             
 
      ATC = 0.55*STT, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.031)              (0.012)            
            17.85                10.46             
 
      ABC = 0.54*STT, Errorvar.= 0.097  , R² = 0.75 
           (0.029)              (0.0097)            
            18.63                10.06              
 
      IBI = 0.53*STT, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.73 
           (0.029)              (0.010)            
            18.22                10.28             
 
      IOP = 0.51*STT, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.68 
           (0.030)              (0.011)            
            17.37                10.66             
 
      TSR = 0.52*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.14  , R² = 0.65 
           (0.031)              (0.013)            
            16.76                10.96             
 
     FRRS = 0.54*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.73 
           (0.029)              (0.010)            
            18.22                10.41             
 
      RMF = 0.53*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.69 
           (0.030)              (0.012)            
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            17.57                10.69             
 
       RM = 0.56*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.087  , R² = 0.78 
           (0.029)              (0.0089)            
            19.38                9.72               
 
     RMON = 0.51*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.69 
           (0.029)              (0.011)            
            17.57                10.69             
 
      SPS = 0.50*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.10   , R² = 0.71 
           (0.028)              (0.0100)            
            17.79                10.32              
 
      SPI = 0.49*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.10   , R² = 0.70 
           (0.028)              (0.0099)            
            17.66                10.39              
 
     ITES = 0.51*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.091  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.028)              (0.0092)            
            18.42                9.94               
 
      SGS = 0.32*BE + 0.23*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.054)   (0.053)              (0.011)            
            5.83      4.40                 11.12             
 
    ITSBC = 0.55*BE, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.030)             (0.011)            
            18.32               9.93              
 
      HIC = 0.55*BE, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.75 
           (0.030)             (0.011)            
            18.54               9.79              
 
      VIC = 0.54*BE, Errorvar.= 0.093  , R² = 0.76 
           (0.029)             (0.0096)            
            18.76               9.63               
 
   IRIERM = 0.37*SI + 0.23*BE, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.055)   (0.054)             (0.011)            
            6.66      4.31                10.90             
 
     OWRW = 0.58*SI, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.75 
           (0.031)             (0.011)            
            18.71               9.93              
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       RC = 0.52*SI, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.69 
           (0.030)             (0.012)            
            17.37               10.61             
 
     PORM = 0.56*SI, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.75 
           (0.030)             (0.010)            
            18.65               9.96              
 
     RMBA = 0.55*SI, Errorvar.= 0.20  , R² = 0.61 
           (0.035)             (0.018)            
            15.84               11.10             
 
     PKOT = 0.58*SPRM, Errorvar.= 0.19  , R² = 0.64 
           (0.035)               (0.018)            
            16.35                 10.64             
 
     SDCA = 0.51*SPRM, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.028)               (0.010)            
            17.79                 9.95              
 
      CSE = 0.53*SPRM, Errorvar.= 0.069  , R² = 0.80 
           (0.027)               (0.0083)            
            19.60                 8.29               
 
   JTBITS = 0.52*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.030)              (0.012)            
            17.53                10.36             
 
     SADM = 0.54*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.064  , R² = 0.82 
           (0.027)              (0.0076)            
            19.99                8.43               
 
     RAWC = 0.55*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.75 
           (0.030)              (0.010)            
            18.61                9.74              
 
      SSS = 0.34*SCE + 0.24*SL, Errorvar.= 0.19  , R² = 0.62 
           (0.053)    (0.053)             (0.016)            
            6.35       4.51                11.38             
 
     CISS = 0.48*CST, Errorvar.= 0.085  , R² = 0.73 
           (0.026)              (0.0087)            
            18.17                9.84               
 
      SSP = 0.49*CST, Errorvar.= 0.096  , R² = 0.72 
           (0.027)              (0.0096)            
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            17.93                9.98               
 
      SWC = 0.49*CST, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.67 
           (0.029)              (0.012)            
            16.91                10.49             
 
      SLS = 0.47*CST, Errorvar.= 0.093  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.027)              (0.0092)            
            17.61                10.16              
 
      SKM = 0.51*SL, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.68 
           (0.030)             (0.013)            
            16.88               8.93              
 
     ITST = 0.48*SG, Errorvar.= 0.16  , R² = 0.59 
           (0.031)             (0.015)            
            15.36               10.44             
 
      DSR = 0.52*SG, Errorvar.= 0.075  , R² = 0.78 
           (0.027)             (0.0098)            
            18.85               7.67               
 
       SC = 0.53*SL, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.67 
           (0.032)             (0.015)            
            16.70               9.12              
 
     STWS = 0.52*SG, Errorvar.= 0.16  , R² = 0.63 
           (0.032)             (0.015)            
            16.06               10.11             
 
 
 
         Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables  
 
                 ISA        STT         II         SI         BE        SPM    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      ISA       1.00 
      STT       0.84       1.00 
              (0.02) 
               37.33 
       II       0.79       0.84       1.00 
              (0.03)     (0.02) 
               31.16      39.38 
       SI       0.87       0.75       0.67       1.00 
              (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.04) 
               43.06      24.86      18.67 
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       BE       0.80       0.78       0.74       0.86       1.00 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02) 
               30.64      27.35      24.19      40.28 
      SPM       0.87       0.87       0.83       0.80       0.86       1.00 
              (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.02) 
               42.60      41.60      34.71      28.45      37.67 
     SPRM       0.82       0.76       0.71       0.87       0.84       0.88 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02) 
               32.62      25.10      21.23      40.36      33.99      39.80 
      CST       0.79       0.75       0.73       0.77       0.77       0.84 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02) 
               29.39      24.31      22.92      25.77      25.54      34.70 
      SCE       0.79       0.81       0.72       0.82       0.87       0.85 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.02) 
               29.65      32.23      22.25      31.95      42.44      36.85 
       SG       0.66       0.70       0.69       0.72       0.74       0.80 
              (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               16.63      19.16      18.91      20.16      22.00      26.41 
       SL       0.74       0.74       0.64       0.82       0.71       0.73 
              (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.04)     (0.04) 
               20.85      20.35      14.92      27.88      18.34      18.75 
 
         Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables  
 
                SPRM        CST        SCE         SG         SL    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     SPRM       1.00 
      CST       0.83       1.00 
              (0.02) 
               33.46 
      SCE       0.86       0.81       1.00 
              (0.02)     (0.03) 
               38.76      30.87 
       SG       0.72       0.84       0.79       1.00 
              (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               19.57      32.16      26.36 
       SL       0.81       0.87       0.78       0.84       1.00 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               25.24      33.00      22.99      27.91 
                           Goodness of Fit Statistics: 
 
                             Degrees of Freedom = 761 
               Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 1936.83 (P = 0.0) 
       Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 1868.33 (P = 0.0) 
                Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 1107.33 
           90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (984.23 ; 1238.08) 
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                        Minimum Fit Function Value = 6.46 
                Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 3.69 
              90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (3.28 ; 4.13) 
             Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.070 
            90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.066 ; 0.074) 
               P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.00 
 
                  Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 7.17 
             90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (6.76 ; 7.61) 
                         ECVI for Saturated Model = 6.02 
                       ECVI for Independence Model = 297.61 
 
     Chi-Square for Independence Model with 861 Degrees of Freedom = 89199.35 
                           Independence AIC = 89283.35 
                               Model AIC = 2152.33 
                             Saturated AIC = 1806.00 
                           Independence CAIC = 89481.05 
                               Model CAIC = 2820.74 
                             Saturated CAIC = 6056.52 
 
                          Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.98 
                        Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.98 
                     Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.86 
                        Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.99 
                        Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.99 
                         Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.98 
 
                             Critical N (CN) = 133.39 
 
 
                     Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.014 
                             Standardized RMR = 0.034 
                        Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.77 
                   Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.73 
                  Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.65 
 
        The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
  Path to  from      Decrease in Chi-Square    New Estimate 
 OE        STT                13.9                 0.16 <-- 
 OE        SPM                 8.4                 0.12 <-- 
 TT        II                 22.6                 0.24 <-- 
 ABC       ISA                11.7                -0.16 <-- 
 ABC       SPM                12.8                -0.19 <-- 
 IBI       II                 15.5                -0.18 <-- 
 IBI       SPM                 9.1                -0.16 <-- 
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 IOP       ISA                16.6                 0.20 <-- 
 IOP       BE                 12.2                 0.15 <-- 
 IOP       SPM                 8.3                 0.16 <-- 
 TSR       STT                12.1                 0.18 <-- 
 RMON      BE                  9.7                -0.14 <-- 
 RMON      SL                  9.2                 0.12 <-- 
 SPI       CST                 8.2                -0.15 <-- 
 ITES      SPRM                9.0                 0.17 <-- 
 ITSBC     SCE                12.3                 0.22 <-- 
 HIC       SCE                 8.2                -0.18 <-- 
 PORM      SL                 10.7                -0.16 <-- 
 RMBA      SPRM               10.3                 0.23 <-- 
 RMBA      SG                  9.4                 0.14 <-- 
 RMBA      SL                 15.5                 0.24 <-- 
 PKOT      SI                 28.6                 0.41 <-- 
 PKOT      SL                 15.0                 0.24 <-- 
 SDCA      SI                 10.5                -0.20 <-- 
 SDCA      SL                 11.2                -0.16 <-- 
 CSE       SCE                 9.7                 0.19 <-- 
 CISS      SI                 10.7                 0.12 <-- 
 SKM       CST                 9.2                 0.25 <-- 
 SC        CST                 9.8                -0.27 <-- 
 STWS      CST                 9.3                -0.20 <-- 
                           Time used:    2.808 Seconds 
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D.2 Output of Model Reduced after First Iteration 
Latent Variables ISA STT II SI BE SPM SPRM SCE SG 
 SL CST 
 Relationships 
 CPI = II 
 TE = II 
 PE = II 
 OE = STT II SPM 
 TT = STT II 
 ATC = STT 
 ABC = ISA STT SPM 
 IBI = STT II SPM 
 IOP = ISA STT BE SPM 
 TSR = ISA STT 
 FRRS = ISA 
 RMF = ISA 
 RM = ISA 
 RMON = ISA BE SL 
 SPS = SPM 
 SPI = SPM CST 
 ITES = SPM SPRM 
 SGS = BE SPM 
 ITSBC = BE SCE 
 HIC = BE SCE 
 VIC = BE 
 IRIERM = SI BE 
 OWRW = SI 
 RC = SI 
 PORM = SI SL 
 RMBA = SI SPRM SG SL 
 PKOT = SI SPRM SL 
 SDCA = SI SPRM SL 
 CSE = SPRM SCE 
 JTBITS = SCE 
 SADM = SCE 
 RAWC = SCE 
 SSS = SCE SL 
 CISS = SI CST 
 SSP = CST 
 SWC = CST 
 SLS = CST 
 SKM = SL CST 
 ITST = SG 
 DSR = SG 
 SC = SL CST 
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 STWS = SG CST 
 Set the Variance of ISA to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of STT to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of II to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SI to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of BE to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SPM to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SPRM to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SCE to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SG to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SL to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of CST to 1.00 
 Path Diagram 
 Admissibility Check = 100 
 Iterations = 999 
 End of Problem 
 
 Sample Size =   301 
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         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 CPI         TE         PE         OE         TT        ATC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      CPI       0.39 
       TE       0.33       0.42 
       PE       0.31       0.37       0.44 
       OE       0.29       0.34       0.36       0.43 
       TT       0.25       0.29       0.33       0.34       0.45 
      ATC       0.24       0.27       0.29       0.29       0.32       0.43 
      ABC       0.22       0.26       0.26       0.26       0.28       0.31 
      IBI       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.29       0.28 
      IOP       0.23       0.25       0.28       0.27       0.28       0.27 
      TSR       0.21       0.24       0.25       0.25       0.28       0.27 
     FRRS       0.23       0.25       0.24       0.26       0.26       0.23 
      RMF       0.24       0.26       0.26       0.26       0.25       0.24 
       RM       0.24       0.27       0.28       0.28       0.27       0.25 
     RMON       0.20       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.26       0.23 
      SPS       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.24 
      SPI       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.26 
     ITES       0.21       0.25       0.26       0.27       0.26       0.25 
      SGS       0.23       0.25       0.27       0.25       0.24       0.25 
    ITSBC       0.21       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.24 
      HIC       0.22       0.24       0.27       0.25       0.25       0.21 
      VIC       0.22       0.24       0.25       0.24       0.25       0.23 
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   IRIERM       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.24 
     OWRW       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.23 
       RC       0.19       0.21       0.22       0.20       0.23       0.23 
     PORM       0.19       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.21 
     RMBA       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.23       0.26       0.26 
     PKOT       0.23       0.25       0.26       0.22       0.26       0.26 
     SDCA       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.23       0.25       0.22 
      CSE       0.21       0.22       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.23 
   JTBITS       0.21       0.24       0.23       0.21       0.23       0.23 
     SADM       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.24 
     RAWC       0.21       0.24       0.23       0.21       0.24       0.24 
      SSS       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.25       0.28       0.26 
     CISS       0.20       0.21       0.21       0.20       0.21       0.20 
      SSP       0.19       0.22       0.19       0.20       0.22       0.21 
      SWC       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.22       0.20       0.21 
      SLS       0.18       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.20 
      SKM       0.18       0.20       0.19       0.18       0.23       0.22 
     ITST       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.18 
      DSR       0.18       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.22 
       SC       0.18       0.20       0.20       0.19       0.23       0.19 
     STWS       0.19       0.23       0.22       0.21       0.20       0.21 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 ABC        IBI        IOP        TSR       FRRS        RMF    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      ABC       0.39 
      IBI       0.31       0.38 
      IOP       0.28       0.28       0.39 
      TSR       0.24       0.24       0.27       0.42 
     FRRS       0.22       0.23       0.26       0.29       0.40 
      RMF       0.20       0.22       0.25       0.27       0.30       0.41 
       RM       0.24       0.23       0.26       0.28       0.30       0.30 
     RMON       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.27       0.26       0.27 
      SPS       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.22       0.23 
      SPI       0.23       0.23       0.23       0.24       0.20       0.23 
     ITES       0.21       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25 
      SGS       0.20       0.22       0.25       0.23       0.26       0.25 
    ITSBC       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24 
      HIC       0.20       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.25       0.23 
      VIC       0.22       0.21       0.24       0.22       0.25       0.23 
   IRIERM       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.26       0.29       0.28 
     OWRW       0.21       0.21       0.23       0.25       0.27       0.26 
       RC       0.20       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.23       0.22 
     PORM       0.21       0.20       0.23       0.26       0.26       0.24 
     RMBA       0.23       0.24       0.23       0.25       0.25       0.25 
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     PKOT       0.24       0.24       0.21       0.29       0.25       0.25 
     SDCA       0.19       0.18       0.20       0.23       0.21       0.21 
      CSE       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.21 
   JTBITS       0.23       0.23       0.22       0.25       0.21       0.22 
     SADM       0.24       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.23       0.24 
     RAWC       0.24       0.25       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.24 
      SSS       0.25       0.27       0.22       0.25       0.24       0.22 
     CISS       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.22       0.20 
      SSP       0.21       0.18       0.20       0.20       0.21       0.19 
      SWC       0.18       0.17       0.20       0.18       0.23       0.21 
      SLS       0.18       0.17       0.18       0.18       0.20       0.19 
      SKM       0.21       0.20       0.16       0.22       0.21       0.19 
     ITST       0.19       0.19       0.17       0.18       0.18       0.17 
      DSR       0.19       0.16       0.19       0.18       0.18       0.19 
       SC       0.21       0.19       0.18       0.19       0.20       0.21 
     STWS       0.19       0.16       0.19       0.17       0.16       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                  RM       RMON        SPS        SPI       ITES        SGS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       RM       0.40 
     RMON       0.29       0.37 
      SPS       0.26       0.24       0.35 
      SPI       0.23       0.22       0.25       0.34 
     ITES       0.25       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.35 
      SGS       0.26       0.20       0.26       0.24       0.27       0.40 
    ITSBC       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.30 
      HIC       0.24       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.24       0.29 
      VIC       0.26       0.20       0.23       0.22       0.23       0.27 
   IRIERM       0.28       0.25       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.29 
     OWRW       0.29       0.27       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.25 
       RC       0.25       0.25       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.24 
     PORM       0.26       0.24       0.21       0.21       0.24       0.24 
     RMBA       0.23       0.25       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.27 
     PKOT       0.27       0.25       0.23       0.25       0.25       0.26 
     SDCA       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.23       0.24       0.24 
      CSE       0.24       0.22       0.22       0.21       0.25       0.25 
   JTBITS       0.21       0.18       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.26 
     SADM       0.24       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.25 
     RAWC       0.25       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.25 
      SSS       0.24       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.25       0.26 
     CISS       0.22       0.20       0.20       0.19       0.22       0.22 
      SSP       0.22       0.20       0.23       0.19       0.21       0.23 
      SWC       0.24       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.23       0.24 
      SLS       0.20       0.19       0.19       0.17       0.19       0.21 
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      SKM       0.21       0.21       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.21 
     ITST       0.17       0.16       0.21       0.18       0.19       0.22 
      DSR       0.18       0.19       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.23 
       SC       0.19       0.22       0.17       0.17       0.20       0.20 
     STWS       0.16       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.20 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
               ITSBC        HIC        VIC     IRIERM       OWRW         RC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
    ITSBC       0.40 
      HIC       0.30       0.41 
      VIC       0.28       0.31       0.38 
   IRIERM       0.31       0.30       0.31       0.46 
     OWRW       0.28       0.27       0.27       0.34       0.44 
       RC       0.24       0.23       0.24       0.29       0.30       0.40 
     PORM       0.27       0.27       0.26       0.31       0.32       0.30 
     RMBA       0.28       0.25       0.25       0.31       0.30       0.28 
     PKOT       0.27       0.27       0.28       0.29       0.32       0.29 
     SDCA       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.23       0.23       0.22 
      CSE       0.26       0.23       0.23       0.26       0.26       0.23 
   JTBITS       0.27       0.27       0.25       0.26       0.22       0.22 
     SADM       0.27       0.24       0.25       0.27       0.26       0.23 
     RAWC       0.27       0.25       0.25       0.29       0.26       0.24 
      SSS       0.27       0.24       0.26       0.31       0.27       0.24 
     CISS       0.22       0.19       0.20       0.24       0.24       0.21 
      SSP       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.21       0.18 
      SWC       0.19       0.19       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.20 
      SLS       0.18       0.19       0.20       0.21       0.20       0.17 
      SKM       0.20       0.18       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.21 
     ITST       0.20       0.22       0.20       0.21       0.19       0.17 
      DSR       0.21       0.21       0.20       0.21       0.21       0.21 
       SC       0.24       0.19       0.20       0.26       0.27       0.22 
     STWS       0.22       0.20       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                PORM       RMBA       PKOT       SDCA        CSE     JTBITS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     PORM       0.41 
     RMBA       0.32       0.50 
     PKOT       0.31       0.35       0.52 
     SDCA       0.25       0.24       0.30       0.36 
      CSE       0.25       0.26       0.29       0.27       0.35 
   JTBITS       0.23       0.27       0.26       0.21       0.25       0.39 
     SADM       0.23       0.24       0.25       0.23       0.26       0.28 
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     RAWC       0.24       0.27       0.28       0.22       0.25       0.28 
      SSS       0.24       0.30       0.29       0.22       0.25       0.27 
     CISS       0.21       0.23       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.20 
      SSP       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.23       0.22       0.21 
      SWC       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.21       0.22       0.20 
      SLS       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.21       0.17 
      SKM       0.20       0.26       0.29       0.20       0.22       0.20 
     ITST       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.18       0.19       0.24 
      DSR       0.18       0.22       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.21 
       SC       0.23       0.27       0.28       0.18       0.22       0.22 
     STWS       0.21       0.22       0.20       0.17       0.18       0.21 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                SADM       RAWC        SSS       CISS        SSP        SWC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     SADM       0.35 
     RAWC       0.30       0.40 
      SSS       0.28       0.29       0.48 
     CISS       0.22       0.24       0.27       0.32 
      SSP       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.34 
      SWC       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.23       0.25       0.36 
      SLS       0.20       0.20       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.23 
      SKM       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.23       0.21       0.22 
     ITST       0.18       0.23       0.23       0.19       0.21       0.21 
      DSR       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.21       0.21       0.21 
       SC       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.21       0.21       0.21 
     STWS       0.22       0.23       0.22       0.18       0.20       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 SLS        SKM       ITST        DSR         SC       STWS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      SLS       0.31 
      SKM       0.23       0.37 
     ITST       0.21       0.21       0.39 
      DSR       0.21       0.21       0.24       0.34 
       SC       0.20       0.26       0.23       0.23       0.41 
     STWS       0.20       0.19       0.24       0.27       0.26       0.42 
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 Number of Iterations = 32 
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 LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood)                            
 
         Measurement Equations 
 
 
      CPI = 0.52*II, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.030)             (0.011)            
            17.69               10.81             
 
       TE = 0.60*II, Errorvar.= 0.056  , R² = 0.87 
           (0.028)             (0.0070)            
            21.15               8.09               
 
       PE = 0.62*II, Errorvar.= 0.062  , R² = 0.86 
           (0.029)             (0.0075)            
            21.02               8.29               
 
       OE = 0.086*STT + 0.47*II + 0.044*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.092  , R² = 0.79 
           (0.058)     (0.044)   (0.058)               (0.0087)            
            1.49        10.77     0.77                  10.50              
 
       TT = 0.40*STT + 0.18*II, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.047)    (0.045)             (0.012)            
            8.63       4.02                11.44             
 
      ATC = 0.55*STT, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.031)              (0.012)            
            17.76                11.03             
 
      ABC =  - 0.053*ISA + 0.83*STT - 0.27*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.074 , R² = 0.81 
              (0.053)     (0.096)    (0.099)              (0.010)            
              -1.01        8.71      -2.70                 7.27              
 
      IBI = 0.85*STT - 0.068*II - 0.28*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.080 , R² = 0.79 
           (0.10)     (0.045)    (0.096)              (0.011)            
            8.42      -1.51      -2.93                 7.42              
 
      IOP = 0.16*ISA + 0.47*STT + 0.094*BE - 0.19*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.056)    (0.074)    (0.048)    (0.089)              (0.011)            
            2.96       6.29       1.97      -2.12                 11.16             
 
      TSR = 0.39*ISA + 0.15*STT, Errorvar.= 0.15  , R² = 0.65 
           (0.051)    (0.049)              (0.013)            
            7.51       3.06                 11.44             
 
     FRRS = 0.54*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.73 
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           (0.029)              (0.010)            
            18.25                10.44             
 
      RMF = 0.53*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.69 
           (0.030)              (0.012)            
            17.59                10.72             
 
       RM = 0.56*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.084  , R² = 0.79 
           (0.029)              (0.0087)            
            19.55                9.63               
 
     RMON = 0.60*ISA - 0.19*BE + 0.14*SL, Errorvar.= 0.090 , R² = 0.76 
           (0.052)    (0.048)   (0.030)             (0.011)            
            11.64     -3.97      4.75                8.57              
 
      SPS = 0.50*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.028)              (0.010)            
            17.65                10.55             
 
      SPI = 0.65*SPM - 0.18*CST, Errorvar.= 0.082 , R² = 0.76 
           (0.062)    (0.060)              (0.011)            
            10.53     -2.96                 7.70              
 
     ITES = 0.42*SPM + 0.099*SPRM, Errorvar.= 0.094  , R² = 0.73 
           (0.049)    (0.047)                (0.0088)            
            8.65       2.10                   10.65              
 
      SGS = 0.33*BE + 0.23*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.048)   (0.047)              (0.010)            
            6.77      4.84                 11.16             
 
    ITSBC = 0.35*BE + 0.20*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.72 
           (0.054)   (0.053)              (0.010)            
            6.62      3.79                 10.97             
 
      HIC = 0.66*BE - 0.10*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.085 , R² = 0.79 
           (0.068)   (0.066)              (0.012)            
            9.60     -1.55                 7.23              
 
      VIC = 0.54*BE, Errorvar.= 0.087  , R² = 0.77 
           (0.029)             (0.0096)            
            19.00               9.08               
 
   IRIERM = 0.37*SI + 0.24*BE, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.050)   (0.049)             (0.011)            
            7.36      4.95                10.89             
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     OWRW = 0.58*SI, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.76 
           (0.031)             (0.011)            
            18.95               9.73              
 
       RC = 0.53*SI, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.69 
           (0.030)             (0.012)            
            17.52               10.53             
 
     PORM = 0.60*SI - 0.065*SL, Errorvar.= 0.099 , R² = 0.76 
           (0.042)   (0.040)              (0.011)            
            14.20    -1.64                 9.43              
 
     RMBA = 0.25*SI + 0.17*SPRM + 0.042*SG + 0.18*SL, Errorvar.= 0.18  , R² = 0.65 
           (0.073)   (0.064)     (0.051)    (0.054)             (0.016)            
            3.38      2.73        0.82       3.36                10.73             
 
     PKOT = 0.058*SI + 0.41*SPRM + 0.23*SL, Errorvar.= 0.15  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.087)    (0.073)     (0.058)             (0.016)            
            0.66       5.67        3.91                9.46              
 
     SDCA =  - 0.079*SI + 0.62*SPRM - 0.034*SL, Errorvar.= 0.060 , R² = 0.83 
              (0.095)    (0.078)     (0.057)              (0.014)            
              -0.83       7.97       -0.60                 4.20              
 
      CSE = 0.35*SPRM + 0.20*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.078  , R² = 0.78 
           (0.042)     (0.042)              (0.0079)            
            8.36        4.68                 9.83               
 
   JTBITS = 0.52*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.69 
           (0.030)              (0.012)            
            17.38                10.59             
 
     SADM = 0.54*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.064  , R² = 0.82 
           (0.027)              (0.0073)            
            20.05                8.74               
 
     RAWC = 0.55*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.030)              (0.010)            
            18.55                10.01             
 
      SSS = 0.45*SCE + 0.16*SL, Errorvar.= 0.18  , R² = 0.62 
           (0.044)    (0.040)             (0.017)            
            10.22      3.88                11.00             
 
     CISS = 0.12*SI + 0.39*CST, Errorvar.= 0.090  , R² = 0.72 
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           (0.032)   (0.034)              (0.0085)            
            3.66      11.32                10.59              
 
      SSP = 0.50*CST, Errorvar.= 0.090  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.027)              (0.0093)            
            18.25                9.59               
 
      SWC = 0.49*CST, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.66 
           (0.029)              (0.012)            
            16.85                10.38             
 
      SLS = 0.47*CST, Errorvar.= 0.089  , R² = 0.72 
           (0.026)              (0.0090)            
            17.86                9.85               
 
      SKM = 0.26*SL + 0.34*CST, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.68 
           (0.035)   (0.048)              (0.012)            
            7.43      6.99                 10.06             
 
     ITST = 0.48*SG, Errorvar.= 0.16  , R² = 0.58 
           (0.031)             (0.015)            
            15.28               10.80             
 
      DSR = 0.51*SG, Errorvar.= 0.084  , R² = 0.75 
           (0.027)             (0.0096)            
            18.47               8.78               
 
       SC = 0.37*SL + 0.27*CST, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.041)   (0.062)              (0.015)            
            9.09      4.29                 7.93              
 
     STWS = 0.76*SG - 0.26*CST, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.090)   (0.088)              (0.018)            
            8.41     -2.98                 6.70              
 
 
 
         Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables  
 
                 ISA        STT         II         SI         BE        SPM    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      ISA       1.00 
      STT       0.84       1.00 
              (0.02) 
               34.63 
       II       0.78       0.82       1.00 
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              (0.03)     (0.02) 
               29.35      34.25 
       SI       0.85       0.75       0.65       1.00 
              (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.04) 
               38.05      24.67      16.99 
       BE       0.81       0.78       0.73       0.84       1.00 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02) 
               30.39      26.05      23.14      34.50 
      SPM       0.87       0.91       0.81       0.77       0.84       1.00 
              (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               42.71      45.97      32.03      25.46      33.00 
     SPRM       0.80       0.76       0.69       0.82       0.80       0.85 
              (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.03) 
               22.35      20.93      18.74      19.07      22.20      32.29 
      SCE       0.79       0.84       0.71       0.81       0.86       0.85 
              (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02) 
               29.26      38.47      21.09      31.13      33.69      37.66 
       SG       0.68       0.75       0.70       0.72       0.75       0.83 
              (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               17.86      22.75      20.28      21.03      22.28      30.71 
       SL       0.41       0.51       0.37       0.67       0.44       0.44 
              (0.12)     (0.10)     (0.11)     (0.09)     (0.11)     (0.12) 
                3.58       4.96       3.50       7.55       3.95       3.62 
      CST       0.78       0.77       0.70       0.71       0.74       0.85 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               26.97      24.40      20.63      20.00      21.84      32.72 
 
         Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables  
 
                SPRM        SCE         SG         SL        CST    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     SPRM       1.00 
      SCE       0.80       1.00 
              (0.03) 
               23.69 
       SG       0.70       0.81       1.00 
              (0.04)     (0.03) 
               16.57      29.99 
       SL       0.47       0.53       0.59       1.00 
              (0.12)     (0.11)     (0.11) 
                3.76       4.93       5.56 
      CST       0.79       0.80       0.87       0.42       1.00 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.13) 
               25.58      30.12      34.09       3.20 
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                           Goodness of Fit Statistics 
 
                             Degrees of Freedom = 731 
               Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 1649.65 (P = 0.0) 
       Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 1573.39 (P = 0.0) 
                Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 842.39 
            90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (731.89 ; 960.62) 
 
                        Minimum Fit Function Value = 5.50 
                Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 2.81 
              90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (2.44 ; 3.20) 
             Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.062 
            90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.058 ; 0.066) 
               P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.00 
 
                  Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 6.39 
             90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (6.02 ; 6.79) 
                         ECVI for Saturated Model = 6.02 
                       ECVI for Independence Model = 297.61 
 
     Chi-Square for Independence Model with 861 Degrees of Freedom = 89199.35 
                           Independence AIC = 89283.35 
                               Model AIC = 1917.39 
                             Saturated AIC = 1806.00 
                           Independence CAIC = 89481.05 
                               Model CAIC = 2727.01 
                             Saturated CAIC = 6056.52 
 
                          Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.98 
                        Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.99 
                     Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.83 
                        Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.99 
                        Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.99 
                         Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.98 
 
                             Critical N (CN) = 150.65 
 
 
                     Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.011 
                             Standardized RMR = 0.028 
                        Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.80 
                   Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.75 
                  Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.65 
 
        The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
  Path to from      Decrease in Chi-Square    New Estimate 
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 OE        SCE                16.9                -0.19 <-- 
 IOP       SL                 15.8                -0.12 <-- 
 RMON      SPM                10.1                 0.21 <-- 
 ITSBC     SL                  8.7                 0.09 <-- 
 PKOT      SG                 13.4                -0.22 <-- 
 PKOT      CST                13.7                -0.25 <-- 
 SDCA      SPM                 8.5                 0.25 <-- 
 SDCA      SG                 12.1                 0.21 <-- 
 JTBITS    BE                  8.8                 0.17 <-- 
 SADM      SL                  9.7                -0.09 <-- 
 SSS       CST                 9.1                 0.18 <-- 
 SWC       II                 10.0                 0.11 <-- 
 SKM       SG                  8.7                -0.20 <-- 
 SC        SG                 10.3                 0.27 <-- 
 
 
D.3 Output of Model Reduced after Second Iteration 
Latent Variables ISA STT II SI BE SPM SPRM SCE SG 
 SL CST 
 Relationships 
 CPI = II 
 TE = II 
 PE = II 
 OE = STT II SPM SCE 
 TT = STT II 
 ATC = STT 
 ABC = ISA STT SPM 
 IBI = STT II SPM 
 IOP = ISA STT BE SPM SL 
 TSR = ISA STT 
 FRRS = ISA 
 RMF = ISA 
 RM = ISA 
 RMON = ISA BE SPM SL 
 SPS = SPM 
 SPI = SPM CST 
 ITES = SPM SPRM 
 SGS = BE SPM 
 ITSBC = BE SCE SL 
 HIC = BE SCE 
 VIC = BE 
 IRIERM = SI BE 
 OWRW = SI 
 RC = SI 
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 PORM = SI SL 
 RMBA = SI SPRM SG SL 
 PKOT = SI SPRM SG SL CST 
 SDCA = SI SPM SPRM SG SL 
 CSE = SPRM SCE 
 JTBITS = BE SCE 
 SADM = SCE SL 
 RAWC = SCE 
 SSS = SCE SL CST 
 CISS = SI CST 
 SSP = CST 
 SWC = II CST 
 SLS = CST 
 SKM = SG SL CST 
 ITST = SG 
 DSR = SG 
 SC = SG SL CST 
 STWS = SG CST 
 Set the Variance of ISA to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of STT to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of II to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SI to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of BE to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SPM to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SPRM to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SCE to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SG to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of SL to 1.00 
 Set the Variance of CST to 1.00 
 Path Diagram 
 Admissibility Check = 100 
 Iterations = 999 
 End of Problem 
 
 Sample Size =   301 
 
 Madhuri PHD Project1                                                            
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 CPI         TE         PE         OE         TT        ATC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      CPI       0.39 
       TE       0.33       0.42 
       PE       0.31       0.37       0.44 
       OE       0.29       0.34       0.36       0.43 
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       TT       0.25       0.29       0.33       0.34       0.45 
      ATC       0.24       0.27       0.29       0.29       0.32       0.43 
      ABC       0.22       0.26       0.26       0.26       0.28       0.31 
      IBI       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.29       0.28 
      IOP       0.23       0.25       0.28       0.27       0.28       0.27 
      TSR       0.21       0.24       0.25       0.25       0.28       0.27 
     FRRS       0.23       0.25       0.24       0.26       0.26       0.23 
      RMF       0.24       0.26       0.26       0.26       0.25       0.24 
       RM       0.24       0.27       0.28       0.28       0.27       0.25 
     RMON       0.20       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.26       0.23 
      SPS       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.24 
      SPI       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.26 
     ITES       0.21       0.25       0.26       0.27       0.26       0.25 
      SGS       0.23       0.25       0.27       0.25       0.24       0.25 
    ITSBC       0.21       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.25       0.24 
      HIC       0.22       0.24       0.27       0.25       0.25       0.21 
      VIC       0.22       0.24       0.25       0.24       0.25       0.23 
   IRIERM       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.24 
     OWRW       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.23 
       RC       0.19       0.21       0.22       0.20       0.23       0.23 
     PORM       0.19       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.21 
     RMBA       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.23       0.26       0.26 
     PKOT       0.23       0.25       0.26       0.22       0.26       0.26 
     SDCA       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.23       0.25       0.22 
      CSE       0.21       0.22       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.23 
   JTBITS       0.21       0.24       0.23       0.21       0.23       0.23 
     SADM       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.24 
     RAWC       0.21       0.24       0.23       0.21       0.24       0.24 
      SSS       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.25       0.28       0.26 
     CISS       0.20       0.21       0.21       0.20       0.21       0.20 
      SSP       0.19       0.22       0.19       0.20       0.22       0.21 
      SWC       0.21       0.24       0.24       0.22       0.20       0.21 
      SLS       0.18       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.20 
      SKM       0.18       0.20       0.19       0.18       0.23       0.22 
     ITST       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.18 
      DSR       0.18       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.22 
       SC       0.18       0.20       0.20       0.19       0.23       0.19 
     STWS       0.19       0.23       0.22       0.21       0.20       0.21 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 ABC        IBI        IOP        TSR       FRRS        RMF    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      ABC       0.39 
      IBI       0.31       0.38 
      IOP       0.28       0.28       0.39 
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      TSR       0.24       0.24       0.27       0.42 
     FRRS       0.22       0.23       0.26       0.29       0.40 
      RMF       0.20       0.22       0.25       0.27       0.30       0.41 
       RM       0.24       0.23       0.26       0.28       0.30       0.30 
     RMON       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.27       0.26       0.27 
      SPS       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.22       0.23 
      SPI       0.23       0.23       0.23       0.24       0.20       0.23 
     ITES       0.21       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.25 
      SGS       0.20       0.22       0.25       0.23       0.26       0.25 
    ITSBC       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24       0.24 
      HIC       0.20       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.25       0.23 
      VIC       0.22       0.21       0.24       0.22       0.25       0.23 
   IRIERM       0.24       0.25       0.26       0.26       0.29       0.28 
     OWRW       0.21       0.21       0.23       0.25       0.27       0.26 
       RC       0.20       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.23       0.22 
     PORM       0.21       0.20       0.23       0.26       0.26       0.24 
     RMBA       0.23       0.24       0.23       0.25       0.25       0.25 
     PKOT       0.24       0.24       0.21       0.29       0.25       0.25 
     SDCA       0.19       0.18       0.20       0.23       0.21       0.21 
      CSE       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.21 
   JTBITS       0.23       0.23       0.22       0.25       0.21       0.22 
     SADM       0.24       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.23       0.24 
     RAWC       0.24       0.25       0.23       0.24       0.24       0.24 
      SSS       0.25       0.27       0.22       0.25       0.24       0.22 
     CISS       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.22       0.20 
      SSP       0.21       0.18       0.20       0.20       0.21       0.19 
      SWC       0.18       0.17       0.20       0.18       0.23       0.21 
      SLS       0.18       0.17       0.18       0.18       0.20       0.19 
      SKM       0.21       0.20       0.16       0.22       0.21       0.19 
     ITST       0.19       0.19       0.17       0.18       0.18       0.17 
      DSR       0.19       0.16       0.19       0.18       0.18       0.19 
       SC       0.21       0.19       0.18       0.19       0.20       0.21 
     STWS       0.19       0.16       0.19       0.17       0.16       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                  RM       RMON        SPS        SPI       ITES        SGS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       RM       0.40 
     RMON       0.29       0.37 
      SPS       0.26       0.24       0.35 
      SPI       0.23       0.22       0.25       0.34 
     ITES       0.25       0.22       0.25       0.25       0.35 
      SGS       0.26       0.20       0.26       0.24       0.27       0.40 
    ITSBC       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.30 
      HIC       0.24       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.24       0.29 
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      VIC       0.26       0.20       0.23       0.22       0.23       0.27 
   IRIERM       0.28       0.25       0.24       0.24       0.25       0.29 
     OWRW       0.29       0.27       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.25 
       RC       0.25       0.25       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.24 
     PORM       0.26       0.24       0.21       0.21       0.24       0.24 
     RMBA       0.23       0.25       0.21       0.24       0.26       0.27 
     PKOT       0.27       0.25       0.23       0.25       0.25       0.26 
     SDCA       0.24       0.22       0.23       0.23       0.24       0.24 
      CSE       0.24       0.22       0.22       0.21       0.25       0.25 
   JTBITS       0.21       0.18       0.22       0.21       0.23       0.26 
     SADM       0.24       0.21       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.25 
     RAWC       0.25       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.25 
      SSS       0.24       0.23       0.22       0.24       0.25       0.26 
     CISS       0.22       0.20       0.20       0.19       0.22       0.22 
      SSP       0.22       0.20       0.23       0.19       0.21       0.23 
      SWC       0.24       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.23       0.24 
      SLS       0.20       0.19       0.19       0.17       0.19       0.21 
      SKM       0.21       0.21       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.21 
     ITST       0.17       0.16       0.21       0.18       0.19       0.22 
      DSR       0.18       0.19       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.23 
       SC       0.19       0.22       0.17       0.17       0.20       0.20 
     STWS       0.16       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.19       0.20 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
               ITSBC        HIC        VIC     IRIERM       OWRW         RC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
    ITSBC       0.40 
      HIC       0.30       0.41 
      VIC       0.28       0.31       0.38 
   IRIERM       0.31       0.30       0.31       0.46 
     OWRW       0.28       0.27       0.27       0.34       0.44 
       RC       0.24       0.23       0.24       0.29       0.30       0.40 
     PORM       0.27       0.27       0.26       0.31       0.32       0.30 
     RMBA       0.28       0.25       0.25       0.31       0.30       0.28 
     PKOT       0.27       0.27       0.28       0.29       0.32       0.29 
     SDCA       0.22       0.24       0.23       0.23       0.23       0.22 
      CSE       0.26       0.23       0.23       0.26       0.26       0.23 
   JTBITS       0.27       0.27       0.25       0.26       0.22       0.22 
     SADM       0.27       0.24       0.25       0.27       0.26       0.23 
     RAWC       0.27       0.25       0.25       0.29       0.26       0.24 
      SSS       0.27       0.24       0.26       0.31       0.27       0.24 
     CISS       0.22       0.19       0.20       0.24       0.24       0.21 
      SSP       0.21       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.21       0.18 
      SWC       0.19       0.19       0.21       0.21       0.22       0.20 
      SLS       0.18       0.19       0.20       0.21       0.20       0.17 
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      SKM       0.20       0.18       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.21 
     ITST       0.20       0.22       0.20       0.21       0.19       0.17 
      DSR       0.21       0.21       0.20       0.21       0.21       0.21 
       SC       0.24       0.19       0.20       0.26       0.27       0.22 
     STWS       0.22       0.20       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.19 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                PORM       RMBA       PKOT       SDCA        CSE     JTBITS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     PORM       0.41 
     RMBA       0.32       0.50 
     PKOT       0.31       0.35       0.52 
     SDCA       0.25       0.24       0.30       0.36 
      CSE       0.25       0.26       0.29       0.27       0.35 
   JTBITS       0.23       0.27       0.26       0.21       0.25       0.39 
     SADM       0.23       0.24       0.25       0.23       0.26       0.28 
     RAWC       0.24       0.27       0.28       0.22       0.25       0.28 
      SSS       0.24       0.30       0.29       0.22       0.25       0.27 
     CISS       0.21       0.23       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.20 
      SSP       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.23       0.22       0.21 
      SWC       0.21       0.23       0.24       0.21       0.22       0.20 
      SLS       0.19       0.19       0.20       0.20       0.21       0.17 
      SKM       0.20       0.26       0.29       0.20       0.22       0.20 
     ITST       0.19       0.24       0.23       0.18       0.19       0.24 
      DSR       0.18       0.22       0.20       0.19       0.20       0.21 
       SC       0.23       0.27       0.28       0.18       0.22       0.22 
     STWS       0.21       0.22       0.20       0.17       0.18       0.21 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                SADM       RAWC        SSS       CISS        SSP        SWC    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     SADM       0.35 
     RAWC       0.30       0.40 
      SSS       0.28       0.29       0.48 
     CISS       0.22       0.24       0.27       0.32 
      SSP       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.24       0.34 
      SWC       0.21       0.20       0.22       0.23       0.25       0.36 
      SLS       0.20       0.20       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.23 
      SKM       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.23       0.21       0.22 
     ITST       0.18       0.23       0.23       0.19       0.21       0.21 
      DSR       0.22       0.22       0.23       0.21       0.21       0.21 
       SC       0.21       0.23       0.26       0.21       0.21       0.21 
     STWS       0.22       0.23       0.22       0.18       0.20       0.19 
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         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 SLS        SKM       ITST        DSR         SC       STWS    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      SLS       0.31 
      SKM       0.23       0.37 
     ITST       0.21       0.21       0.39 
      DSR       0.21       0.21       0.24       0.34 
       SC       0.20       0.26       0.23       0.23       0.41 
     STWS       0.20       0.19       0.24       0.27       0.26       0.42 
 
 
 
 Madhuri PHD Project1                                                            
 
 Number of Iterations = 63 
 
 LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood)                            
 
         Measurement Equations 
 
 
      CPI = 0.52*II, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.030)             (0.011)            
            17.75               10.81             
 
       TE = 0.60*II, Errorvar.= 0.054  , R² = 0.87 
           (0.028)             (0.0068)            
            21.26               7.95               
 
       PE = 0.62*II, Errorvar.= 0.062  , R² = 0.86 
           (0.029)             (0.0074)            
            21.04               8.30               
 
       OE = 0.17*STT + 0.44*II + 0.16*SPM - 0.19*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.082  , R² = 0.81 
           (0.062)    (0.042)   (0.062)    (0.043)              (0.0083)            
            2.75       10.58     2.59      -4.44                 9.87               
 
       TT = 0.42*STT + 0.17*II, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.046)    (0.044)             (0.012)            
            9.11       3.81                11.46             
 
      ATC = 0.55*STT, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.031)              (0.012)            
            17.73                11.09             
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      ABC =  - 0.053*ISA + 0.84*STT - 0.27*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.075  , R² = 0.80 
              (0.050)     (0.095)    (0.097)              (0.0099)            
              -1.05        8.78      -2.80                 7.63               
 
      IBI = 0.85*STT - 0.054*II - 0.30*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.081 , R² = 0.79 
           (0.10)     (0.043)    (0.096)              (0.010)            
            8.51      -1.24      -3.14                 7.74              
 
      IOP = 0.18*ISA + 0.62*STT + 0.13*BE - 0.31*SPM - 0.15*SL, Errorvar.= 0.098 , R² = 0.75 
           (0.056)    (0.091)    (0.050)   (0.11)     (0.032)             (0.010)            
            3.14       6.82       2.52     -2.88      -4.85                9.43              
 
      TSR = 0.38*ISA + 0.16*STT, Errorvar.= 0.14  , R² = 0.65 
           (0.050)    (0.048)              (0.013)            
            7.53       3.37                 11.44             
 
     FRRS = 0.54*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.029)              (0.010)            
            18.46                10.22             
 
      RMF = 0.54*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.030)              (0.012)            
            17.66                10.60             
 
       RM = 0.56*ISA, Errorvar.= 0.086  , R² = 0.79 
           (0.029)              (0.0089)            
            19.43                9.56               
 
     RMON = 0.49*ISA - 0.25*BE + 0.21*SPM + 0.097*SL, Errorvar.= 0.093 , R² = 0.75 
           (0.056)    (0.053)   (0.062)    (0.028)              (0.010)            
            8.76      -4.82      3.43       3.48                 9.04              
 
      SPS = 0.50*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.70 
           (0.028)              (0.010)            
            17.68                10.57             
 
      SPI = 0.63*SPM - 0.15*CST, Errorvar.= 0.086 , R² = 0.75 
           (0.056)    (0.054)              (0.010)            
            11.08     -2.81                 8.42              
 
     ITES = 0.43*SPM + 0.087*SPRM, Errorvar.= 0.093  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.045)    (0.043)                (0.0088)            
            9.59       2.01                   10.59              
 
      SGS = 0.35*BE + 0.20*SPM, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.71 
           (0.049)   (0.048)              (0.010)            
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            7.08      4.20                 11.15             
 
    ITSBC = 0.39*BE + 0.15*SCE + 0.039*SL, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 0.72 
           (0.050)   (0.054)    (0.031)              (0.010)            
            7.80      2.74       1.28                 10.95             
 
      HIC = 0.69*BE - 0.14*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.078 , R² = 0.81 
           (0.062)   (0.059)              (0.011)            
            11.09    -2.34                 6.79              
 
      VIC = 0.54*BE, Errorvar.= 0.091  , R² = 0.76 
           (0.029)             (0.0095)            
            18.85               9.60               
 
   IRIERM = 0.38*SI + 0.23*BE, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.73 
           (0.050)   (0.048)             (0.011)            
            7.64      4.68                10.94             
 
     OWRW = 0.58*SI, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.76 
           (0.031)             (0.011)            
            18.92               9.69              
 
       RC = 0.53*SI, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.69 
           (0.030)             (0.012)            
            17.53               10.48             
 
     PORM = 0.58*SI - 0.047*SL, Errorvar.= 0.099 , R² = 0.76 
           (0.038)   (0.034)              (0.011)            
            15.55    -1.38                 9.42              
 
     RMBA = 0.26*SI + 0.15*SPRM + 0.073*SG + 0.19*SL, Errorvar.= 0.17  , R² = 0.65 
           (0.068)   (0.059)     (0.057)    (0.046)             (0.016)            
            3.78      2.63        1.29       4.17                10.98             
 
     PKOT = 0.044*SI + 0.49*SPRM + 0.033*SG + 0.31*SL - 0.12*CST, Errorvar.= 0.11  , R² = 
0.78 
           (0.090)    (0.089)     (0.10)     (0.063)   (0.096)              (0.017)            
            0.49       5.53        0.33       4.95     -1.20                 6.62              
 
     SDCA =  - 0.080*SI + 0.080*SPM + 0.51*SPRM + 0.035*SG - 0.00087*SL, Errorvar.= 
0.067 , R² = 0.81 
              (0.077)    (0.076)     (0.088)     (0.063)    (0.048)                (0.013)            
              -1.03       1.05        5.80        0.56      -0.018                  5.34              
 
      CSE = 0.33*SPRM + 0.23*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.075  , R² = 0.78 
           (0.042)     (0.048)              (0.0080)            
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            7.99        4.74                 9.37               
 
   JTBITS = 0.18*BE + 0.36*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.12  , R² = 0.68 
           (0.048)   (0.049)              (0.011)            
            3.81      7.28                 11.23             
 
     SADM = 0.60*SCE - 0.12*SL, Errorvar.= 0.047  , R² = 0.87 
           (0.042)    (0.034)             (0.0080)            
            14.55     -3.45                5.86               
 
     RAWC = 0.55*SCE, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.75 
           (0.029)              (0.010)            
            18.68                9.91              
 
      SSS = 0.33*SCE + 0.13*SL + 0.17*CST, Errorvar.= 0.18  , R² = 0.63 
           (0.056)    (0.040)   (0.057)              (0.016)            
            5.92       3.39      2.95                 11.25             
 
     CISS = 0.12*SI + 0.39*CST, Errorvar.= 0.087  , R² = 0.72 
           (0.031)   (0.034)              (0.0083)            
            3.75      11.60                10.48              
 
      SSP = 0.50*CST, Errorvar.= 0.090  , R² = 0.73 
           (0.027)              (0.0094)            
            18.23                9.55               
 
      SWC = 0.11*II + 0.40*CST, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.65 
           (0.033)   (0.036)              (0.012)            
            3.39      11.09                10.93             
 
      SLS = 0.48*CST, Errorvar.= 0.086  , R² = 0.72 
           (0.026)              (0.0089)            
            18.00                9.71               
 
      SKM =  - 0.087*SG + 0.30*SL + 0.43*CST, Errorvar.= 0.094 , R² = 0.75 
              (0.083)    (0.040)   (0.084)              (0.012)            
              -1.04       7.61      5.13                 7.84              
 
     ITST = 0.47*SG, Errorvar.= 0.17  , R² = 0.57 
           (0.031)             (0.015)            
            15.01               11.03             
 
      DSR = 0.50*SG, Errorvar.= 0.087  , R² = 0.74 
           (0.027)             (0.0094)            
            18.37               9.27               
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       SC = 0.27*SG + 0.27*SL + 0.097*CST, Errorvar.= 0.13  , R² = 0.68 
           (0.082)   (0.039)   (0.080)               (0.014)            
            3.31      6.88      1.22                  9.76              
 
     STWS = 0.84*SG - 0.35*CST, Errorvar.= 0.10  , R² = 0.76 
           (0.097)   (0.095)              (0.018)            
            8.68     -3.65                 5.54              
 
 
 
         Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables  
 
                 ISA        STT         II         SI         BE        SPM    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      ISA       1.00 
      STT       0.83       1.00 
              (0.03) 
               32.69 
       II       0.77       0.81       1.00 
              (0.03)     (0.02) 
               28.01      33.30 
       SI       0.86       0.76       0.66       1.00 
              (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.04) 
               41.07      25.82      17.48 
       BE       0.81       0.79       0.74       0.84       1.00 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02) 
               30.44      27.68      24.17      34.29 
      SPM       0.85       0.92       0.80       0.78       0.85       1.00 
              (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02) 
               37.55      47.19      30.70      26.38      35.71 
     SPRM       0.76       0.71       0.66       0.78       0.77       0.81 
              (0.05)     (0.06)     (0.05)     (0.06)     (0.05)     (0.05) 
               15.53      12.12      12.85      13.91      15.97      17.18 
      SCE       0.78       0.84       0.70       0.81       0.83       0.83 
              (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               26.82      37.73      20.29      31.68      30.27      32.49 
       SG       0.69       0.76       0.70       0.73       0.75       0.82 
              (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               18.32      23.88      20.71      22.18      23.71      31.13 
       SL       0.37       0.47       0.32       0.56       0.37       0.34 
              (0.15)     (0.14)     (0.14)     (0.13)     (0.15)     (0.17) 
                2.49       3.25       2.22       4.34       2.45       2.00 
      CST       0.75       0.76       0.68       0.71       0.73       0.84 
              (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
               23.92      23.56      18.59      19.34      21.64      31.75 
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         Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables  
 
                SPRM        SCE         SG         SL        CST    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
     SPRM       1.00 
      SCE       0.74       1.00 
              (0.06) 
               12.67 
       SG       0.66       0.80       1.00 
              (0.07)     (0.03) 
                9.15      28.77 
       SL       0.31       0.53       0.43       1.00 
              (0.17)     (0.15)     (0.17) 
                1.87       3.63       2.45 
      CST       0.76       0.77       0.88       0.32       1.00 
              (0.05)     (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.19) 
               14.93      25.19      35.45       1.74 
 
 
                           Goodness of Fit Statistics 
 
                             Degrees of Freedom = 717 
               Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 1521.29 (P = 0.0) 
       Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 1431.56 (P = 0.0) 
                Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 714.56 
            90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (610.64 ; 826.23) 
 
                        Minimum Fit Function Value = 5.07 
                Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 2.38 
              90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (2.04 ; 2.75) 
             Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.058 
            90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.053 ; 0.062) 
              P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.0022 
 
                  Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 6.01 
             90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (5.67 ; 6.38) 
                         ECVI for Saturated Model = 6.02 
                       ECVI for Independence Model = 297.61 
 
     Chi-Square for Independence Model with 861 Degrees of Freedom = 89199.35 
                           Independence AIC = 89283.35 
                               Model AIC = 1803.56 
                             Saturated AIC = 1806.00 
                           Independence CAIC = 89481.05 
                               Model CAIC = 2679.08 
                             Saturated CAIC = 6056.52 
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                          Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.98 
                        Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.99 
                     Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.82 
                        Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.99 
                        Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.99 
                         Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.98 
 
                             Critical N (CN) = 160.35 
 
 
                     Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.010 
                             Standardized RMR = 0.026 
                        Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.81 
                   Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.77 
                  Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.65 
 
        The Modification Indices Suggest to Add the 
  Path to  from      Decrease in Chi-Square    New Estimate 
 TT        SCE                10.0                -0.15 
 RMON      SI                 17.5                 0.33 
 JTBITS    ISA                12.0                -0.15 
 JTBITS    SI                 12.5                -0.18 
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 19. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Minimum of one year 
experience in either ISM 
or ISO, or both 
301 1.0133 .11470 8.543 .140 71.465 .280 
Years of experience you 
have in either ISM or 
ISO, or both 
301 3.9369 .98624 -.985 .140 1.064 .280 
Currently working in the 
field of either ISM or 
ISO, or both 
301 1.0332 .17952 5.235 .140 25.577 .280 
Theoretical or practical 
knowledge about 
achieving IS maturity in 
an organization 
301 1.0100 .09950 9.916 .140 96.967 .280 
Agreement to participate 
in this research 301 1.0000 .00000 . . . . 
Possess good English 
language skills 301 1.0000 .00000 . . . . 
Continuous Process 
Improvements 301 4.2724 .62626 -1.178 .140 4.927 .280 
Technology Excellence 301 4.2591 .64753 -.977 .140 2.925 .280 
Process Excellence 301 4.2658 .66518 -.906 .140 2.194 .280 
Operations Excellence 301 4.2658 .65508 -.911 .140 2.418 .280 
Technology 
Trustworthiness 301 4.2392 .67027 -.990 .140 2.593 .280 
Adapt to Technology 
Changes 301 4.2425 .65649 -.870 .140 2.307 .280 
Adapt to Business 
Changes 301 4.2724 .62092 -.850 .140 2.893 .280 
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Integrity of Business 
Information 301 4.2691 .61968 -.844 .140 2.915 .280 
Institutionalization of 
Processes 301 4.2890 .62143 -.709 .140 2.066 .280 
Tracking Signs of Risks 301 4.2791 .64436 -1.014 .140 3.089 .280 
Formulating Risk 
Response Strategies 301 4.2990 .63005 -.817 .140 2.333 .280 
Risk Metrics Formulation 301 4.2691 .64084 -.846 .140 2.400 .280 
Risk Measurements 301 4.2924 .63317 -.886 .140 2.650 .280 
Risk Monitoring 301 4.2425 .60909 -.806 .140 3.130 .280 
Security Program 
Strategy 301 4.2458 .59388 -.617 .140 2.612 .280 
Security Program 
Integration 301 4.2259 .58492 -.688 .140 3.328 .280 
IT Enablement of 
Security 301 4.2060 .59225 -.673 .140 3.078 .280 
Security Governance 
Structures 301 4.2093 .63197 -1.077 .140 4.405 .280 
IT Security and Business 
Coordination 301 4.2425 .63586 -.882 .140 2.809 .280 
Horizontal Information 
Flow 301 4.2558 .64110 -.900 .140 2.719 .280 
Vertical Information 
Flow 301 4.2625 .61716 -.834 .140 2.963 .280 
Information Risks 
Integrated into ERM 301 4.2226 .67845 -.951 .140 2.331 .280 
Organization-Wide Risk 
View 301 4.1794 .66411 -.973 .140 3.213 .280 
Risks Communications 301 4.2193 .63121 -.851 .140 2.856 .280 
Prioritization of Risks 
Mitigation 301 4.1860 .64182 -.875 .140 2.807 .280 
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Risk Management Budget 
Allocation 301 4.0764 .70532 -1.027 .140 2.392 .280 
Pre-emptive Knowledge 
of Threats 301 4.1362 .72437 -1.484 .140 4.639 .280 
Security Data Collection 
and Analysis 301 4.2492 .60087 -.814 .140 3.386 .280 
Continuous Security 
Enhancements 301 4.2392 .59098 -.509 .140 2.183 .280 
Joint Teams of Business 
and IT Security 301 4.3056 .62685 -.908 .140 2.847 .280 
Security-Aware Decision-
Making 301 4.2558 .59246 -.530 .140 2.158 .280 
Risk-Aware Work 
Culture 301 4.2525 .63459 -.819 .140 2.496 .280 
Stakeholder Satisfaction 
Surveys 301 4.2060 .69577 -1.139 .140 2.872 .280 
Continuous 
Improvements in Security 
Skills 
301 4.2658 .56195 -.476 .140 2.873 .280 
Skilled Security 
Practitioners 301 4.2724 .58213 -.734 .140 3.488 .280 
Security Workforce 
Screening 301 4.2857 .60396 -.683 .140 2.430 .280 
Security Leadership 
Skills 301 4.2458 .55919 -.569 .140 3.580 .280 
Security Knowledge 
Management 301 4.1794 .61186 -.911 .140 3.682 .280 
Continuous Access 
Review 301 4.2292 .54523 -.537 .140 4.045 .280 
IT Security Training 301 4.2359 .62250 -1.130 .140 4.894 .280 
Defined Security Roles 301 4.1894 .58368 -.761 .140 3.790 .280 
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Security Certifications 301 4.1761 .64205 -1.242 .140 4.869 .280 
Security Teams Working 
In Shifts 301 4.1595 .64896 -1.567 .140 6.939 .280 
Valid N (listwise) 301       
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Appendix F: New Path Formations in Modified Models as Determined 
through SEM 
 
Table 20. New Path Formations in the First Modified Model in SEM 
S. No. Path From Path To 
1 STT OE 
2 SPM OE 
3 II TT 
4 ISA ABC 
5 SPM ABC 
6 II IBI 
7 SPM IBI 
8 ISA IOP 
9 BE IOP 
10 SPM IOP 
11 STT TSR 
12 BE RMON 
13 SL RMON 
14 CST SPI 
15 SPRM ITES 
16 SCE ITSBC 
17 SCE HIC 
18 SL PORM 
19 SPRM RMBA 
20 SG RMBA 
21 SL RMBA 
22 SI PKOT 
23 SL PKOT 
24 SI SDCA 
25 SL SDCA 
26 SCE CSE 
27 SI CISS 
28 CST SKM 
29 CST SC 
30 CST STWS 
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Table 21. New Path Formations in the Second Modified Model in SEM 
S. No. Path From Path To 
1 SCE                  OE         
2 SL                   IOP        
3 SPM                  RMON       
4 SL                    ITSBC      
5 SG                   PKOT       
6 CST                 PKOT       
7  SPM                   SDCA      
8 SG                   SDCA       
9 BE                   JTBITS     
10 SL                    SADM       
11 CST                 SSS        
12  II                   SWC       
13 SG                 SKM        
14 SG                 SC         
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Appendix G: IRB Memorandum 
MEMORANDUM 
 
 
To:  Madhuri Edwards 
   
From:  Ling Wang, Ph.D.,    
  Center Representative, Institutional Review Board 
  
Date:  June 22, 2017 
 
Re: IRB #:  2017-402; Title, “Identifying Factors Contributing Towards 
Information Security Maturity in an Organization” 
 
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level.  Based on the 
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB review under 
45 CFR 46.101(b) (Exempt Category 2).  You may proceed with your study as described to the 
IRB.  As principal investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements: 
 
1) CONSENT:  If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they must be obtained in 
such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the process affords 
subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers from those directly 
involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider their participation after they 
have been provided this information.  The subjects must be given a copy of the signed 
consent document, and a copy must be placed in a secure file separate from de-identified 
participant information.  Record of informed consent must be retained for a minimum of 
three years from the conclusion of the study. 
2) ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS:  The principal investigator is 
required to notify the IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and Ling Wang, Ph.D., 
respectively) of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a 
result of this study.  Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, 
depression as a result of participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss 
of confidentiality/anonymity of subject.  Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is 
serious. 
3) AMENDMENTS:  Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of 
subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to 
implementation.  Please be advised that changes in a study may require further review 
depending on the nature of the change.  Please contact me with any questions regarding 
amendments or changes to your study. 
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The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human subjects 
prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46) revised June 
18, 1991. 
 
Cc: Gurvirender P Tejay, Ph.D. 
 Ling Wang, Ph.D. 
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